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  B	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  A	  C	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Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  a	  thesis	  project	  consisting	  of	  written	  scholarship	  and	  a	  
series	  of	  performances	  that	  investigate	  communication	  between	  human	  and	  animal	  
species	  while	  expanding	  upon	  concepts	  of	  performance	  art.	  	  In	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room,	  I	  
discuss	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  performance	  art	  
practice,	  focusing	  on	  potential	  frameworks,	  methodologies,	  and	  mythologies	  
contained	  therein.	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  explores	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  humans	  and	  animals	  
collectively	  cultivate	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  connection	  across	  the	  barriers	  of	  our	  species.	  	  
It	  is	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  removal	  of	  these	  barriers	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  division.	  It	  explores	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I	  N	  T	  R	  O	  D	  U	  C	  T	  I	  O	  N	  
Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  a	  Master’s	  thesis	  project	  that	  responds	  to	  my	  developing	  
and	  sometimes	  confounding	  relationship	  with	  my	  cat	  Sushi.1	  	  In	  my	  research,	  I	  attempt	  
to	  understand	  this	  specific	  bond	  within	  a	  more	  expansive	  framework	  of	  human-­‐animal	  
relationships.	  I	  focus	  on	  applying	  my	  lived	  experience,	  daily	  observation,	  and	  learned	  
knowledge	  to	  existing	  structures	  for	  understanding	  human-­‐animal	  connections,	  
scholarship,	  cultural	  production,	  and	  contemporary	  art	  practice.	  During	  the	  research	  
and	  production	  of	  my	  Master’s	  thesis,	  I	  realized	  this	  project	  by	  developing	  my	  artistic	  
practice	  through	  experimentation,	  observation,	  and	  speculation	  and	  by	  continuing	  to	  
nurture	  an	  ongoing	  inquiry	  into	  human-­‐animal	  communication.	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  a	  
project	  led	  by	  process	  and	  performance,	  through	  the	  intensification	  and	  concentrated	  
development	  of	  my	  intuitive,	  artistic	  practice,	  and	  by	  intersecting	  theory	  with	  
presumption	  and	  ambiguity.	  	  It	  responds	  to	  two	  central	  questions:	  in	  what	  ways	  have	  
human-­‐animal	  pet	  relationships	  amplified	  an	  existing	  form	  of	  communication	  between	  
species?;	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  has	  research	  and	  production	  in	  contemporary	  
performative	  practice	  investigated	  these	  forms	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  and	  
communication?	  
	   Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  strives	  to	  address	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  through	  an	  
experimental	  and	  speculative	  dialogue	  with	  and	  about	  animals.	  I	  aim	  to	  locate	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Sushi	  is	  my	  companion	  animal.	  She	  is	  a	  5-­‐year	  old,	  black,	  medium-­‐haired	  female	  feline	  with	  
white	  bursts	  at	  her	  neck	  and	  lower	  belly.	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dialogue	  as	  it	  is	  established	  through	  presumption	  and	  experience,	  relying	  on	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  animal	  as	  a	  sentient	  being.	  This	  sentient	  animal	  is	  modern,	  
postmodern,	  posi-­‐postmodern.2	  In	  attributing	  consciousness	  and	  emotions	  to	  animals,	  
the	  degree	  to	  which	  animality	  and	  affect	  are	  read	  varies	  with	  each	  pet	  relationship;	  this	  
project	  establishes	  and	  builds	  upon	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  sentient	  animal	  being	  capable	  of	  
emotion,	  contribution,	  and	  communication.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  animals	  
do	  have	  emotion,	  but	  that	  these	  emotions	  are	  unknown,	  mysterious,	  and	  determined	  
only	  by	  subjective	  human	  experience	  and	  language.	  
The	  animal	  specific	  to	  this	  thesis	  paper	  is	  the	  domesticated	  creature,	  the	  pet.3	  
In	  the	  establishment	  of	  this	  thesis	  project,	  I	  identify	  a	  posthumanist	  framework4	  within	  
which	  to	  consider	  animality	  and	  concepts	  of	  “becoming	  with”5	  and	  “being	  with”6.	  These	  
concepts	  are	  not	  synonymous,	  and	  I	  detail	  contrasting	  and	  complementary	  elements	  in	  
my	  understanding	  of	  these	  phenomenological	  determinants	  with	  my	  description	  of	  
“coming	  apart.”	  I	  take	  note	  of	  theoretical	  developments	  related	  to	  animals	  and	  the	  way	  
that	  animals	  are	  commonly	  understood,	  and	  I	  reflect	  on	  concepts	  of	  human-­‐animal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Posi-­‐postmodern	  is	  a	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  approach	  to	  understanding	  relationships,	  
concepts,	  troubles,	  and	  truths.	  I	  will	  describe	  in	  detail	  the	  origins	  of	  posi-­‐postmodern	  later	  in	  the	  
text	  in	  TWO,	  pg	  63.	  
3	  	  By	  using	  the	  term	  ‘domesticated’,	  I	  am	  referring	  specifically	  to	  close	  pet	  relationships,	  
generally	  with	  cats	  and	  dogs.	  Although	  the	  term	  ‘domestic	  animal’	  can	  refer	  to	  any	  animal	  that	  
has	  been	  ‘tamed’	  by	  humans,	  such	  as	  cows,	  sheep,	  pigs,	  or	  horses,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  
not	  refer	  to	  those	  other	  animals	  unless	  noted.	  
4	  This	  is	  posthumanism	  as	  developed	  by	  Cary	  Wolfe,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  depth	  in	  TWO,	  pg	  53.	  
5	  “Becoming	  with”	  is	  a	  term	  that	  Donna	  Haraway	  introduces	  in	  the	  text	  When	  Species	  Meet	  
(2008b).	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  meeting	  (between	  humans	  and	  animals)	  and	  what	  results	  
from	  that	  meeting;	  it	  is	  an	  ontological	  and	  biological	  shift.	  I	  will	  discuss	  “becoming	  with”	  
throughout	  the	  text,	  specifically	  further	  in	  ONE,	  pg	  17.	  
6	  “Being	  with”	  (Martin	  Heidegger,	  Being	  and	  Time,	  1953)	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  describes	  the	  very	  
nature	  of	  being	  human	  and	  of	  being	  human	  with	  another.	  I	  will	  apply	  this	  concept	  of	  “being	  
with”	  to	  humans	  and	  animals	  later	  in	  ONE,	  pg	  20.	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relationships	  and	  interspecies	  connections	  in	  philosophy	  and	  psychoanalysis.	  With	  
speculation	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  intuitive	  communication,	  I	  outline	  an	  under-­‐
developed	  potential	  that	  is	  present	  in	  all	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  and	  investigate	  
selected	  artwork	  by	  artists	  who	  have	  offered	  insight	  into	  intuitive	  relationships	  with	  
animals	  in	  their	  artistic	  practice.	  Furthermore,	  I	  detail	  diverse	  practices	  in	  the	  recent	  
history	  of	  performance	  art	  and	  the	  way	  that	  mythologies	  of	  the	  artist	  and	  of	  
performance	  events	  have	  been	  encouraged	  and	  emphasized.7	  These	  mythologies	  
reflect	  an	  aura,	  formed	  by	  combining	  the	  medium	  of	  photography	  with	  performance	  
and	  mediated	  through	  the	  only	  available	  remains	  of	  early	  performance	  art:	  still	  images	  
with	  vague	  supplementary	  information.8	  What	  then	  confronts	  the	  contemporary	  
academic	  and	  student	  of	  performance	  is	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  work	  existing	  as	  
mythology	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  our	  reliance	  on	  still	  image	  documentation.	  The	  
mythology	  that	  is	  developed	  through	  performance	  art	  by	  this	  documentation	  and	  
narrative	  is	  emphasized	  and	  pushed	  forward	  through	  my	  own	  artistic	  experiments.	  	  I	  
include	  in	  my	  thesis	  an	  investigation	  of	  artwork	  that	  elaborates	  on	  conventional	  notions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Certainly,	  there	  are	  artists	  who	  have	  manipulated	  video	  and	  photo	  documentation	  for	  an	  
alternate	  understanding	  of	  performance,	  such	  as	  Yves	  Klein	  (Leap	  Into	  the	  Void,	  1960).	  This	  
practice	  was	  integral	  for	  the	  mythologization	  of	  certain	  performances:	  an	  experience	  of	  an	  event	  
created	  without	  being	  present	  for	  the	  event	  itself.	  However,	  as	  Amelia	  Jones	  argues	  in	  
“Presence”	  in	  absentia	  (1997),	  this	  mediated	  relationship	  to	  performance	  resonates	  with	  any	  
relationship	  to	  any	  cultural	  product	  (12).	  “While	  the	  live	  situation	  may	  enable	  the	  
phenomenological	  relations	  of	  flesh-­‐to-­‐flesh	  engagement,	  the	  documentary	  exchange	  
(viewer/reader	  <-­‐-­‐>	  document)	  is	  equally	  intersubjective”	  (Jones,	  12).	  Jones	  goes	  on	  to	  point	  out	  
that	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  artist	  falls	  under	  scrutiny	  by	  the	  audience,	  regardless	  of	  being	  present	  
or	  reading	  an	  image	  of	  the	  performance,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  hindsight	  afforded	  the	  viewer	  of	  
an	  image	  may	  create	  more	  meaning	  and	  comprehension	  around	  the	  historical	  and	  narrative	  
processes	  of	  the	  artwork.	  	  	  	  
8	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  Joseph	  Beuys’s	  I	  Like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  Me,	  1974,	  which	  I	  will	  
discuss	  later	  in	  ONE,	  pg	  37.	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of	  performance	  to	  develop	  a	  discussion	  of	  performativity	  in	  practice.	  Throughout	  this	  
work,	  I	  consider	  degrees	  of	  performativity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  the	  artist	  and	  the	  animal.	  	  
In	  my	  performative	  practice,	  I	  consider	  the	  removal	  of	  implied	  barriers	  between	  
our	  species	  -­‐	  mine	  and	  Sushi’s	  -­‐	  and	  seek	  to	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  human-­‐
animal	  dichotomy	  for	  our	  relationship.	  Through	  this	  process,	  I	  adopt	  an	  overarching	  
ideology	  of	  what	  I	  call	  posi-­‐postmodernism,	  a	  strategy	  for	  the	  everyday;	  it	  is	  both	  a	  
theoretical	  perspective	  and	  a	  conceptual	  approach.	  Posi-­‐postmodernism	  acknowledges	  
Sushi	  and	  me	  in	  the	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy	  yet	  enables	  me	  to	  establish	  the	  concept	  
of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  along	  with	  signified	  barriers	  and	  limitations	  to	  our	  
communication.	  
Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  captures	  a	  momentary	  glimpse	  at	  my	  relationship	  with	  
Sushi.	  In	  this	  glimpse,	  one	  can	  see	  Sushi	  and	  me	  perform	  together,	  play	  together,	  love	  
each	  other,	  antagonize	  each	  other:	  we	  are	  companions	  and	  co-­‐dependants.	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  the	  distinction	  of	  species:	  that	  we	  are	  human	  and	  animal.	  However,	  
in	  this	  project,	  I	  speculatively	  position	  Sushi	  and	  myself	  as	  void	  of	  definitive	  species.	  I	  
playfully	  consider	  ourselves	  species-­‐less	  when	  we	  are	  together	  in	  the	  room,	  performing	  
with	  one	  another;	  I	  do	  not	  regard	  Sushi	  as	  an	  animal	  collaborator.	  Instead,	  in	  our	  
performances,	  I	  position	  the	  term	  collaborator	  as	  being	  irrelevant;	  while	  certainly	  we	  
are	  both	  performing,	  we	  are	  performing	  together	  in	  order	  to	  “become	  with.”	  When	  I	  
photograph	  only	  Sushi	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  camera,	  she	  is	  “being”	  without	  a	  sense	  of	  
performing.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  when	  I	  am	  the	  sole	  performer	  in	  the	  frame;	  however,	  
when	  we	  perform	  and	  are	  together	  we	  are	  “being	  with.”	  By	  positioning	  ourselves	  as	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performers	  and	  companions,	  the	  experimentations	  that	  are	  represented	  in	  Animals	  in	  
the	  Room	  toy	  with	  the	  absurd	  and	  the	  speculative.	  Despite	  advances	  in	  animal	  cognition	  
and	  animal	  communication,	  much	  about	  animal	  emotion	  remains	  unknown.	  As	  such,	  I	  
rely	  on	  human	  presumption	  while	  queering	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowing	  Sushi’s	  thought	  
process	  and	  emotion.	  The	  inherent	  truth	  of	  working	  with	  an	  animal	  in	  performative	  
practice	  is	  that	  our	  shared	  emotions	  are	  known	  only	  by	  speculation,	  sensation,	  and	  a	  
visceral	  notion	  rather	  than	  by	  fact	  or	  data.	  	  
This	  thesis	  is	  built	  upon	  the	  idea	  of	  performing	  a	  relationship.	  It	  is	  a	  process-­‐
based,	  intuitive,	  and	  reflexive	  project.	  The	  process,	  performative	  and	  experimental,	  
leads	  reflexive	  research	  and	  intuitive	  responses	  to	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  —	  
specifically,	  my	  relationship	  with	  Sushi.	  As	  the	  human	  creator	  and	  the	  lead	  
performer/researcher/producer	  in	  this	  project,	  I	  take	  actions	  from	  my	  daily	  life	  with	  
Sushi	  and	  stage	  a	  glimpse	  of	  this	  action	  for	  the	  audience,	  mediated	  through	  still	  
photography.	  In	  my	  everyday	  relationship	  with	  Sushi,	  I	  believe	  we	  love	  each	  other,	  I	  
project	  my	  feelings	  onto	  her,	  I	  care	  for	  her,	  and	  I	  understand	  that	  she	  reciprocates	  this	  
affection.	  I	  believe	  in	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  our	  relationship.	  In	  our	  performances,	  I	  
position	  our	  relationship	  as	  transcendental.	  We	  communicate	  through	  our	  learned	  
language	  and	  experience,	  a	  mixture	  of	  read	  body	  language	  and	  signs,	  verbal	  
communication	  (in	  that	  I	  observe	  that	  Sushi	  responds	  to	  my	  voice),	  and	  intuitive	  
transmission	  of	  affect.	  Sushi’s	  role	  in	  this	  project	  is	  both	  as	  an	  autonomous	  being	  and	  as	  
a	  reflexive	  medium	  for	  our	  intuitive	  relationship.	  Lacking	  an	  ability	  to	  speak	  plainly,	  I	  
project	  Sushi’s	  experience	  and	  the	  results	  of	  our	  research-­‐creation	  onto	  this	  thesis	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project.	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  a	  dual	  projection:	  one,	  by	  the	  process	  of	  reading	  Sushi’s	  
emotion	  and	  experience,	  and	  two,	  by	  interpreting	  this	  observation	  through	  my	  own	  
filtered	  authorship,	  subjectivity	  and	  constructed	  frameworks.	  This	  leads	  me	  to	  suggest	  
that	  our	  relationship	  is	  deliberately	  elusive,	  ambiguous,	  and	  confounding	  due	  to	  my	  
implicit	  projection	  of	  intention	  and	  human	  language.	  My	  aim	  in	  the	  project	  is	  to	  
emphasize	  speculation	  while	  illustrating	  a	  cultivated	  intuitive	  awareness	  and	  
communication	  across	  the	  species	  divide.	  This	  project	  may	  offer	  a	  subjective	  resolution	  
to	  tenuous	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  providing	  an	  example	  upon	  which	  to	  break	  
down	  dichotomies	  and	  negotiate	  new	  possibilities	  while	  challenging	  pre-­‐existing	  
notions	  of	  interspecies	  interactions.	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  also	  questions	  traditional	  
modes	  of	  performance,	  relationship,	  and	  process.	  	  
Some	  primary	  objectives	  of	  this	  thesis	  project	  have	  been	  to	  research	  and	  
experiment	  with	  concepts	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  through	  performance.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  
these	  performances,	  I	  have	  considered	  experimentation	  as	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  
my	  methodology,	  which	  has	  allowed	  me	  the	  freedom	  for	  complexity	  in	  theorization.	  
Essential	  to	  this	  work	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  process	  in	  which	  constructed	  limits	  became	  
limitless,	  invisible,	  and	  irrelevant.	  Key	  in	  the	  process	  of	  performance	  and	  speculative	  
experimentation	  is	  to	  find	  a	  balance	  and	  disrupt	  it,	  to	  acknowledge	  limitations	  in	  order	  
to	  move	  forward.	  Furthermore,	  I	  have	  been	  investigating	  an	  expansive	  understanding	  
of	  performance	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  humans,	  animals,	  and	  contemporary	  art,	  considering	  the	  
removal	  of	  barriers	  between	  species	  and	  the	  process	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  that	  is	  
expressed	  in	  performance.	  I	  have	  used	  certain	  terms	  in	  this	  project,	  such	  as	  ‘species’,	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‘phenomenal’,	  and	  ‘posi-­‐postmodern’,	  adopting	  and	  adapting	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  
human	  language	  to	  shape	  that	  terminology	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  connections	  to	  my	  own	  
concepts	  and	  processes.	  	  
This	  speculative	  research	  questions	  a	  human	  need	  to	  connect	  with	  animals	  on	  a	  
sensorial	  and	  intuitive	  level	  that	  is	  based	  on	  shared	  communication.	  Humans	  have	  
some	  limited	  information	  on	  how	  animals	  communicate	  among	  themselves,	  with	  other	  
animal	  species,	  and	  with	  humans.	  However,	  much	  of	  what	  we	  understand	  about	  human	  
communication	  with	  animals	  relies	  on	  projection	  and	  hopefulness,	  a	  human	  need	  to	  
connect	  to	  another	  being.	  My	  thesis	  project	  therefore	  contributes	  to	  a	  questioning	  of	  
this	  connection	  (and	  this	  need)	  that	  we	  feel	  towards	  animals	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  limitations	  
of	  our	  species,	  in	  spite	  of	  rationality	  and	  scientific	  knowledge.	  Heidegger	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  know	  animals,	  much	  less	  ourselves	  or	  other	  humans	  -­‐	  and	  yet	  that	  is	  the	  
very	  inspiration	  to	  “be	  with”:	  	  to	  “be	  with”	  is	  to	  know.	  
This	  thesis	  furthermore	  contributes	  to	  an	  inquiry	  of	  practice-­‐led	  research,	  an	  
ambivalent	  and	  sometimes	  haphazard	  approach	  to	  artistic	  and	  creative	  applications.	  By	  
framing	  my	  performances	  with	  Sushi	  as	  experimental	  research,	  resulting	  in	  
observational	  data,	  visceral	  notion,	  and	  documentation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  artwork,	  I	  am	  
investigating	  possible	  implications	  that	  practice-­‐led	  research	  can	  have	  on	  performative	  
practice.	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The	  full	  discourse	  of	  human-­‐animal	  (in	  academia,	  what	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  
‘animal	  studies’)9	  is	  penetrated	  by	  the	  weight	  of	  ethics.	  The	  notion	  of	  ethical	  treatment	  
pervades,	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  all	  human	  interactions	  with	  animals,	  referencing	  a	  long	  
and	  very	  complicated	  history	  of	  human	  mistreatment	  and	  exploitation	  of	  other	  
creatures.	  Acknowledging	  this	  history	  should	  enable	  progressive	  movement	  forward	  in	  
leveling	  respectful	  treatment	  of	  animals.	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  can	  value	  a	  multitudinous	  
species	  with	  extraordinary	  abilities	  and	  lives,	  and	  we	  can	  take	  care	  in	  our	  everyday	  
relationships	  to	  approach	  animals	  with	  thoughtfulness	  and	  openness.	  This	  thesis,	  
therefore,	  strives	  to	  take	  note	  of	  this	  history	  while	  enabling	  Sushi	  as	  an	  individual	  being	  
deserving	  of	  respect,	  without	  sensationalizing	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  live	  animal	  presence	  in	  
performance	  art.	  
Unfortunately,	  ‘animal	  studies’	  has	  also	  become	  associated	  with	  attempting	  to	  
solve	  the	  species	  divide:	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  very	  complicated	  problem	  that	  is	  
engraved	  on	  our	  collective	  human	  memory.	  Contemporary	  research	  in	  academia	  is	  vast	  
and	  can	  sometimes	  be	  totalizing	  by	  trying	  to	  comprehend	  the	  discourse	  and	  solve	  
larger	  questions	  of	  humanity	  and	  animality.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  tendency	  in	  academia	  to	  
marginalize	  the	  political	  rhetoric	  of	  animal	  studies,	  creating	  more	  ambiguity,	  
complexity,	  and	  texture.	  In	  my	  thesis,	  I	  attempt	  to	  take	  note	  of	  this	  discourse	  while	  
avoiding	  a	  rehearsal	  of	  what	  is	  already	  present	  in	  this	  discourse.	  I	  endeavor	  to	  move	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  differences	  between	  academic	  “field”	  and	  an	  academic	  “discipline”.	  
A	  discipline	  is	  a	  branch	  of	  research	  and	  scholarship,	  whereas	  a	  field	  is	  the	  study	  within	  that	  
discipline.	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forward	  in	  my	  research	  and	  practice,	  and	  I	  will	  reference	  the	  timeless	  discussion	  of	  
human-­‐animal	  without	  being	  limited	  by	  it.	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Investigating	  an	  artistic	  and	  scholarly	  discourse	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  animals,	  in	  this	  
thesis	  I	  reflect	  upon	  a	  familiar	  element	  of	  our	  everyday	  lives	  -­‐	  the	  domesticated	  animal,	  
or	  even	  the	  basic	  concept	  of	  animals	  -­‐	  and	  I	  consider	  our	  relationship	  as	  humans	  with	  
this	  animal.	  When	  speaking	  specifically	  of	  the	  domesticated	  animal	  (cats	  and	  dogs,	  
commonly)	  we10	  may	  consider	  this	  animal	  as	  one	  that	  some	  of	  us	  sleep	  and	  snuggle	  
with:	  it	  is	  a	  being	  that	  we	  care	  for,	  and	  presumably,	  we	  believe	  it	  cares	  for	  us.	  	  It	  is	  a	  
creature	  that	  we	  may	  conceptualize	  as	  having	  an	  animal	  personality	  with	  narrative	  
thought	  process	  and	  complicated	  emotion.	  We	  coddle	  this	  animal;	  we	  
anthropomorphize	  this	  animal;	  we	  make	  this	  animal	  a	  part	  of	  our	  families;	  we	  love	  this	  
animal.	  We	  believe	  in	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  animal	  also	  loves	  us.	  	  
Beyond	  the	  domestic	  space,	  the	  notion	  of	  animals	  is	  unavoidable	  in	  
contemporary	  culture.	  Even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  have	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  an	  animal	  as	  a	  
pet,	  we	  are	  bombarded	  with	  animal	  imagery,	  animalistic	  concepts,	  animal	  metaphor.	  
Animals	  are	  a	  part	  of	  our	  common	  experience:	  in	  addition	  to	  pet	  relationships,	  we	  
interact	  with	  pests	  that	  we	  try	  to	  avoid	  or	  dispose	  of,	  we	  pay	  for	  the	  privilege	  of	  gazing	  
at	  wild	  animals	  up	  close,	  and	  animal	  representation	  is	  integral	  in	  visual	  media	  such	  as	  
film,	  fashion,	  art,	  advertising,	  and	  design.	  Many	  of	  us	  also	  consume	  animals,	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  “we”	  in	  this	  paragraph	  to	  note	  humans	  with	  pets,	  as	  a	  generalized	  and	  
otherwise	  non-­‐specific	  group	  of	  people.	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exception	  of	  vegetarians/vegans	  like	  myself.	  We	  farm	  and	  harvest	  animals	  for	  their	  
meat,	  milk,	  skin,	  bone,	  and	  fur.	  Our	  culture	  is	  satiated	  with	  animals,	  concepts	  of	  the	  
animal,	  animal	  imagery,	  animal	  products.	  	  	  
But	  where	  do	  we	  acquire	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  is	  animal?	  Colloquially,	  ‘animal’	  
means	  what	  humans	  conceptualize	  as	  not	  being	  human;	  however,	  biologically,	  we	  -­‐
humans	  -­‐	  are	  animals.	  The	  particular	  term	  ‘the	  animal’	  is	  generally	  avoided	  in	  emergent	  
discourse	  because	  it	  is	  a	  deeply	  monolithic	  concept	  that	  relies	  on	  all	  animals	  being	  alike	  
and	  yet	  distinct	  from	  humans;	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  humans	  are	  animals,	  and	  animals	  are	  
more	  varied	  than	  the	  term	  ‘the	  animal’	  can	  imply.	  I	  intend	  to	  look	  more	  specifically	  at	  
the	  relationships	  between	  animals	  and	  humans	  while	  concretely	  investigating	  my	  
relationship	  to	  my	  own	  pet	  cat.	  In	  addition,	  I	  consider	  how	  the	  inextricable	  bond	  and	  
connection	  I	  feel	  for	  my	  companion	  animal	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  other	  relationships.	  	  In	  
using	  the	  terms	  ‘animals’	  and	  ‘humans’	  in	  my	  text,	  I	  am	  also	  creating	  and	  confirming	  a	  
division	  between	  animal	  and	  human	  species.	  This	  strategy	  in	  dictation	  merely	  avoids	  
confusion,	  and	  I	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	  throughout	  this	  text	  and	  artistic	  project	  that	  we	  
are	  the	  same.	  Posthuman	  scholars	  such	  as	  Haraway	  and	  Cary	  Wolfe	  have	  developed	  an	  
understanding	  of	  what	  ‘species’	  can	  mean.	  In	  the	  development	  of	  my	  thesis,	  I	  evoke	  
questions	  of	  species	  boundaries	  between	  Sushi	  and	  me	  within	  this	  posthumanist	  
framework.	  
Animals	  have	  long	  been	  connected	  to	  the	  cultural	  development	  of	  human	  
history.	  Evidence	  for	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Adam’s	  naming	  of	  the	  beasts	  in	  Genesis,	  in	  the	  
cave	  drawings	  at	  Lascaux,	  in	  the	  taxonomic	  Bestiary,	  or	  in	  allegorical	  unicorn	  tapestries;	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this	  idea	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  hybrid	  and	  talking	  animals	  of	  myth	  and	  legend.	  The	  
domestication	  of	  cats	  was	  recorded	  as	  early	  as	  old	  Kingdom	  Egypt,11	  and	  the	  recent	  
times	  of	  modernity	  when	  wild	  animals	  were	  kept	  as	  prizes,	  given	  as	  gifts	  from	  one	  
sovereign	  to	  another,	  or	  used	  in	  sport.	  The	  confinement	  of	  horses,	  cows,	  chickens,	  and	  
sheep	  for	  utilitarian	  purposes	  also	  perpetuated	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  dumb	  beast:	  void	  of	  
emotion	  and	  incapable	  of	  suffering,	  disconnected	  from	  animal	  subjectivity.	  The	  
propriety	  of	  animals	  also	  increased	  a	  division	  between	  predator	  and	  prey,	  and	  humans	  
have	  since	  been	  developing	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  utilitarian	  or	  companion	  animals.	  This	  
hierarchy	  is	  based	  on	  use-­‐value	  and	  aesthetics,	  which	  latter	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  
competition	  of	  show	  dogs,	  cats,	  and	  horses	  (Kalof,	  2007).12	  This	  development	  of	  
human-­‐animal	  relationships	  and	  animal	  representation	  in	  human	  culture	  is	  long	  and	  
complicated,	  and	  the	  relationships	  themselves	  are	  still	  tenuous	  and	  unresolved.	  	  
The	  convoluted	  nature	  of	  our	  understanding	  and	  categorization	  of	  animals	  
makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  provide	  one	  sweeping	  generalization	  about	  how	  animals	  are	  
represented	  in	  popular	  culture.	  Taking	  reflection	  of	  a	  shifting	  notion	  of	  animals,	  which	  
includes	  considering	  what	  animality	  means	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  our	  understanding	  
of	  our	  own	  humanity,	  our	  notion	  of	  animals	  is	  anything	  but	  static	  or	  definitive.	  Despite	  
the	  rise	  of	  posthuman	  thinking,	  a	  culture	  of	  human	  superiority	  still	  exists	  either	  through	  
literal	  dominance	  or	  based	  on	  an	  idea	  that	  all	  animals	  rely	  upon	  humans	  to	  provide	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  There	  is	  evidence	  of	  cats	  as	  being	  semi-­‐defied,	  mummified,	  and	  preserved	  in	  carefully	  
constructed	  tombs	  with	  humans.	  However,	  cats	  living	  in	  Egypt	  at	  this	  time	  were	  also	  utilitarian	  
as	  assisting	  humans	  in	  wild	  fowl	  hunts	  (Howard	  1951:	  150).	  
12	  The	  vast	  scholarship	  produced	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  animals	  in	  human	  history	  is	  beyond	  the	  
scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  text	  by	  Kalof	  is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  that	  detail	  a	  development	  of	  animal	  
representation	  and	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  history.	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for	  them.	  	  
The	  animals	  that	  are	  represented	  in	  popular	  culture	  can	  be	  anthropomorphized,	  
given	  a	  human	  voice	  or	  expression.	  Animal	  representation	  provides	  an	  arena	  of	  diverse	  
examples	  of	  animals	  on	  which	  we	  continue	  to	  project	  our	  desires	  and	  emotions.	  These	  
animals	  can	  be	  cute,	  soft,	  ideal,	  and	  humorous,	  or	  wild	  and	  savage.	  A	  celebrity	  animal	  
like	  Maru13	  is	  like	  your	  pet	  only	  better,	  because	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  clean	  up	  after	  him.	  In	  
certain	  literary	  genres,	  animals	  are	  narrators.	  Animal	  narrators	  are	  common	  in	  
children’s	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  in	  books	  targeting	  young	  adults,	  such	  as	  Black	  Beauty	  
(Anna	  Sewell,	  1877),	  The	  Call	  of	  the	  Wild	  and	  White	  Fang	  (Jack	  London,	  1903;	  1906).	  
Additionally,	  there	  are	  essential	  literary	  examples	  geared	  toward	  adults:	  for	  example,	  
Beautiful	  Joe	  (Margaret	  Marshall	  Saunders,	  1894);	  evocative	  and	  omniscient	  animal	  
narrators	  like	  the	  complicated	  Timbuktu	  by	  Paul	  Auster	  (1999)	  or	  Animal	  Farm	  (George	  
Orwell,	  1945);	  Watership	  Down	  (Richard	  Adams,	  1972);	  and	  the	  notable	  graphic	  novel	  
Maus	  (Art	  Spiegelman	  1986;	  1991),	  among	  many	  others.	  Through	  these	  examples,	  
human	  authors	  capture	  a	  sense	  of	  humanity,	  an	  emotion	  that	  we	  identify	  with	  being	  
human,	  in	  the	  voice	  of	  an	  animal.	  These	  animal	  characters	  have	  complicated	  emotions	  
and	  strong	  politics,	  goals,	  and	  motivations,	  and	  the	  narratives	  reflect	  lives	  comparable	  
to	  how	  we	  understand	  our	  own	  human	  lives.	  In	  film,	  through	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  
representation,	  animals	  are	  transformed	  into	  humans	  and	  back	  again,	  turned	  into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Maru	  is	  a	  charming,	  awkward,	  eccentric,	  and	  famous	  Internet	  cat	  (also	  known	  as	  Box	  Cat)	  
made	  popular	  by	  the	  videos	  that	  his	  human	  companion,	  Mugumogu,	  creates	  and	  posts	  on	  
YouTube.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  text	  (March	  2	  2011)	  Maru	  had	  over	  100,000	  
subscribers	  to	  his	  YouTube	  channel.	  “Maru”,	  accessed	  February	  27	  2011,	  
http://www.youtube.com/user/mugumogu.	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monsters,	  act	  as	  a	  character	  foil	  or	  as	  the	  voice	  of	  reason,	  or	  are	  used	  for	  comic	  relief.	  A	  
more	  contemporary	  example	  is	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  YouTube	  and	  the	  Internet,	  which	  
have	  increased	  the	  ways	  we	  can	  observe	  and	  interact	  with	  animals	  through	  the	  screen,	  
providing	  a	  diverse	  bestiary	  of	  animals	  that	  are	  filmed,	  photographed,	  put	  on	  display,	  or	  
given	  poor	  Internet	  grammar	  and	  language,	  as	  with	  the	  LOLCats.14	  	  The	  proliferation	  of	  
animal	  characters	  on	  the	  Internet	  has	  altered	  the	  way	  that	  animals	  are	  present	  in	  a	  
domestic	  space:	  our	  pets	  exist	  on	  the	  Internet,	  and	  we	  can	  engage	  with	  someone	  else’s	  
pet	  through	  the	  virtual	  world.	  The	  boundary	  of	  our	  private	  lives	  becomes	  public	  through	  
our	  pets,	  and	  baby	  talk	  and	  infantilization	  has	  become	  familiar	  ground	  on	  the	  Internet.	  	  
Common	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  about	  animals	  in	  contemporary	  
society	  is	  gleaned	  from	  a	  mash-­‐up	  of	  this	  culture	  of	  animal	  representation.	  As	  Barbara	  
Smuts	  writes	  in	  Between	  Species:	  Science	  and	  Subjectivity	  (2006)	  regarding	  domestic	  
dogs,	  	  
most	  humans’	  expectations	  about	  dogs	  derive	  from	  popular	  culture,	  dog	  
trainers,	  and	  personal	  experience	  with	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  dogs.	  Because	  these	  
sources	  of	  knowledge	  do	  not	  begin	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  complexity,	  adaptability	  
and	  inventiveness	  of	  dogs,	  many	  aspects	  of	  dog-­‐human	  relationships	  have	  
more	  to	  do	  with	  our	  limited	  expectations	  and	  mistaken	  assumptions	  than	  with	  
who	  they	  really	  are	  (124).	  	  
	  
What	  results	  from	  this	  misunderstanding	  can	  be	  the	  infantilization	  of	  animals,	  or	  the	  
notion	  that	  these	  animals	  are	  incapable	  of	  complex	  thought	  and	  communication,	  
leading	  to	  the	  suppression	  of	  animal	  subjectivity:	  animals	  are	  thought	  of	  as	  either	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Simply	  put,	  a	  LOLCat	  (laugh-­‐out-­‐loud-­‐cat)	  is	  a	  photograph	  of	  a	  cat	  combined	  with	  text	  (usually	  
uppercase),	  anthropomorphizing	  the	  cat.	  The	  text	  is	  often	  idiosyncratic	  and	  grammatically	  
incorrect,	  known	  as	  ‘lolspeak’	  or	  ‘kitty	  pidgin’.	  LOLCats	  are	  widely	  distributed	  as	  Internet	  
memes.	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“highly	  dependent,	  boring,	  or	  aggressive”	  (Smuts,	  124).	  Instead	  of	  this	  negative	  
approach	  to	  understanding	  animals,	  Smuts	  suggests	  that	  if	  we	  treat	  animals	  as	  
“mysterious	  individuals	  with	  highly	  advanced	  relationship	  skills,	  myriad	  desires,	  and	  
uncanny	  abilities,	  we	  are	  in	  for	  some	  wonderful	  surprises”	  (124).	  Any	  relationship	  needs	  
to	  be	  developed	  and	  nurtured:	  Smuts	  emphasizes	  that	  this	  openness	  and	  development	  
is	  essential	  to	  human-­‐animal	  relationships.	  It	  takes	  real-­‐life	  interaction	  to	  learn	  from	  
these	  relationships,	  rather	  than	  unreliable	  representations	  of	  animals	  in	  our	  everyday	  
culture.	  This	  understanding	  of	  animals	  as	  individuals	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  
mediated	  through	  popular	  culture	  or	  through	  the	  limited	  expressions	  of	  animals	  offered	  
in	  literature	  or	  film.	  It	  is	  an	  awareness	  of	  humans	  and	  animals	  that	  must	  be	  experienced	  
through	  touch,	  sense,	  and	  emotion.
O	  N	  E	  	  
This	  chapter	  identifies	  the	  artistic	  and	  conceptual	  groundwork	  for	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  
and	  briefly	  introduces	  my	  methodological	  approach,	  which	  is	  then	  expanded	  upon	  in	  
the	  second	  chapter.	  This	  section	  will	  also	  provide	  an	  introduction	  to	  Sushi,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
major	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  “becoming	  with,”	  the	  concept	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  
by	  Donna	  Haraway	  and	  elaborated	  on	  by	  Barbara	  Smuts.	  Following	  this,	  I	  will	  
determine	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  framing	  “becoming	  with”	  through	  an	  introduction	  to	  
Heidegger’s	  concept	  “being	  with.”	  Furthermore,	  this	  section	  investigates	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  performance	  I	  like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  me	  by	  Joseph	  Beuys	  and	  considers	  this	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T	  H	  I	  S	  	  	  I	  S	  	  	  S	  U	  S	  H	  I	  	  
Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  involves	  Sushi	  and	  me.	  	  We	  are	  the	  animals	  in	  the	  room.	  	  
The	  room	  is	  our	  home;	  we	  live	  together	  with	  few	  physical	  boundaries.	  The	  boundaries	  
that	  exist	  are	  abstract:	  the	  interspecies	  divide	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  human	  language.	  I	  
understand	  our	  relationship	  as	  obsessive,	  eccentric,	  and	  sometimes	  aggravating.	  	  
In	  2006,	  I	  decided	  to	  adopt	  a	  house	  cat.	  My	  parents	  were	  farmers,	  and	  I	  had	  
always	  loved	  animals,	  especially	  the	  barn	  cats.	  My	  sisters	  and	  I	  coddled	  these	  barn	  cats,	  
who	  could	  be	  affectionate	  despite	  being	  tough	  and	  dirty.	  These	  cats	  served	  their	  
purpose	  as	  mousers,	  living	  a	  dangerous	  life	  in	  a	  world	  of	  farm	  equipment	  and	  coyote	  
predators.	  Their	  lives	  had	  no	  boundaries.	  
Before	  Sushi,	  I	  had	  never	  experienced	  living	  in	  a	  room	  with	  a	  cat	  (and	  at	  the	  
time	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  adopt	  a	  cat,	  I	  was	  living	  in	  a	  tiny,	  one-­‐room	  bachelor	  apartment).	  I	  
visited	  the	  Kingston	  Humane	  Society	  with	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  cat	  I	  wanted	  to	  
adopt:	  specifically,	  an	  older	  female	  cat	  who	  was	  socialized,	  calm,	  sweet	  -­‐	  a	  nearly	  
invisible	  companion	  with	  few	  needs,	  an	  animal	  that	  was	  self-­‐reliant.	  Instead,	  I	  opted	  for	  
Sushi	  (her	  original	  name	  was	  Snicker),	  a	  kitten	  at	  3	  months	  old.	  I	  don’t	  have	  a	  “she	  
chose	  me”	  story.15	  I	  looked	  at	  her,	  she	  looked	  at	  me,	  I	  gave	  her	  a	  little	  pat	  on	  her	  little	  
head.	  At	  the	  time,	  I	  did	  not	  have	  a	  strong	  conception	  of	  how	  varied	  cat	  personalities	  
could	  be.	  Sushi	  looked	  at	  me,	  and	  I	  thought	  I	  saw	  the	  ideal	  qualities	  in	  her:	  calm	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Sentimental	  stories	  of	  immediate	  connection	  between	  species	  are	  pervasive	  in	  the	  discourse	  
of	  pet	  relationships.	  Of	  course,	  I	  feel	  a	  connection	  to	  Sushi	  now,	  but	  my	  decision	  to	  adopt	  her	  
was	  arbitrary.	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confident,	  an	  expression	  of	  feline	  femininity.	  I	  named	  her	  Sushi	  because	  I	  made	  sushi	  
for	  dinner	  that	  night.	  
When	  I	  brought	  Sushi	  home,	  she	  was	  completely	  destructive,	  running	  excitedly	  
around	  my	  tiny	  apartment.	  She	  knocked	  over	  every	  possible	  thing	  that	  was	  not	  
secured,	  chewing	  on	  the	  spines	  of	  my	  books	  until	  her	  gums	  bled.	  Even	  when	  we	  sat	  
together	  she	  was	  obstructive,	  positioning	  herself	  so	  that	  I	  ended	  up	  with	  a	  mouthful	  of	  
fur	  or	  sharp	  claws	  in	  my	  leg.	  The	  first	  night	  we	  slept	  together,	  I	  was	  insistent	  that	  Sushi	  
sleep	  at	  the	  foot	  of	  the	  bed	  but	  she	  stubbornly	  walked	  from	  the	  foot	  to	  the	  pillow,	  over	  
and	  over	  again.	  I	  gave	  up,	  exhausted	  and	  sleep-­‐deprived.	  At	  the	  time,	  I	  was	  working	  
(rather,	  over-­‐working)	  four	  jobs	  and	  rarely	  got	  a	  full	  night’s	  sleep	  as	  it	  was.	  Convinced	  I	  
had	  made	  a	  huge	  mistake,	  I	  began	  to	  strategize	  how	  to	  return	  Sushi	  to	  the	  Humane	  
Society	  without	  feeling	  guilt.	  But	  after	  a	  few	  days	  of	  guilty	  thoughts	  and	  endearing	  
moments,	  I	  committed	  myself	  to	  Sushi.	  I	  trusted	  that	  whatever	  she	  was	  expressing	  at	  
that	  time	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  her	  kitten	  eccentricities	  and	  adaptation	  to	  a	  new	  home	  
and	  that	  we	  would	  settle	  into	  a	  comfortable	  living	  situation	  over	  time.	  	  
Sushi	  still	  sleeps	  on	  the	  pillow.	  Her	  animal	  primacy,	  determination,	  and	  
obliviousness	  to	  my	  wishes	  has	  led	  to	  early	  morning	  wakeups	  caused	  by	  her	  scratching	  
at	  the	  door,	  picking	  her	  claws	  at	  the	  carpet,	  biting	  my	  hands,	  arms,	  face,	  head.	  When	  I	  
am	  home,	  I	  am	  constantly	  moving	  Sushi	  off	  the	  kitchen	  counter,	  away	  from	  glasses	  of	  
water,	  or	  off	  my	  lap	  because	  I	  have	  other	  things	  to	  do	  and	  need	  to	  stand	  up.	  Sushi	  
follows	  me	  around	  the	  house,	  which	  causes	  me	  to	  trip	  over	  her	  multiple	  times	  every	  
day.	  I	  am	  usually	  aware	  of	  her	  location.	  I	  also	  follow	  Sushi	  around	  the	  house.	  One	  of	  her	  
	  	   18	  
favourite	  sleeping	  spaces	  is	  in	  my	  closet,	  in	  a	  basketful	  of	  scarves;	  sometimes	  I	  sneak	  up	  
on	  her	  in	  the	  daytime,	  scaring	  her	  awake	  when	  I’m	  bored.	  Sometimes	  she	  wakes	  me	  
when	  she’s	  bored	  and	  restless.	  We	  often	  snuggle	  together.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  me	  to	  
appreciate	  Sushi	  through	  touch,	  and	  I	  try	  to	  give	  her	  my	  undivided,	  affectionate	  
attention,	  if	  only	  for	  a	  few	  moments,	  every	  day.	  I	  like	  to	  presume	  her	  eccentricities	  are	  
also	  expressions	  of	  deep	  affection.	  	  
	  
B	  E	  C	  O	  M	  I	  N	  G	  	  	  W	  I	  T	  H	  
In	  When	  Species	  Meet,	  Donna	  Haraway	  begins	  with	  a	  question:	  “How	  is	  
‘becoming	  with’	  a	  practice	  of	  becoming	  worldly?”	  (2008b:	  3).	  According	  to	  Haraway,	  
companion	  species	  relationships	  are	  continuously	  developing	  and	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
becoming,	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  as	  the	  process	  of	  “becoming	  with”.	  	  Through	  my	  
reading	  of	  Haraway,	  I	  interpret	  “becoming	  with”	  as	  a	  meeting	  of	  humans	  and	  animals	  
and	  the	  resultant	  reaction	  on	  a	  physical	  and	  phenomenal	  level.16	  This	  experience	  of	  
“becoming	  with”	  points	  to	  a	  possible	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  we,	  as	  humans,	  can	  understand	  
our	  own	  humanness	  -­‐	  meaning	  that	  each	  connection	  with	  an	  animal	  results	  in	  a	  shift	  in	  
the	  biological	  and	  emotional	  make-­‐up	  of	  our	  species.	  	  For	  Haraway,	  to	  be	  worldly	  
means	  to	  learn	  from	  “grappling	  with	  the	  ordinary”	  (2008b:	  3);	  it	  is	  expanding	  beyond	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  My	  intention	  in	  using	  the	  word	  phenomenal	  throughout	  the	  text	  is	  to	  imply	  something	  greater	  
than	  the	  ordinary	  -­‐	  highly	  extraordinary	  -­‐	  or	  relating	  to	  phenomena.	  I	  also	  use	  the	  term	  to	  
denote	  an	  experience	  that	  is	  sensory	  and	  profound.	  Phenomenal	  can	  mean	  that	  which	  is	  
cognizable	  by	  the	  senses	  (rather	  than	  the	  mind),	  relating	  to	  a	  primordial	  understanding	  of	  self,	  
others,	  and	  situations.	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levels	  of	  comfort,	  gaining	  knowledge	  and	  experience,	  becoming	  aware.	  Haraway	  
observes	  that:	  	  
the	  human	  genomes	  can	  be	  found	  in	  only	  about	  10	  percent	  of	  all	  the	  cells	  that	  
occupy	  the	  mundane	  space	  I	  call	  my	  body;	  the	  other	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  cells	  are	  
filled	  with	  genomes	  of	  bacteria,	  fungi,	  protists,	  and	  such,	  some	  of	  which	  play	  in	  
a	  symphony	  necessary	  to	  my	  being	  alive	  at	  all,	  and	  some	  of	  which	  are	  hitching	  a	  
ride	  and	  doing	  the	  rest	  of	  me,	  of	  us,	  no	  harm.	  	  I	  am	  vastly	  outnumbered	  by	  my	  
tiny	  companions;	  better	  put,	  I	  become	  an	  adult	  human	  being	  in	  company	  with	  
these	  tiny	  messmates.	  	  To	  be	  one	  is	  always	  to	  ‘become	  with’	  many	  (2008b:	  3-­‐4).	  	  
	  
This	  mixed	  community	  of	  genes	  that	  creates	  a	  human	  body,	  and	  the	  way	  that	  we	  
understand	  humans	  and	  animals,	  leads	  us	  to	  question	  who	  we	  really	  are:	  beyond	  an	  
understanding	  of	  biological	  identity,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  consider	  how	  we	  function	  as	  well	  
as	  where	  and	  how	  we	  intersect	  with	  animals.	  This	  concept	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  my	  thesis	  project,	  considering	  that	  in	  each	  moment	  that	  Sushi	  and	  I	  
meet,	  we	  experience	  a	  shift	  in	  our	  ontology.	  Haraway	  writes	  in	  The	  Companion	  Species	  
Manifesto	  that	  “beings	  do	  not	  pre-­‐exist	  their	  relatings”	  (2003a:	  6),	  meaning	  that	  I	  am	  
who	  I	  am	  because	  of	  my	  relationship	  with	  Sushi,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  As	  Barbara	  Smuts	  
posits	  about	  her	  relationship	  with	  her	  pets,	  “our	  relationships	  are	  a	  perpetual	  
improvisational	  dance,17	  co-­‐created	  and	  emergent,	  simultaneously	  reflecting	  who	  we	  
are	  and	  bringing	  into	  being	  who	  we	  will	  become”	  (115).	  Haraway	  considers	  who	  we	  
become	  when	  we	  meet	  another	  species.	  In	  Haraway’s	  terms,	  “becoming	  with”	  occurs	  
on	  a	  micro	  level:	  our	  cells	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  and	  we	  “become	  with”	  our	  
companions.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  voluntary	  relationship:	  we	  cannot	  control	  this	  interaction	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Smuts	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  dance	  with	  Stuart	  Shanker.	  It	  is	  a	  metaphor	  based	  on	  the	  
analysis	  of	  communication	  across	  species	  that	  is	  “mutually	  contingent,	  co-­‐regulated,	  and	  
creative”	  (2006:	  115).	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the	  resultant	  reaction	  that	  occurs	  within	  our	  internal	  being.	  	  “We	  make	  each	  other	  up,	  in	  
the	  flesh.	  	  Significantly	  other	  to	  each	  other,	  in	  specific	  difference,	  we	  signify	  in	  the	  flesh	  
a	  nasty	  developmental	  infection	  called	  love.	  This	  love	  is	  a	  historical	  aberration	  and	  a	  
natural	  cultural	  legacy”	  (2008b:	  16).	  To	  extrapolate	  from	  this,	  Smuts	  discusses	  her	  
relationship	  with	  her	  dogs,	  challenging	  the	  notion	  that	  bonds	  are	  “caused”	  by	  the	  
individuals	  (124).	  Instead,	  the	  notion	  that	  both	  Haraway	  and	  Smuts	  support	  is	  that	  
animals	  and	  humans,	  both	  highly	  social,	  have	  malleable	  traits	  enhanced	  through	  
relationships.	  These	  character	  and	  behavioral	  traits	  are	  not	  defined	  by	  genes	  or	  history,	  
nor	  are	  they	  defined	  by	  species	  (Smuts:	  124).	  Instead,	  Smuts	  writes,	  “if	  they	  (other	  
beings)	  relate	  to	  us	  as	  individuals,	  and	  we	  relate	  to	  them	  as	  individuals,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  
us	  to	  have	  a	  personal	  relationship.	  If	  either	  party	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  other’s	  
social	  subjectivity,	  such	  a	  relationship	  is	  precluded”	  (125).	  Lived	  experiences,	  
individuality,	  personality,	  and	  subjectivity	  define	  and	  develop	  relationships	  between	  
species.	  As	  Nigel	  Thrift	  notes,	  “people	  and	  things	  and	  circumstances	  become	  
intermixed	  in	  an	  interior	  community	  which	  offers	  some	  degree	  of	  immunity	  to	  its	  
members	  and	  so	  produces	  a	  kind	  of	  temporary	  skin.	  The	  environment	  in	  which	  ‘we’	  are	  
situated	  becomes	  something	  much	  more	  fluid	  or	  ‘atmospheric’”	  (2008a:	  86).	  I	  believe	  
this	  example	  from	  Thrift	  is	  a	  further	  development	  of	  “becoming	  with,”	  a	  concept	  of	  
change	  that	  can	  only	  take	  place	  among	  current	  members	  and	  within	  a	  certain	  space	  
and	  proximity.	  In	  this	  equal,	  interior	  community	  relationship,	  what	  results	  is	  more	  
sensorial,	  a	  feeling,	  an	  atmosphere:	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  articulated	  in	  words	  but	  
is	  known	  by	  all	  members	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  
	  	   21	  
“Becoming	  with”	  is	  a	  constant	  progression	  between	  humans	  and	  animals.	  
“Becoming	  with”	  is	  always	  moving	  forward,	  always	  in	  motion.	  “Becoming	  with”	  is	  a	  
plurality	  of	  ideas.	  I	  suggest	  here	  that	  “becoming	  with”	  is	  both	  a	  declaration	  of	  animality,	  
of	  animal	  nature	  and	  the	  expression	  of	  instinct,	  inherent	  in	  both	  humans	  and	  animals,	  
and	  a	  description	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  animality	  and	  humanity.	  	  The	  spectrum	  of	  
animality	  ranges	  from	  domestic	  to	  wild,	  from	  controlled	  and	  overpowered	  to	  out	  of	  
control,	  extinct,	  dominated,	  and	  manipulated.	  	  Within	  this	  spectrum,	  we	  find	  ourselves	  
as	  humans	  and	  animals.	  
That	  humans	  have	  felt	  an	  inextricable	  connection	  to	  animals	  has	  been	  widely	  
acknowledged	  and	  understood	  by	  scholars	  ranging	  from	  Cary	  Wolfe	  and	  Haraway	  to	  
Jacques	  Derrida,	  Temple	  Grandin,	  Jacques	  Lacan,	  and	  many	  others,	  stemming	  from	  the	  
impact	  of	  the	  Darwinian	  Revolution.18	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  animality	  
permeated	  post-­‐1945	  Western	  critical	  theory	  during	  a	  period	  of	  crisis	  of	  critical	  thought.	  
In	  this	  period,	  humans	  were	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  explain	  humanity	  and	  to	  feel	  connected.	  This	  
connection	  to	  animals,	  simulated	  or	  otherwise,	  is	  also	  proved	  through	  our	  common	  
histories	  (we’ve	  evolved	  alongside	  one	  another),	  our	  shared	  life	  cycles	  (of	  birth,	  life,	  and	  
death)	  and,	  as	  noted	  through	  the	  Darwinian	  Revolution,	  shared	  genes.	  But	  do	  we	  share	  
knowledge,	  experience,	  and	  collective	  memory	  with	  animals?	  Do	  we	  share	  intuition	  
with	  animals,	  whom	  we	  collectively	  regard	  as	  predominantly	  instinctual	  beings?	  How	  
do	  we	  recognize	  ourselves	  in	  relation	  to	  animals,	  when,	  as	  Donna	  Haraway	  writes,	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Darwinian	  Revolution	  further	  in	  THREE,	  pg	  77.	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are	  almost	  entirely	  constructed	  of	  animal	  microorganisms?	  	  We	  are	  truly	  not	  our	  own	  
humans;	  we	  have	  never	  been	  human.19	  We	  are	  as	  animal	  as	  the	  animal.	  	  
	  
B	  E	  I	  N	  G	  	  	  W	  I	  T	  H	  
Being	  human,	  or	  animal,	  or	  hum-­‐animal,	  is	  a	  concept	  rooted	  in	  an	  
understanding	  of	  ourselves,	  of	  our	  own	  humanity.	  Haraway’s	  concept	  of	  “becoming	  
with”	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  development	  of	  my	  thesis	  project	  as	  the	  basis	  and	  inspiration	  for	  
my	  performance	  series	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  this	  
concept,	  and	  the	  adjacent	  Companion	  Species	  Manifesto20	  by	  Haraway	  as	  an	  ideal	  
situation.	  The	  micro-­‐meeting	  of	  cells	  and	  protists	  in	  “becoming	  with”	  is	  a	  literal,	  
biological	  interaction,	  but	  the	  companionship	  that	  Haraway	  discusses	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  
her	  specific	  relationship	  with	  her	  dogs:	  it	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  sensation.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  
my	  performances	  with	  Sushi,	  I	  attempt	  to	  convey	  an	  expression	  of	  hyper-­‐awareness	  
and	  heightened	  intuition	  that	  is	  speculative	  and	  ambiguous.	  To	  clarify,	  Haraway’s	  
concept	  of	  companionship	  with	  animals	  is	  an	  ideal	  that	  should	  be	  worked	  towards	  and	  
cultivated	  through	  daily	  positive	  interactions	  with	  animals.	  However,	  this	  ideal	  requires	  
projection,	  assumption,	  and	  imagination.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  ‘We	  have	  never	  been	  Human’	  is	  the	  title	  of	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Haraway’s	  text	  When	  Species	  Meet.	  
Her	  usage	  of	  the	  phrase	  connects	  to	  a	  complicated	  history	  of	  the	  human	  in	  theory	  and	  the	  
expression	  of	  the	  human	  in	  the	  posthumanities.	  She	  is	  also	  paying	  homage	  here	  to	  the	  text	  by	  
Bruno	  Latour,	  We	  Have	  Never	  Been	  Modern	  (2003).	  	  
20	  The	  Companion	  Species	  Manifesto:	  Dogs,	  People	  and	  Significant	  Otherness	  (2003)	  by	  Haraway	  is	  
an	  anecdotal	  and	  historical	  text	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  dogs	  (animals)	  in	  our	  human	  lives,	  
evoking	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  humans	  and	  animals	  can	  function	  and	  evolve	  alongside	  one	  
another.	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In	  regarding	  our	  pet	  animals	  as	  companions,	  we	  humans	  rely	  on	  the	  human-­‐
human	  companionship	  model:	  that	  is,	  we	  use	  terminology	  such	  as	  ‘equal’	  and	  ‘fair’	  and	  
apply	  it	  to	  a	  relationship	  with	  living	  beings	  that	  have	  emotion	  and	  a	  thought	  process	  
that	  is	  unknowable	  to	  a	  human.	  I	  may	  project	  a	  sense	  of	  companionship	  onto	  Sushi	  and	  
feel	  that	  I	  treat	  her	  well	  (to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  ability),	  but	  she	  is	  not	  my	  equal.	  However,	  I	  
am	  also	  not	  suggesting	  that,	  simply	  because	  I	  am	  human,	  I	  am	  dominant	  over	  her,	  as	  
there	  is	  no	  logic	  to	  assume	  this	  dominance.	  Rather,	  Sushi	  and	  I	  exist	  on	  two	  different	  
planes	  of	  being,	  and	  within	  that,	  on	  two	  different	  levels.	  One,	  we	  are	  human	  and	  
animal.	  I	  live	  in	  the	  human	  plane	  of	  existence,	  the	  human	  world,	  and	  Sushi	  lives	  in	  the	  
animal	  world.	  Two,	  I	  experience	  life	  in	  my	  Umwelt21,	  my	  subjective	  environment,	  and	  
Sushi	  situates	  herself	  in	  her	  own	  subjective	  environment.	  We	  exist	  distinct	  from	  one	  
another,	  although	  we	  at	  times	  interact	  with	  and	  cross	  over	  into	  each	  other’s	  Umwelten.	  
I	  can	  never	  know	  what	  Sushi	  is	  experiencing	  in	  her	  phenomenological	  being,	  and	  
similarly,	  she	  can	  never	  truly	  enter	  my	  Umwelt.	  Helene	  Weiss	  explains	  Jakob	  von	  
Uexküll’s	  theoretical	  biology	  and	  concept	  of	  Umwelt	  in	  the	  article	  Aristotle's	  Teleology	  
and	  Uexküll's	  Theory	  of	  Living	  Nature	  (1948),	  writing	  that	  “each	  species	  has	  its	  specific	  
structure,	  and	  correspondingly,	  its	  specific	  world.	  The	  animal's	  world	  is	  not	  identical	  
with	  our	  world,	  nor	  is	  the	  world	  of	  one	  animal	  species	  the	  same	  as	  the	  world	  of	  another.	  
The	  animal's	  world	  is	  constituted	  by	  what	  it	  perceives	  of	  its	  surroundings	  and	  by	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  it	  acts	  on	  its	  surroundings”	  (49).	  In	  this	  way,	  Uexküll	  combines	  what	  has	  
theoretically	  been	  merely	  a	  speculative	  world	  of	  perception	  with	  action	  in	  perfect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Umwelt	  is	  usually	  translated	  as	  "environment"	  or	  “surrounding	  world”.	  Uexküll	  theorized	  that	  
organisms	  could	  have	  different	  Umwelten,	  even	  though	  they	  share	  the	  same	  environment.	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correspondence.	  And	  this	  perception	  and	  action	  varies	  among	  animal	  species,	  between	  
what	  Uexküll	  refers	  to	  as	  higher	  and	  primitive	  animals.	  As	  Weiss	  illustrates,	  “a	  primitive	  
animal,	  e.g.	  a	  tick,	  perceives	  very	  few	  qualities	  and	  reacts	  with	  very	  few	  actions.	  Higher	  
animals	  have	  richer	  and	  more	  complicated	  worlds,	  though	  this	  by	  no	  means	  makes	  
their	  functioning	  any	  surer.	  Each	  animal's	  Umwelt	  differs	  from	  what	  we	  call	  its	  
surroundings,	  which	  are	  noticeable	  to	  man”	  (49).	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  humans	  can	  take	  
note	  of	  how	  an	  animal	  may	  function	  within	  its	  own	  world,	  its	  own	  Umwelt,	  but	  we	  do	  
not	  perceive	  the	  animal’s	  world.	  The	  animal’s	  world	  exists	  only	  for	  that	  animal,	  and	  
similarly	  in	  the	  reverse	  for	  humans.	  Each	  human	  lives	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  subjective	  world	  
that	  cannot	  be	  known	  by	  any	  other	  human	  or	  animal.	  In	  Uexküll’s	  theoretical	  biology,	  
the	  animal	  is	  not	  in	  isolation,	  but	  it	  is	  together	  with	  its	  specific	  world	  through	  	  
“being”:	  existence.	  
Each	  animal	  has	  a	  world	  within	  which	  that	  animal	  exists,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  a	  world	  
that	  counter-­‐intervenes	  upon	  our	  human	  world.	  According	  to	  the	  research	  of	  Uexküll,	  
animals	  function	  according	  to	  a	  plan	  that	  has	  inconsequential	  effects	  on	  individual	  
humans.	  In	  this	  research,	  animals	  do	  not	  sense	  deep	  connection	  to	  humans	  but	  rather	  
utilize	  what	  is	  available	  to	  the	  animal	  in	  their	  world,	  which	  may	  be	  a	  human	  (as	  a	  pet	  
owner)	  or	  something	  that	  humans	  have	  created	  and	  placed	  in	  this	  animal’s	  world.	  Both	  
humans	  and	  animals	  each	  live	  in	  our	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds	  with	  some	  infiltration	  
from	  other	  human	  and	  other	  animal	  worlds.	  This	  negates	  Haraway’s	  concept	  of	  the	  
companion	  animal,	  which	  suggests	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  and	  environment,	  with	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awareness	  and	  fondness	  across	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds	  instead	  of	  arbitrary	  choices	  
and	  infiltration.	  	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  concept	  of	  Umwelt,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  contrasting	  
concepts	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  and	  “being	  with”	  open	  possibilities	  for	  a	  new	  direction	  of	  
understanding	  human	  and	  animal	  being.	  Because	  we	  take	  example	  from	  our	  human-­‐
human	  relationship	  models	  when	  projecting	  onto	  our	  animals,	  using	  terminology	  like	  
‘trust’,	  ‘mutual	  respect’	  and	  ‘communication’	  to	  arrive	  at	  ‘equality’,	  we	  must	  also	  
consider	  the	  imperfections	  of	  this	  model.	  To	  be	  human	  is	  to	  be	  disappointed	  in	  
humanity:	  it	  is	  perpetual	  heartbreak,	  frustration,	  aimless	  projection,	  wasted	  love,	  and	  
regret.	  The	  lack	  of	  verbal	  communication	  between	  humans	  and	  animals	  leaves	  much	  to	  
be	  desired.	  To	  be	  human	  also	  means	  to	  search:	  for	  meaning,	  for	  optimism,	  for	  a	  truth.	  
Looking	  to	  the	  philosophical	  concepts	  of	  Heidegger22,	  “being”	  and	  the	  complementary	  
“being	  with”	  tend	  to	  counter	  some	  of	  the	  idealism	  of	  Haraway	  in	  light	  of	  an	  
existentialist	  and	  crisis-­‐based	  idea	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  This	  conflict	  
represents	  the	  tortured	  logic	  of	  being	  a	  human	  and	  attempting	  to	  understand	  the	  
stakes	  of	  working	  with,	  caring	  for,	  and	  being	  with	  animals	  in	  this	  “nature	  culture	  legacy”	  
of	  Haraway’s.	  But	  despite	  this	  conflict,	  the	  concepts	  “becoming	  with”	  and	  “being	  with”	  
complement	  one	  another	  in	  that	  both	  concepts	  are	  rooted	  in	  ontological	  process:	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  The	  limitations	  of	  this	  section	  are	  in	  both	  scope	  and	  practice	  –	  Heidegger’s	  text	  Being	  and	  Time	  
is	  a	  pivotal	  phenomenological	  and	  philosophical	  text,	  which	  has	  countless	  translations,	  
deconstructions,	  and	  critiques	  that	  I	  could	  not	  possibly	  begin	  to	  take	  note	  of	  here.	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very	  nature	  of	  being.	  This	  tortured	  logic,	  full	  of	  conflict	  and	  negotiation,	  is	  expressed	  
fully	  in	  my	  theory	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism.23	  	  
I	  will	  briefly	  outline	  my	  understanding	  of	  “being	  with”	  as	  an	  introduction	  to	  
posi-­‐postmodernism	  and	  consider	  this	  concept	  in	  relation	  to	  Haraway’s	  “becoming	  
with”.	  These	  opposing	  yet	  complementary	  notions	  will	  lead	  towards	  a	  new	  concept,	  
that	  of	  “coming	  apart”:	  the	  sensation	  of	  being	  together	  yet	  apart.	  I	  outline	  “coming	  
apart”	  as	  based	  on	  the	  human	  model	  of	  an	  idealism	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  destroyed	  by	  the	  
companion	  human.	  In	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  the	  potential	  for	  separateness	  is	  
there	  as	  well,	  and	  is	  in	  fact	  inherent	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  very	  lack	  of	  common	  language,	  
which	  creates	  a	  barrier	  that	  can	  never	  be	  overcome.	  Why,	  then,	  do	  humans	  approach	  
animal	  relationships	  with	  this	  utopic	  notion	  of	  unconditional	  love?	  No	  human,	  with	  the	  
possible	  exception	  of	  babies	  who	  also	  lack	  language,	  can	  be	  trusted	  with	  unconditional	  
love.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  unconditional	  love	  that	  does	  not	  have	  expiration,	  and	  
this	  temporality	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  as	  well.	  Humans	  can	  
certainly	  love	  one	  another,	  love	  animals,	  and	  express	  this	  love:	  but	  there	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  	  
this	  love.	  
In	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  is	  Heidegger’s	  
phenomenological	  concept	  of	  “being.”	  This	  is	  an	  essential	  starting	  point	  to	  
understanding	  humanity,	  and	  there	  the	  discussion	  of	  being	  human	  in	  the	  world	  can	  be	  
introduced.	  This	  dialogue	  of	  “being”	  is	  timeless	  and	  exceedingly	  vast	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  
ontological	  discussion,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  is	  a	  dialogue	  that	  has	  been	  rehearsed	  with	  little	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  I	  will	  detail	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  later	  in	  my	  text	  in	  the	  methodology	  section,	  TWO	  pg	  63.	  
	  	   27	  
impact	  on	  the	  way	  we	  can	  understand	  our	  relationship	  to	  animals.	  In	  the	  very	  discussion	  
of	  being,	  as	  Heidegger	  writes,	  “it	  is	  said	  that	  ‘being’	  is	  the	  most	  universal	  and	  the	  
emptiest	  concept.	  As	  such	  it	  resists	  every	  attempt	  at	  definition”	  (1953a:	  1).	  The	  
ambivalence	  and	  elusive	  nature	  of	  this	  “being”	  makes	  it	  critical	  in	  a	  speculative	  dialogue	  
about	  humanity.	  “Being”	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  being,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  notion,	  
of	  “being,”	  being	  oneself,	  being	  human.	  
My	  thesis	  project	  is	  a	  detailed	  attempt	  at	  developing	  and	  gaining	  self-­‐
knowledge	  as	  an	  artist	  and	  as	  a	  human	  that	  “becomes	  with”	  an	  animal,	  Sushi.	  However,	  
as	  Heidegger	  notes	  in	  his	  description	  of	  “being	  with,”	  to	  be	  with	  is	  to	  know,	  to	  cultivate	  
an	  inherent	  knowledge	  of	  that	  which	  you	  are	  with.	  However,	  humans	  are	  consistently	  
and	  reliably	  in	  crisis:	  who	  among	  us	  can	  say	  that	  we	  really	  know	  ourselves,	  or	  
understand	  our	  “being”?	  How	  then	  can	  we	  truly,	  phenomenologically,	  be	  human?	  How	  
is	  it	  that	  we	  can	  “be	  with,”	  to	  know	  another,	  if	  we	  cannot	  even	  know	  ourselves?	  	  
To	  be	  human	  in	  the	  world	  is	  to	  consider	  what	  this	  can	  mean,	  and	  the	  fields	  of	  
psychoanalysis	  and	  philosophy	  have	  been	  dedicated	  to	  determining	  and	  theorizing	  the	  
terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  humanity	  -­‐	  the	  terms	  of	  being	  human.	  The	  definition	  of	  
“being,”	  as	  Heidegger	  notes,	  is	  that	  “being”	  cannot	  be	  one	  thing,	  but	  many	  things,	  and	  
it	  is	  a	  “being	  with”	  that	  is	  in	  motion.	  “Being”	  human	  is	  to	  be	  in	  motion	  yet	  solid	  and	  still,	  
a	  concept	  that	  transcends	  conventional	  discourse.	  Alan	  Schrift	  considers	  this	  motion	  as	  
bringing	  us	  towards	  “an	  approach	  to	  reformulate	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  subject	  itself	  -­‐	  not	  as	  
a	  fixed	  and	  full	  substance	  or	  completed	  project,	  but	  always	  as	  a	  work	  in	  progress.	  The	  
central	  idea	  is	  that,	  as	  a	  work	  in	  progress,	  one’s	  life	  is	  never	  complete”	  (2000:	  58-­‐59).	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This	  incomplete	  and	  ongoing	  process	  resonates	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  “becoming”	  from	  
Haraway,	  but	  it	  also	  references	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  in	  stating	  that	  we	  are	  not	  a	  fixed	  
subject,	  but	  consistently	  experiencing,	  moving,	  “being.”	  “Being,”	  in	  this	  form,	  is	  a	  word	  
of	  motion	  and	  action.	  “Being”	  is	  existence;	  “being”	  is	  that	  which	  exists.	  
“Being	  with”	  complements	  the	  question	  of	  being,	  the	  question	  of	  existence:	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  in	  the	  world	  we	  must	  “be	  with”	  others.	  “Being	  with”	  others	  means	  to	  share	  
the	  same	  concerns,	  to	  share	  the	  same	  world	  in	  our	  existence,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  
can	  be	  applied	  to	  human	  relationships.	  William	  Large	  analyzes	  Heidegger’s	  concept	  of	  
“being	  with”	  by	  saying,	  “even	  when	  I	  walk	  alongside	  a	  field	  in	  a	  countryside,	  and	  
nobody	  is	  there,	  others	  are	  still	  present	  as	  Being-­‐with,	  because	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  
field	  mattered	  to	  someone	  at	  sometime,	  and	  my	  walk	  itself	  traces	  the	  contours	  of	  their	  
concern”	  (2008:	  55).	  But	  as	  Large	  continues	  to	  note,	  the	  very	  form	  of	  “being	  with”	  is	  an	  
expression	  of	  loneliness:	  “I	  can	  only	  be	  alone	  because	  I	  am	  already	  with	  others”	  (2008:	  
55).	  “Being	  with”	  is	  not	  a	  knowing,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  concern,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  cultivated	  by	  what	  
Heidegger	  called	  “considerateness	  and	  forbearance”	  (2008:	  55).	  There	  is	  also	  built	  into	  
this	  loneliness	  an	  anonymity	  in	  that	  the	  specific	  individuals	  are	  not	  whom	  we	  are	  “being	  
with”	  but	  a	  more	  abstract	  sense	  of	  they,	  or	  others.	  It	  is	  in	  sharing	  the	  conditions	  of	  being	  
human	  that	  we	  can	  “be	  with,”	  because	  we	  share	  the	  same	  human	  world.	  
	  Breaking	  down	  “being”,	  “being	  with,”	  and	  “becoming	  with,”	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  
sense	  of	  emptiness	  in	  considering	  how	  we	  are	  human.	  How,	  then,	  do	  we	  apply	  these	  
questions	  of	  our	  existence	  to	  our	  relationships	  with	  animals	  (Or,	  in	  a	  Heideggerian	  
sentiment,	  how	  do	  we	  ask	  the	  questions	  so	  that	  the	  thinking	  through	  is	  more	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productive	  to	  know	  than	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  itself)?	  How	  do	  we	  conceptualize	  a	  
relationship	  with	  animals	  that	  can	  be	  hopeful	  and	  idealistic	  yet	  also	  concerned	  with	  
concepts	  of	  existence,	  acknowledging	  the	  separateness	  of	  our	  subjective	  environments	  
and	  the	  elements	  that	  we	  can	  never	  experience?	  	  
We	  can	  “come	  apart.”	  We	  can	  breakdown	  -­‐	  emotionally,	  biologically,	  
ontologically,	  phenomenologically	  -­‐	  but	  physically,	  we	  remain	  where	  we	  are,	  in	  the	  
space,	  in	  the	  room	  together.	  “Coming	  apart”	  means	  knowing	  the	  depth	  of	  our	  
relationship	  with	  animals	  and	  acknowledging	  the	  limits	  of	  our	  very	  being,	  our	  Umwelt,	  
and	  our	  love.	  “Coming	  apart”	  can	  mean	  respecting	  these	  limitations	  and	  admiring	  the	  
mystery	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships.	  It	  is	  a	  resigned	  loneliness	  in	  understanding	  that	  
a	  knowing	  of	  another,	  a	  “being	  with”	  or	  “becoming	  with,”	  cannot	  occur:	  humans,	  and	  
we	  can	  speculate	  animals,	  will	  always	  sense	  a	  loneliness	  in	  “being”	  and	  will	  never	  truly	  
know	  another,	  human	  or	  animal.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  completion	  of	  oneself	  
found	  in	  another,	  but	  only	  hopefulness	  and	  projection.	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In	  this	  section,	  I	  consider	  the	  possibilities	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  and	  “being	  with”	  
through	  my	  performance	  with	  Sushi,	  and	  I	  reflect	  upon	  the	  research	  and	  process	  of	  the	  
artwork.	  My	  goal	  in	  this	  project	  was	  to	  investigate	  the	  potential	  of	  working	  and	  thinking	  
through	  dichotomies	  by	  engaging	  in	  the	  artistic	  process	  with	  an	  animal,	  with	  special	  
focus	  on	  the	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy.	  I	  have	  relied	  on	  my	  own	  speculative	  tropes	  to	  
transmit	  my	  conceptual	  ideas	  in	  investigating	  this	  dichotomy.	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I	  believe	  that	  art	  can	  be	  used	  to	  break	  down	  essential	  concepts	  of	  relevant	  
issues,	  leading	  to	  a	  solution,	  a	  strategy,	  an	  ideology,	  a	  shift	  in	  thinking.	  I	  am	  convinced	  
that	  many	  artists,	  very	  generally,	  are	  hyper-­‐aware	  of	  their	  social,	  political	  and	  
environmental	  surroundings,	  and	  in	  questioning	  their	  position	  in	  the	  world	  -­‐	  by	  reaching	  
towards	  or	  rejecting	  normativity	  -­‐	  artists	  create	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  audience	  may	  be	  
subtly	  interrogated	  or	  thoughtfully	  provoked.	  	  For	  artists,	  the	  process	  of	  seeking	  out	  a	  
position	  through	  engaging	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  art	  is	  also	  related	  -­‐	  and	  even	  inherently	  
connected	  -­‐	  to	  seeking	  self-­‐knowledge.	  By	  ascribing	  this	  intuitive	  approach	  to	  artistic	  
production,	  I	  posit	  a	  relationship	  in	  which	  artists	  and	  animals	  are	  fundamental	  to	  
contributing	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  conceptualizing	  and	  representing	  human-­‐animal	  relationships.	  	  	  
Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  derived	  from	  documentation	  of	  a	  series	  of	  performance	  
events.	  These	  events	  take	  place	  in	  the	  home	  that	  Sushi	  and	  I	  share.	  These	  performance	  
events	  represent	  active	  research	  (participant	  observation),	  data	  collection	  through	  
photographs	  and	  notes,	  and	  reflexive	  interpretation.	  Each	  event	  is	  a	  performance	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  “becoming	  with,”	  showing	  a	  vibrant,	  daily	  practice	  in	  which	  we	  base	  our	  
production	  on	  a	  reflection	  upon	  research	  and	  art.	  The	  data	  collected	  through	  this	  
experimental	  research	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  my	  written	  thesis	  and	  art	  exhibition,	  both	  
entitled	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room.	  Each	  component	  of	  this	  project,	  in	  each	  iteration	  of	  
experimentation,	  scholarship,	  and	  art	  production,	  is	  distinct	  and	  yet	  ultimately	  
intertwined	  with	  all	  other	  components.	  An	  awareness	  of	  this	  method	  of	  production	  is	  
essential	  to	  understanding	  the	  project	  as	  dynamic	  and	  interdisciplinary.	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The	  artistic	  project	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  comprised	  of	  the	  documentation	  of	  
the	  performances.	  As	  the	  lead	  researcher	  and	  artist	  on	  this	  project,	  and	  while	  defining	  
Sushi	  as	  a	  contributing	  performer	  in	  the	  research	  phase,	  I	  position	  myself	  as	  the	  sole	  
author	  of	  the	  final	  product:	  the	  exhibition	  and	  the	  written	  scholarship.	  This	  is	  in	  light	  of	  
the	  fact	  that	  through	  the	  process	  and	  practice	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  Sushi,	  I	  have	  
experienced	  a	  shift	  in	  my	  emotional,	  ontological,	  and	  phenomenal	  construction	  of	  self.	  
Meaning	  that,	  despite	  being	  human,	  being	  myself,	  Sushi	  has	  infiltrated	  my	  very	  being,	  
and	  influenced	  the	  production	  of	  this	  work.	  
	  	   In	  the	  presentation	  of	  this	  work,	  there	  are	  sequences	  and	  solo	  images	  that	  
capture	  events	  of	  “becoming	  with.”	  I	  feel	  that	  each	  event	  represents	  an	  amplification	  of	  
the	  intuitive	  and	  idealistic	  possibilities	  of	  my	  relationship	  with	  Sushi,	  and	  through	  the	  
medium	  of	  performance	  I	  have	  provided	  a	  glimpse	  into	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  The	  
documented	  performances	  are	  process-­‐based,	  unscripted,	  and	  spontaneous.	  What	  
happens	  outside	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  documentation	  is	  unknown	  to	  the	  audience,	  who	  
must	  place	  trust	  in	  me	  as	  the	  producer	  that	  the	  resulting	  artwork	  is	  presented	  as	  truth,	  
or	  instead	  engage	  in	  the	  speculative	  nature	  of	  the	  project.	  This	  truth,	  which	  is	  evidence	  
of	  lived	  events,	  is	  mediated	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  photography,	  documenting	  a	  
fleeting	  moment	  of	  interaction.	  	  
The	  composition	  of	  the	  photographs	  and	  performances	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  
simplistic,	  both	  aesthetically	  and	  in	  the	  actions	  that	  have	  been	  performed.	  In	  the	  living	  
room	  of	  the	  home	  that	  Sushi	  and	  I	  share,	  there	  is	  a	  blank	  wall	  that	  faces	  three	  bright,	  
west-­‐facing	  windows,	  providing	  a	  vibrant	  natural	  light.	  For	  the	  performances,	  I	  set	  the	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camera	  on	  a	  tripod	  and	  take	  photos	  using	  a	  hand-­‐held	  remote.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  a	  
transparency	  of	  process	  visible	  in	  some	  images,	  as	  I	  am	  holding	  a	  remote	  when	  the	  
images	  are	  captured,	  or	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  work	  is	  sometimes	  imperfect.	  To	  me,	  this	  
transparency	  implies	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  performances:	  each	  represents	  a	  moment	  of	  a	  
daily	  life	  existing	  in	  concept	  and	  as	  object.	  Additionally,	  the	  integrity	  of	  “becoming	  
with”,	  and	  representing	  this	  as	  an	  event,	  implies	  that	  only	  Sushi	  and	  I	  be	  in	  the	  space	  
together.	  Therefore,	  I	  staged	  and	  photographed	  all	  performances	  myself	  without	  
relying	  on	  a	  third	  presence.	  During	  the	  performance,	  it	  is	  only	  Sushi	  and	  I	  in	  the	  room,	  
with	  no	  other	  audience.	  What	  has	  resulted	  are	  a	  series	  of	  still	  images	  that	  lyrically	  
reflect,	  to	  some	  extent,	  my	  artistic	  intention	  in	  the	  process	  and	  performance.	  In	  some	  
cases,	  I	  merely	  place	  myself	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  camera	  and	  await	  Sushi’s	  interaction	  
with	  me	  in	  the	  room.	  With	  patience,	  I	  gently	  request,	  in	  a	  method	  reminiscent	  of	  
telepathy,	  that	  Sushi	  enter	  the	  room	  and	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  camera	  lens.	  There	  are	  times	  
when	  she	  has	  initially	  followed	  me	  into	  the	  room,	  and	  other	  times	  in	  which	  Sushi	  does	  
not	  appear	  in	  the	  frame	  at	  all.	  	  
In	  some	  instances,	  I	  have	  a	  loose	  idea,	  a	  plan,	  for	  the	  performance.	  For	  
example,	  in	  Drying	  I	  anticipated	  how	  Sushi	  would	  get	  wet.	  	  Sushi	  usually	  waits	  outside	  
the	  bathroom	  door	  for	  me	  while	  I	  shower	  and	  immediately	  enters	  the	  bathroom	  when	  I	  
open	  the	  door,	  where	  she	  will	  sit	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  wet	  shower	  in	  a	  pool	  of	  water.	  
There	  are	  times	  when	  the	  tap	  drips	  water	  onto	  her	  head.	  Because	  she	  is	  a	  medium-­‐
haired	  cat	  (not	  quite	  long-­‐haired,	  but	  certainly	  not	  short-­‐haired),	  the	  water	  clings	  to	  her	  
when	  she	  leaves	  the	  shower.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Drying,	  I	  wanted	  to	  capture	  her	  reaction	  to	  
	  	   33	  
my	  trying	  to	  dry	  her	  with	  a	  towel.	  This	  is	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  being	  an	  unnecessary	  
caregiver	  of	  Sushi,	  in	  which	  I	  rarely	  indulge:	  she	  does	  not	  regularly	  rely	  on	  me	  to	  dry	  her	  
wet	  fur.	  Certainly,	  we	  play	  together,	  and	  I	  brush	  Sushi’s	  fur	  (which	  she	  seems	  to	  enjoy)	  
and	  sometimes	  trim	  her	  nails,	  but	  that	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  caretaking	  that	  is	  common	  in	  
our	  relationship	  -­‐	  with	  the	  obvious	  exception	  of	  feeding	  her.	  When	  Sushi	  was	  a	  kitten,	  
shortly	  after	  I	  brought	  her	  home	  from	  the	  Humane	  Society,	  I	  tried	  to	  bathe	  her.	  This	  
clearly	  upset	  her;	  the	  atmosphere	  during	  this	  exchange	  was	  sad	  and	  humiliating.	  I	  
remember	  being	  upset	  with	  myself,	  giving	  up,	  and	  not	  able	  to	  negotiate	  my	  own	  
emotional	  turmoil	  at	  causing	  Sushi	  discomfort.	  After	  the	  attempted	  bath,	  she	  refused	  
to	  allow	  me	  to	  dry	  her	  wet	  fur,	  and	  instead	  hid	  from	  me,	  shivering.	  When	  she	  finally	  
relaxed,	  I	  wrapped	  her	  up	  in	  a	  towel	  and	  showed	  her	  affection	  as	  a	  means	  of	  an	  apology.	  
Drying	  is	  my	  second	  attempt	  at	  drying	  her	  wet	  fur,	  5	  years	  later.	  	  	  
	  
Fig.	  1.	  Drying,	  2011	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   In	  the	  case	  of	  Drying,	  I	  analyze	  this	  experiment	  post-­‐performance	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  
communicate	  (though	  not	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  perform).	  Because	  we	  do	  not	  regularly	  interact	  
in	  this	  way	  (me	  drying	  her	  with	  a	  towel)	  she	  rejected	  my	  attempts,	  moving	  away	  from	  
me,	  lying	  on	  her	  back	  and	  batting	  at	  my	  hands	  in	  playfulness	  bordering	  on	  aggression.	  
This	  attempt	  to	  represent	  an	  infantilization	  of	  Sushi	  made	  us	  both	  uncomfortable;	  for	  
the	  last	  five	  years	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  respect	  Sushi	  as	  an	  autonomous	  being	  and	  avoid	  
disrespecting	  her	  ability	  to	  take	  care	  of	  herself.	  When	  I	  brought	  Sushi	  to	  the	  vet	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  after	  her	  adoption,	  the	  women	  who	  were	  working	  the	  desk	  at	  the	  
veterinarian’s	  referred	  to	  Sushi	  as	  “my	  baby,”	  “little	  cutie,”	  and	  “sweetheart.”	  I	  had	  an	  
almost	  violent	  reaction	  to	  the	  type	  of	  language	  being	  used.	  In	  the	  first	  days	  with	  Sushi	  
home,	  I	  didn’t	  know	  what	  to	  say	  or	  how	  to	  talk	  to	  her;	  we	  barely	  communicated	  to	  one	  
another	  because	  I	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  I	  did	  not	  resort	  to	  “baby	  talk”	  as	  a	  default	  mode	  of	  
communication.	  I	  vowed	  to	  myself	  that	  I	  would	  never	  anthropomorphize	  Sushi	  to	  the	  
point	  of	  seeing	  her	  as	  a	  “fur	  baby”	  (Fudge	  2008:	  48).	  “Fur	  baby”	  is	  a	  contemporary	  term	  
coined	  by	  Erica	  Fudge	  suggesting	  pets	  that	  are	  “parented”	  by	  their	  human	  companions,	  
a	  phenomenon	  common	  amongst	  young,	  childless	  couples.	  Parents	  of	  “fur	  babies”	  set	  
themselves	  apart	  from	  other	  pet	  owners	  because	  they	  sentimentalize	  their	  roles	  as	  
caregivers,	  believing	  that	  they	  provide	  special	  attention	  for	  their	  pets	  by	  giving	  them	  
substantial	  play	  and	  socialization	  time	  with	  other	  animals.	  “Fur	  babies”	  are	  treated	  
almost	  as	  human	  children	  with	  fur	  (49).	  Although	  I	  do	  love	  Sushi	  deeply,	  I	  try	  not	  to	  
force	  her	  into	  a	  role	  of	  infancy	  or	  consider	  her	  infantile,	  reliant,	  under-­‐developed	  in	  
intelligence,	  or	  lacking	  (beyond	  the	  regular	  feeding	  and	  interactions	  that	  are	  intrinsic	  in	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pet	  relationships).	  In	  observing	  Sushi,	  I	  have	  reasoned	  that	  she	  is	  an	  extremely	  
intelligent	  animal	  who	  does	  not	  require	  this	  treatment.	  	  
The	  performances	  Brushing,	  Snuggles,	  and	  Fur	  Baby	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  artistic	  
experimentation	  in	  which	  I	  am	  imposing	  a	  desire	  to	  “take	  care”	  of	  Sushi,	  leading	  to	  
what	  I	  frame	  as	  resultant	  failure.	  I	  often	  brush	  her	  fur,	  but	  during	  the	  Brushing	  
performance,	  she	  became	  unusually	  aggressive	  instead	  of	  enjoying	  it	  as	  she	  generally	  
does.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  she	  sensed	  that	  my	  motives	  were	  not	  as	  casual	  as	  usual,	  noticing	  
that	  instead	  of	  wanting	  to	  provide	  her	  pleasure,	  I	  had	  alternative	  motives	  that	  
conflicted	  with	  our	  regular	  habits.	  	  In	  Fur	  Baby,	  I	  wanted	  to	  represent	  us	  sleeping	  
together	  (which	  we	  do,	  each	  night),	  but	  Sushi	  refused	  to	  acknowledge	  my	  intention	  and	  
went	  her	  own	  way.	  She	  refused	  to	  lay	  down	  with	  me	  and	  squirmed	  away	  from	  my	  
grasp,	  an	  unusual	  moment	  for	  a	  cat	  that	  is	  generally	  overly	  affectionate.	  Snuggles	  is	  
meant	  to	  represent	  our	  regular	  activity	  of	  interacting	  with	  affection.	  	  This	  affection	  is	  
necessary	  because,	  like	  Sushi,	  I	  have	  so	  much	  love	  to	  give,	  and	  our	  mutual	  affection	  for	  
one	  another	  provides	  an	  outlet	  for	  expressions	  of	  this	  love.	  Though	  Snuggles	  is	  not	  
essentially	  a	  failure,	  it	  illustrates	  a	  degree	  of	  interaction,	  affection,	  and	  obsession	  that	  is	  
indicative	  of	  my	  complex	  relationship	  to	  Sushi.	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Fig.	  2.	  Brushing,	  2011	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Fig.	  3.	  Fur	  Baby,	  2011	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Fig.	  4.	  Snuggles,	  2011	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The	  starting	  point	  and	  inspiration	  for	  my	  thesis	  research	  is	  the	  performance	  by	  
German	  artist	  Joseph	  Beuys	  I	  like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  Me	  (1974).	  Beuys’s	  artwork	  
and	  legacy	  are	  critical,	  though	  certainly	  not	  limited	  to,	  a	  discussion	  of	  performance	  art,	  
human-­‐animal	  communication,	  “becoming	  with,”	  and	  expressions	  of	  animality	  in	  this	  
thesis.	  His	  performance	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  quintessential	  example	  from	  which	  to	  
investigate	  the	  possibilities	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  performance	  art	  because	  
it	  is	  complex,	  suggesting	  a	  human-­‐animal	  bond	  that	  was	  built	  and	  reinforced.	  	  
Beuys,	  who	  is	  known	  as	  a	  sculptor	  and	  one	  of	  the	  pioneers	  of	  performance	  art	  in	  
the	  Western	  canonical	  art	  world,	  produced	  artworks	  that	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  
of	  preserving	  nature	  while	  advocating	  sustainability.24	  His	  interest	  in	  pedagogy	  and	  
social	  communication	  led	  him	  to	  be	  politically	  active,	  and	  he	  became	  well	  known	  as	  a	  
provocative	  and	  controversial	  artist.	  Beuys	  constructed	  an	  identity	  and	  art	  practice	  that	  
were	  embedded	  into	  one	  another:	  the	  artist	  was	  the	  art,	  the	  art	  was	  the	  artist.	  	  During	  
his	  career,	  Beuys	  consistently	  refused	  invitations	  to	  visit	  America,	  “saying	  he	  would	  not	  
come	  as	  long	  as	  the	  US	  remained	  in	  Vietnam”	  (Levi-­‐Strauss	  1999:	  2).	  Public	  reception	  
of	  Beuys’s	  work	  in	  North	  America	  was	  ambivalent	  as	  a	  result	  and	  is	  best	  summed	  up	  in	  
the	  article	  by	  Kay	  Larson	  that	  appeared	  in	  Art	  News	  (1980)	  shortly	  after	  a	  retrospective	  
of	  Beuys’s	  work	  at	  the	  Guggenheim	  was	  installed;	  the	  article	  was	  titled,	  Joseph	  Beuys:	  
Shaman,	  Sham	  or	  one	  of	  the	  most	  brilliant	  artists	  of	  all	  time?	  A	  key	  concept	  that	  Beuys	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Beuys	  is	  a	  pivotal	  figure	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Western	  art	  world	  and	  his	  influence	  can	  be	  seen	  
on	  a	  global	  level.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  limitations	  of	  my	  thesis	  do	  not	  provide	  ample	  room	  to	  fully	  
discuss	  his	  legacy.	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developed	  through	  his	  performative	  practice	  was	  the	  cultivation	  of	  his	  identity	  as	  a	  
shaman.25	  These	  factors	  contribute	  to	  the	  impact	  and	  legacy	  of	  I	  like	  America…,	  a	  
performance	  done	  in	  May	  of	  1974	  with	  Beuys	  and	  a	  live	  coyote	  in	  René	  Block	  Gallery,	  
New	  York	  City,	  for	  seven	  days.26	  This	  was	  Beuys’s	  second	  visit	  to	  America.	  
In	  this	  piece,	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  empty	  gallery	  space	  can	  be	  essential	  to	  
understanding	  the	  human-­‐animal	  relationship	  that	  unfolded.	  Both	  Beuys	  and	  the	  
coyote,	  named	  Little	  John	  and	  hailing	  from	  New	  Jersey,27	  are	  positioned	  in	  a	  space	  that	  
they	  had	  never	  visited	  before	  and	  are	  introduced	  to	  one	  another	  for	  the	  first	  time;	  
however,	  Beuys	  was	  at	  an	  advantage	  because	  he	  had	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  possible	  
gallery	  space	  ecology,	  while	  it	  is	  unknown	  whether	  or	  not	  Little	  John	  was	  familiar	  with	  
gallery	  spaces.	  
Beuys	  arrived	  in	  New	  York,	  at	  Kennedy	  Airport,	  from	  Germany.	  He	  was	  
wrapped	  from	  head	  to	  foot	  in	  felt,	  his	  trademark	  material,	  and	  rode	  in	  the	  back	  of	  an	  
ambulance	  from	  the	  airport	  to	  the	  gallery.	  Without	  seeing	  any	  of	  the	  American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Beuys	  discusses	  his	  shamanistic	  approach	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Heimer	  Bastian	  and	  Jeannot	  
Simmen	  in	  1979,	  saying,	  “when	  I	  do	  something	  shamanistic,	  I	  make	  use	  of	  the	  shamanistic	  
element	  –	  admittedly	  an	  element	  of	  the	  past	  –	  in	  order	  to	  express	  something	  about	  a	  future	  
possibility.”	  My	  reading	  of	  this	  description	  is	  that	  Beuys	  appropriates	  elements	  of	  traditional	  
shamanism	  in	  his	  performative	  works,	  which	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  questions	  of	  his	  integrity,	  or	  the	  
sham	  (92).	  It	  is	  important	  when	  discussing	  shamanism	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  
term	  and	  the	  contemporary	  hybridization	  of	  the	  form	  from	  spiritual	  and	  aboriginal	  traditions	  
that	  span	  across	  cultures	  and	  continents.	  Shamanism	  is	  not	  a	  term	  specific	  to	  one	  culture	  or	  
tradition,	  but	  can,	  in	  a	  general	  sense,	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  position	  held	  in	  a	  culture/society	  by	  
a	  person	  of	  some	  supernatural	  or	  psychic	  ability,	  sometimes	  a	  healer	  and	  seer	  (Harner	  1990).	  
Contemporary	  and	  new	  age	  trends	  have	  appropriated	  the	  concept	  of	  shamanism	  (in	  the	  same	  
category	  as	  palm	  and	  tarot	  readers	  or	  astral	  projectionist),	  and	  artists	  such	  as	  Beuys	  have	  
borrowed	  the	  term	  in	  a	  performative,	  speculative	  sense.	  
26	  There	  are	  conflicting	  accounts	  regarding	  the	  length	  of	  this	  performance:	  Tisdall	  writes	  that	  it	  
was	  seven	  days,	  while	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  recalls	  a	  three-­‐day	  performance.	  
27	  Both	  Little	  John’s	  origin	  prior	  to	  the	  performance	  and	  his	  post-­‐performance	  whereabouts	  
remain	  a	  mystery.	  	  
	  	   41	  
landscape	  or	  environment,	  Beuys	  was	  delivered	  to	  the	  gallery.	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  writes	  that	  
in	  this	  action	  -­‐	  the	  blind	  and	  bound	  ambulance	  ride	  -­‐	  and	  with	  the	  drama	  of	  the	  
ambulance,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  doubt	  regarding	  the	  purpose	  of	  his	  trip	  to	  America.	  
“Wrapped	  in	  a	  felt	  cocoon	  inside	  the	  ambulance,	  Beuys	  recalled	  his	  own	  myth	  of	  origin,	  
in	  which	  he	  was	  shot	  down	  over	  the	  Crimea	  and	  rescued	  by	  nomadic	  Tartars,	  who	  
wrapped	  him	  in	  insulating	  felt	  to	  warm	  him.	  Here	  again,	  the	  artist	  journeys	  to	  another	  
world	  through	  ritualizing	  threshold	  rites.	  Again	  he	  is	  wounded	  and	  in	  need	  of	  
treatment”	  (5-­‐6).28	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  suggests	  that	  Beuys	  is	  in	  need	  of	  healing,	  coming	  to	  the	  
coyote	  with	  a	  desire	  to	  repair	  his	  trauma.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fig.	  5.	  Joseph	  Beuys,	  I	  Like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  Me,	  1979	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Beuys	  was	  well	  known	  for	  perpetuating	  a	  mythology	  around	  his	  origin,	  and	  the	  scholarship	  on	  
this	  is	  vast.	  Caroline	  Tisdall	  recounts	  Beuys’s	  plane	  crash	  over	  the	  Crimea	  during	  the	  Second	  
World	  War.	  Beuys	  was	  a	  rear-­‐gunner	  for	  the	  Luftwaffe,	  the	  German	  air	  force.	  Apparently,	  the	  
pilot	  died	  in	  the	  crash	  and	  Beuys’s	  broken	  body	  was	  found	  and	  nursed	  back	  to	  health	  by	  the	  
Tartars,	  a	  nomadic	  tribe.	  In	  order	  to	  heal	  his	  broken	  bones,	  they	  wrapped	  his	  body	  in	  felt	  and	  
animal	  fat,	  two	  materials	  which	  became	  essential	  to	  his	  later	  art	  practice	  (Tisdall	  1979a:	  16-­‐17).	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In	  the	  René	  Block	  Gallery	  space,	  a	  meeting	  of	  human	  and	  animal	  contained	  
countless	  potential	  scenarios,	  including	  aggression	  or	  violence.	  For	  the	  performance,	  
Beuys,	  with	  his	  usual	  uniform	  of	  a	  felt	  hat	  and	  a	  fishing	  vest,	  brought	  with	  him	  props:	  a	  
walking	  stick,	  two	  felt	  blankets,	  a	  musical	  triangle,	  gloves,	  a	  stack	  of	  hay,	  a	  flashlight,	  
and	  fifty	  Wall	  Street	  Journals,	  with	  fifty	  more	  to	  be	  delivered	  each	  day	  (Tisdall	  2008b:	  6).	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  time	  together,	  Beuys	  performed	  an	  orchestrated	  sequence	  of	  
actions,	  repeated	  over	  and	  over	  again.	  As	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  outlines:	  	  
A	  triangle	  is	  struck	  three	  times	  to	  begin	  the	  sequence.	  This	  triangle	  that	  Beuys	  
wears	  as	  a	  pendant	  around	  his	  neck	  is	  the	  alchemical	  sign	  for	  fire	  (dry,	  fiery,	  
choleric	  warmth),	  which	  ancient	  glacial	  Eurasian	  shamans	  sorely	  needed.	  It	  is	  
also	  a	  sign	  for	  the	  feminine	  element	  (earthy	  &	  mercurial)	  and	  for	  the	  creative	  
intellect,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  Pythagorean	  symbol	  for	  wisdom.	  Striking	  its	  three	  sides	  
three	  times,	  Beuys	  calls	  himself,	  Coyote,	  and	  the	  Audience	  to	  order.	  After	  the	  
triangle	  is	  struck,	  a	  recording	  of	  loud	  turbine	  engine	  noise	  is	  played	  outside	  the	  
enclosure,	  signifying	  ‘indetermined	  energy’	  and	  calling	  up	  a	  chaotic	  vitality.	  	  
At	  this	  point,	  Beuys	  pulls	  on	  his	  gloves,	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  traditional	  bear-­‐claw	  
gloves	  worn	  by	  ‘master	  of	  animals’	  shamans	  such	  as	  those	  depicted	  on	  the	  walls	  
of	  Trois	  Frères,	  and	  gets	  into	  his	  fur	  pelt/felt,	  wrapping	  it	  around	  himself	  so	  that	  
he	  disappears	  into	  it	  with	  the	  flashlight.	  He	  then	  extends	  the	  crook	  of	  his	  staff	  
out	  from	  the	  opening	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  felt	  wrap,	  as	  an	  energy	  conductor	  and	  
receptor,	  antenna	  or	  lightning	  rod.	  The	  conical	  shape	  of	  the	  felt	  resembles	  a	  
tipi,	  the	  nomadic	  shelter	  which	  migrated	  from	  Siberia	  to	  North	  America	  with	  
the	  hunters.	  Topped	  with	  the	  crooked	  staff,	  it	  also	  recalls	  both	  the	  stag	  and	  the	  
shape	  of	  the	  lightning	  in	  Lightning	  with	  Stag	  in	  Its	  Glare	  (1958-­‐85),	  and	  is	  a	  
reference	  to	  the	  classic	  shamanic	  antlered	  mask,	  also	  going	  back	  to	  the	  caves	  of	  
the	  Upper	  Paleolithic,	  as	  does	  Beuys's	  ‘Eurasian	  staff,’	  the	  shamanic	  phallos	  
(Coyote	  carried	  his	  around	  in	  a	  box	  on	  his	  back)	  and	  staff	  of	  the	  psycho	  pomp	  -­‐	  
messenger	  and	  mediator.	  The	  felt	  enclosure	  doubles	  as	  a	  sweat	  lodge	  for	  
Beuys,	  accumulating	  the	  heat	  necessary	  for	  transformation.	  	  
Beuys	  bends	  at	  the	  waist	  and	  follows	  the	  movements	  of	  the	  coyote	  around	  the	  
room,	  keeping	  the	  receptor/staff	  pointed	  in	  the	  coyote's	  direction	  at	  all	  times.	  
When	  the	  beam	  of	  the	  flashlight	  is	  glimpsed	  from	  beneath	  the	  felt,	  we	  
recognize	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  Hermit	  from	  the	  Tarot	  -­‐	  an	  old	  man	  with	  a	  staff,	  
holding	  a	  lighted	  lamp	  half-­‐hidden	  by	  the	  great	  mantle	  which	  envelopes	  him.	  
This	  card	  in	  the	  Tarot	  indicates	  wisdom,	  circumspection,	  and	  protection.	  It	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refers	  to	  the	  developed	  mind	  of	  man,	  the	  prudence	  and	  foresight	  of	  learning,	  
and	  is	  thought	  by	  some	  to	  picture	  Hermes,	  the	  Messenger.	  After	  awhile,	  Beuys	  
emerges	  from	  the	  felt	  and	  walks	  to	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  room,	  marking	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  sequence	  of	  gestures.	  There	  is	  a	  pile	  of	  straw,	  another	  piece	  of	  felt,	  and	  
stacks	  of	  each	  day's	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  in	  the	  room.	  Beuys	  sleeps	  on	  the	  
coyote's	  straw;	  the	  coyote	  sleeps	  on	  Beuys’	  felt.	  The	  copies	  of	  the	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	  arrive	  each	  day	  from	  outside	  (like	  the	  engine	  noise)	  and	  enter	  the	  
dialogue	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  materialist	  thinking	  (6-­‐7).	  
During	  the	  lengthy	  span	  of	  the	  performance,	  Beuys	  executed	  these	  deliberate,	  
ritualized	  actions	  within	  the	  space,	  and	  Tisdall	  observes	  that	  Little	  John	  took	  the	  lead	  
role	  in	  moderating	  and	  regulating	  the	  timing	  and	  the	  mood	  of	  these	  actions	  (2008b:	  7).	  
Beuys’s	  actions	  in	  these	  performances	  were,	  to	  the	  audience,	  ambiguous	  expressions	  of	  
ritual;	  in	  Levi-­‐Strauss’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  work,	  however,	  each	  of	  the	  artist’s	  actions	  
were	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  shamanistic	  or	  mythological	  symbolism.	  During	  this	  
performance,	  the	  interaction	  between	  Beuys	  and	  the	  coyote	  was	  cautious,	  deliberate,	  
tenuous.	  The	  coyote,	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  very	  wildness	  and	  mystery,	  created	  the	  conditions	  
and	  limitations	  of	  the	  performance.	  Little	  John	  appeared	  to	  mark	  his	  territory	  on	  each	  
of	  the	  artist’s	  objects.	  	  The	  coyote’s	  expression	  of	  animality	  was	  expected;	  it	  seemed	  to	  
move	  around	  the	  gallery	  space	  in	  a	  suitably	  animal	  way.	  In	  Tisdall’s	  narration	  of	  the	  
event,	  she	  suggests	  the	  coyote	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  his	  own	  actions	  on	  Beuys’s	  
performance,	  that	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  consciousness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  animal.	  
	  Beuys’s	  choreographed	  ritual	  was	  repeated	  over	  thirty	  times	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  
the	  performance,	  with	  the	  coyote	  reacting	  differently	  each	  time:	  nervous,	  
disinterested,	  watchful,	  waiting,	  cautious,	  mischievous,	  aggressive	  (2008b:	  7).	  At	  times,	  
the	  coyote	  appeared	  to	  express	  his	  animality:	  Little	  John	  tore	  the	  felt	  apart;	  he	  tore	  the	  
Wall	  Street	  Journals	  apart;	  he	  relieved	  himself	  on	  them.	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  speculates	  that	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this	  action,	  the	  coyote	  pissing	  on	  the	  pile	  of	  newspapers,	  was	  intended	  “to	  mark	  it,	  as	  if	  
to	  say	  ‘everything	  that	  claims	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  America	  is	  part	  of	  my	  territory’”	  (7).	  Little	  
John	  never	  slept	  with	  his	  back	  to	  the	  audience.	  In	  the	  confined	  gallery	  space,	  the	  artist	  
and	  the	  animal	  formed	  a	  visible	  bond,	  suggesting	  an	  emotional	  “becoming	  with”	  and	  
“being	  with”	  one	  another.	  	  Tisdall	  writes	  that	  Beuys	  and	  Little	  John	  would	  lie	  in	  the	  
straw	  together,	  and	  when	  it	  was	  time	  to	  end	  the	  performance,	  Beuys	  hugged	  the	  
coyote	  close	  (8).	  	  After	  Beuys	  left,	  wrapped	  again	  in	  felt	  and	  taken	  in	  an	  ambulance	  to	  
the	  airport,	  Little	  John	  acted	  like	  a	  caged	  animal	  for	  the	  first	  time:	  pacing	  anxiously	  
back	  and	  forth,	  “sniffing,	  searching,	  whining	  and	  scenting	  the	  air	  with	  fear”	  (8).	  In	  
Tisdall’s	  observation,	  what	  happened	  between	  the	  animal	  and	  the	  human	  in	  this	  
performance	  transcended	  concepts	  of	  species:	  Beuys	  and	  Little	  John	  eluded	  a	  definition	  
of	  their	  own	  species	  in	  the	  process	  of	  “becoming	  with”,	  of	  learning	  from	  one	  another.	  	  
In	  some	  of	  Beuys’s	  previous	  works,	  he	  had	  identified	  himself	  with	  the	  image	  of	  
the	  hare.	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  says	  that	  “in	  Beuys’s	  iconography,	  the	  Hare	  symbolizes	  birth	  and	  
especially	  incarnation;	  vulnerability	  and	  the	  finiteness	  of	  humankind.	  Like	  the	  Hare,	  
Beuys	  is	  careful	  .	  .	  .	  he	  moves	  slowly	  and	  deliberately,	  approaching	  coyote	  carefully”	  
(Levi-­‐Strauss:	  7).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  coyote	  is	  wise:	  in	  myth,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  creation,	  
“coyote	  taught	  humans	  how	  to	  survive”	  (3).	  As	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  succinctly	  writes	  it,	  through	  
allegory	  in	  I	  like	  America…,	  “hare	  comes	  to	  coyote	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  survive”	  (7).	  This	  is	  a	  
reversal	  in	  understandings	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  which	  the	  human	  is	  
dominant;	  instead,	  we	  see	  that	  Beuys,	  after	  arriving	  in	  America	  acting	  metaphorically	  
wounded	  and	  traumatized,	  selected	  the	  coyote	  based	  on	  Little	  John’s	  ability	  to	  heal.	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The	  relationship	  that	  arose,	  developed,	  and	  ended	  in	  the	  gallery	  space	  has	  
become	  crucial	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  and	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  
performance	  art	  practices.	  	  Beuys	  took	  a	  risk	  in	  selecting	  an	  animal	  for	  his	  performance	  
that	  was	  not	  only	  wild,	  but	  also	  very	  dangerous.	  There	  were	  elements	  of	  the	  
unexpected	  and	  spontaneous	  present	  in	  the	  performance	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  risk.	  And	  
there	  was	  also	  a	  suggestion	  of	  collaboration.	  	  According	  to	  Beuys,	  “I	  had	  a	  concept	  of	  
how	  a	  coyote	  might	  behave	  -­‐	  it	  could	  have	  been	  different.	  That’s	  what	  I	  hoped	  for,	  but	  I	  
was	  not	  sure	  whether	  it	  would	  work.	  	  But	  it	  did	  -­‐	  it	  worked	  well.	  	  Probably	  I	  had	  the	  right	  
spiritual	  focus	  .	  .	  .	  I	  really	  made	  good	  contact	  with	  him”	  (Tisdall	  2008b:	  13).	  My	  reading	  
of	  Beuys’s	  performance	  is	  that	  he	  acknowledged	  the	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  species	  
and,	  as	  the	  artist,	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  Little	  John	  could	  assert	  his	  animal	  power	  
and	  autonomy	  during	  the	  performance.	  	  
	  
Fig.	  6.	  Joseph	  Beuys,	  I	  Like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  Me,	  197	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This	  notable	  performance	  has	  inspired	  countless	  reactionary	  performances,	  
homage,	  and	  critical	  deconstruction.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  escape	  the	  influence	  of	  Beuys	  (in	  
any	  discourse	  of	  contemporary	  art)	  and	  the	  I	  like	  America…	  performance	  is	  
exceptionally	  crucial	  when	  discussing	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  and	  animals	  in	  
contemporary	  performance	  art.	  Beuys’s	  presentation	  of	  I	  like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  
Me	  is	  largely	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  gestured	  attempt	  to	  heal	  parallel	  relationships	  between	  
Germany	  and	  America,	  between	  idealism	  and	  materialism,	  and	  between	  the	  domestic	  
(human)	  and	  the	  wild	  (animal)	  (Levi-­‐Strauss:	  7).	  This	  example	  of	  “becoming	  with,”	  of	  
animality	  and	  humanity,	  establishes	  a	  precedent	  of	  the	  human-­‐animal	  dialogue	  in	  
contemporary	  performance	  art,	  and	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  refer	  back	  to	  this	  performance	  as	  
the	  ideas	  surrounding	  Beuys’s	  work	  are	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  my	  thesis	  research.	  
T	  W	  O	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  outlines	  the	  various	  possible	  intersections	  between	  research	  and	  practice	  
in	  my	  Master’s	  project.	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  written	  thesis	  and	  my	  
artistic	  practice.	  Both	  elements	  of	  this	  project	  are	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  research-­‐led	  
practice.	  The	  research	  and	  practice	  exist	  symbiotically:	  one	  is	  also	  the	  other.	  I	  suggest	  
that	  this	  structure	  is	  non-­‐hierarchical,	  positioning	  practice	  and	  research	  as	  equal	  
components	  to	  a	  process	  of	  thinking	  through,	  creating,	  writing,	  performing,	  and	  
investigating	  what	  it	  can	  mean	  to	  be	  a	  contemporary	  artist	  with	  an	  interdisciplinary	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  O	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Fig.	  7.	  Observation	  I,	  2010	  
The	  Observation	  experiments	  display	  an	  example	  of	  spontaneous	  performance	  
between	  Sushi	  and	  me,	  expressing	  how	  we	  “come	  apart.”	  The	  Observation	  series	  were	  
inspired	  by	  Augusto	  Boal’s	  Games	  for	  Actors	  and	  Non-­‐Actors	  (1992;	  2006).29	  The	  
documentation	  of	  Observation	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  how	  Sushi	  and	  I	  connect	  (and	  in	  
some	  cases,	  what	  I	  interpret	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  connect)	  on	  a	  sensorial	  and	  emotional	  level.	  
In	  Observation	  I,	  I	  meditated	  upon	  Sushi’s	  appearance	  for	  some	  time,	  then	  turned	  
myself	  around	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  the	  way	  that	  she	  looked	  out	  loud,	  based	  on	  my	  
memory	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  observation.	  Generally,	  the	  Observation	  series	  follows	  the	  
format	  of	  Sushi	  and	  me	  looking	  at	  one	  other	  in	  a	  still	  and	  observant	  state.	  Throughout	  
these	  performances	  I	  sensed	  a	  strong	  connection	  to	  Sushi.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Games	  for	  Actors	  and	  Non-­‐Actors	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  guide,	  a	  revolutionary	  method,	  for	  
transformation	  and	  liberation	  from	  oppression	  in	  theatre	  and	  game	  playing.	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would	  indicate	  what	  exactly	  Sushi	  is	  observing	  when	  she	  is	  looking	  at	  me,	  and	  during	  
these	  experiments,	  I	  felt	  myself	  moving	  into	  a	  meditative	  phase	  rather	  than	  being	  in	  a	  
state	  of	  observation	  and	  awareness.	  I	  found	  that	  Sushi,	  when	  we	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
unmoving,	  had	  a	  calm	  and	  cathartic	  presence.	  She	  appears	  to	  live	  in	  her	  own	  head,	  
oblivious	  to	  the	  stakes	  of	  our	  performances,	  and	  yet	  transmits	  what	  I	  interpret	  as	  highly	  
emotional,	  calming,	  and	  reasonable	  energies.	  	  
In	  the	  Observation	  series,	  each	  performance	  would	  begin	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  I	  
would	  sit	  down	  and	  place	  myself	  in	  front	  of	  the	  camera	  in	  the	  room.	  I	  would	  call	  Sushi	  
into	  the	  room	  through	  intention,	  and	  without	  words.	  If	  she	  sat	  and	  looked	  at	  me,	  we	  
would	  then	  observe	  one	  another.	  If	  she	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  engaging	  in	  this	  
performance,	  I	  considered	  the	  performance	  a	  failure	  because	  the	  documentation	  failed	  
to	  capture	  a	  moment	  reflective	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Sushi	  and	  me.	  This	  is	  not	  
because	  Sushi	  made	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  an	  independent	  being,	  as	  she	  is,	  and	  performed	  as	  
she	  chose	  to;	  instead,	  it	  is	  a	  failure	  because	  we	  were	  unable	  to	  express	  the	  sense	  of	  
being	  with	  one	  another	  in	  a	  visual	  way.	  In	  these	  performances,	  I	  requested	  that	  she	  
perform	  by	  observing	  me,	  and	  sometimes	  she	  did	  not.	  However,	  when	  she	  did	  not	  
engage,	  I	  would	  continue	  to	  sit	  and	  observe	  her	  actions	  regardless.	  My	  artistic	  intention	  
for	  the	  Observation	  series,	  to	  illustrate	  our	  relationship,	  was	  simple	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  
successful;	  however,	  in	  her	  disengagement	  from	  observing	  and	  therefore	  meeting	  my	  
intention,	  I	  also	  failed	  to	  meet	  her	  animal	  intention	  -­‐	  what	  it	  is	  that	  drives	  her	  actions	  -­‐	  
and	  the	  performance	  failed.	  We	  failed,	  together.	  This,	  then,	  is	  “being	  with”	  an	  animal:	  
presuming	  to	  share	  the	  same	  concerns	  and	  yet	  feeling	  isolated	  in	  these	  concerns.	  We	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are	  “coming	  apart”	  by	  being	  in	  the	  same	  space	  together	  and	  yet	  not	  interacting,	  not	  
crossing-­‐over	  into	  each	  other’s	  Umwelt.	  We	  share	  a	  concern	  for	  our	  surroundings,	  the	  
room	  that	  we	  are	  in,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  or	  know	  one	  another.	  The	  Observation	  
series	  is	  a	  specific	  example	  of	  “coming	  apart,”	  particularly	  as	  our	  interactions	  are	  
without	  touch	  or	  voice	  and	  we	  are	  therefore	  relying	  only	  on	  intuitive	  sensation	  	  
and	  emotion.	  
	  
Fig.	  8.	  Observation	  II,	  2010	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M	  E	  T	  H	  O	  D	  O	  L	  O	  G	  Y	  
My	  self-­‐imposed	  approach	  to	  art	  making	  has	  always	  been	  disciplined	  and	  
regimented,	  yet	  also	  very	  intuitive	  and	  forgiving.	  Ideas	  change	  and	  are	  influenced	  by	  
absolutely	  everything.	  My	  ritual	  of	  drinking	  coffee	  in	  the	  morning,	  the	  way	  I	  laugh	  out	  
loud	  alone	  in	  a	  room,	  the	  way	  my	  cat	  snuggles	  on	  my	  lap	  as	  I’m	  writing,	  the	  way	  I	  make	  
eye	  contact	  with	  dogs	  but	  not	  the	  people	  that	  are	  attached	  to	  the	  dogs,	  my	  approach	  to	  
yoga,	  my	  philosophy	  of	  friendship	  and	  love:	  all	  these	  events	  and	  moments	  inform	  my	  
practice.	  Everything	  influences	  what	  I	  do	  in	  my	  life	  as	  an	  artist,	  and	  gaining	  this	  
information	  and	  experience	  is	  process-­‐based.	  This	  process	  never	  gets	  turned	  off:	  it	  is	  
my	  methodology.	  Understanding	  this	  process	  of	  “being”	  creates	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
reconsider	  the	  subject,	  the	  artist,	  as	  not	  fixed	  but	  incomplete:	  a	  work	  undergoing	  
process.	  While	  “being”	  in	  process,	  that	  which	  currently	  exists	  in	  a	  subject’s	  environment	  
is	  mutable.	  It	  is	  my	  belief	  that	  many	  artists	  are	  driven	  by	  a	  need	  to	  know,	  to	  “be”:	  to	  try	  
to	  understand	  themselves	  in	  the	  role	  of	  artist,	  of	  human,	  and	  to	  understand	  how	  this	  
position	  can	  be	  contextualized	  on	  a	  macro-­‐level.	  This	  is	  a	  position	  that	  is	  based	  on	  fluid	  
and	  organic	  experiences	  that	  influence	  how	  we	  understand	  “being.”	  	  
I	  approach	  research	  with	  a	  haphazard	  sensibility,	  lacking	  discipline	  and	  focus.	  In	  
my	  process	  of	  “being,”	  I	  research	  by	  thinking,	  reading,	  moving,	  laughing,	  drinking,	  
running	  and	  running	  away	  and	  running	  into,	  watching,	  playing,	  crying,	  and	  sleeping.	  I	  
feel	  I	  cannot	  position	  myself	  in	  the	  world	  without	  making	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  
world.	  Additionally,	  I	  cannot	  understand	  myself	  without	  contextualizing	  who	  I	  am	  and	  
what	  I	  am	  doing	  in	  this	  world.	  This	  investigation	  has	  become	  an	  essential	  area	  of	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research	  and	  development	  for	  my	  graduate	  work.	  Nigel	  Thrift	  writes	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  
subjectivity,	  “might	  it	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  subjectivity	  as	  artists	  have	  begun	  to	  
think	  of	  being,	  as	  a	  series	  of	  ephemeral	  mental	  objects	  of	  concentration	  and	  dispersal	  in	  
which	  physical	  handwork,	  material	  industry,	  and	  intellectual	  labour	  stand	  in	  for	  the	  
hidden	  work	  of	  crafting	  self-­‐awareness	  out	  of	  environmental	  fluctuations”	  (2008a:	  86).	  
This	  supports	  my	  notion	  that	  what	  is	  thinking	  through	  concepts	  and	  projects,	  what	  is	  
artistic	  process,	  is	  synonymous	  with	  developing	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  self-­‐
definition.	  Furthermore,	  Thrift	  expands	  this	  notion	  beyond	  the	  role	  of	  the	  artist,	  using	  
art	  practice	  as	  a	  model	  for	  developing	  subjectivity	  and	  the	  self.	  	  This	  is	  the	  process	  of	  
understanding	  “being.”	  
My	  artistic	  process	  and	  methodology	  is	  diverse,	  mixed,	  intuitive,	  and	  reflexive.	  
To	  position	  myself	  as	  a	  researcher,	  or	  artist-­‐researcher,	  means	  to	  move	  forward	  from	  
my	  previous	  artistic	  training,	  which	  was	  very	  technical	  and	  based	  in	  the	  studio	  
environment.	  I	  consider	  my	  approach	  to	  my	  art	  practice	  as	  following	  an	  academic	  
model	  but	  influenced	  primarily	  by	  my	  intuition	  and	  speculation.	  In	  each	  project,	  I	  try	  to	  
familiarize	  myself	  with	  the	  context	  of	  the	  work	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concept/topic	  
during	  my	  production	  of	  the	  artwork.	  Coming	  to	  graduate	  school	  and	  considering	  my	  
artistic	  process	  as	  research	  had	  initially	  felt	  uncomfortable	  and	  strange.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  a	  
shift	  in	  terminology,	  but	  in	  legitimization.	  Suddenly,	  I	  am	  not	  an	  emerging	  artist	  who	  
messes	  around	  with	  fabric,	  glue,	  paper,	  cat,	  and	  camera	  in	  her	  home	  studio	  barefoot	  
while	  blasting	  ABBA	  Gold	  and	  drinking	  wine.	  I	  am	  a	  researcher	  now.	  As	  Arjun	  Appadurai	  
writes	  in	  Globalization	  and	  the	  Research	  Imagination,	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What	  do	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  speak	  today	  of	  research?	  Like	  other	  cultural	  
keywords,	  research	  is	  so	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  we	  stand	  and	  the	  
air	  we	  breathe	  that	  it	  resists	  conscious	  scrutiny.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  
research,	  there	  are	  two	  additional	  problems.	  First,	  research	  is	  virtually	  
synonymous	  with	  our	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  scholars	  and	  members	  of	  
the	  academy,	  and	  thus	  it	  has	  the	  invisibility	  of	  the	  obvious.	  Second,	  since	  
research	  is	  the	  optic	  through	  which	  we	  typically	  find	  out	  about	  something	  as	  
scholars	  today,	  it	  is	  especially	  hard	  to	  use	  research	  to	  understand	  research	  
(238).	  	  
	  
In	  my	  practice,	  this	  analysis	  of	  invisible	  research	  is	  deeply	  linked	  to	  artistic	  process.	  How	  
do	  we	  display	  creative	  thinking	  as	  process	  to	  the	  academy?	  How	  do	  we	  use	  artistic	  
research,	  or	  practice-­‐led	  research,	  to	  legitimize	  this	  process?	  While	  the	  academy	  is	  
bringing	  practice-­‐led	  graduate	  programs	  into	  formation,	  there	  is	  still	  an	  ambiguity	  
regarding	  guidelines	  and	  regulations	  for	  the	  research	  that	  leads	  to	  achieving	  a	  degree.	  
The	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  validate	  to	  the	  academy	  a	  process	  that	  must	  be	  rooted	  in	  
intuition	  and	  reflection	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  artwork	  that	  is	  dynamic	  is	  really	  a	  question	  
of	  terminology:	  why	  do	  we	  use	  the	  terms	  borrowed	  from	  other	  disciplines	  and	  fields	  to	  
legitimize	  practice?	  
Therefore,	  this	  validation	  becomes	  a	  performance	  for	  the	  academy.	  Ostensibly,	  
the	  legitimization	  of	  my	  research	  can	  appear	  to	  academics	  and	  artists	  alike	  to	  be	  
forced,	  false,	  and	  transparent.	  While	  attempting	  to	  shift	  my	  process	  into	  an	  academic	  
scope,	  I	  choose	  to	  maintain	  my	  position	  as	  primarily	  an	  intuitive	  and	  reflexive	  artist.	  I	  
would	  also	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  intuitive	  methodologies	  have	  become	  normalized	  
as	  processes	  for	  artists	  working	  today.	  I	  realize	  that	  defining	  my	  practice	  and	  the	  role	  I	  
take	  as	  an	  artist	  creates	  an	  artist/academic	  dichotomy.	  In	  this	  paradigm,	  I	  suggest	  that	  
‘practice’,	  ‘research’,	  ‘artist’,	  and	  ‘academic’	  are	  inconsequential	  terms.	  I	  am	  an	  artist	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because	  that	  is	  where	  I	  began:	  it	  is	  my	  origin.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘practice’	  to	  encompass	  the	  
process	  of	  being	  an	  artist-­‐academic.	  Both	  artists	  and	  academics	  are	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  
creative,	  process-­‐based	  practice.	  As	  artists,	  and	  as	  academics,	  we	  begin	  with	  an	  idea,	  
think	  it	  through,	  start	  the	  project,	  stop	  and	  keep	  thinking,	  carry	  on,	  think	  some	  more,	  
lose	  faith,	  get	  exhausted,	  finish	  it	  up,	  over-­‐think	  the	  audience’s	  reception.	  Be	  done	  	  
with	  it.	  
The	  main	  sources	  for	  the	  legitimization	  of	  my	  artistic	  process	  and	  methodology	  
are	  Research	  Design	  (John	  W.	  Creswell,	  2009)	  and	  Reflexive	  Methodology	  (Mats	  
Alvesson	  and	  Kaj	  Sköldberg,	  2000).	  In	  discussing	  my	  methodology,	  I	  mainly	  refer	  to	  my	  
artistic	  process	  rather	  than	  my	  academic	  process,	  as	  everything	  that	  I	  have	  done	  
towards	  my	  Master’s	  project	  has	  been	  artistic	  and	  creative.	  Approaching	  my	  Master’s	  
project	  as	  an	  artist	  and	  as	  a	  reluctant	  academic	  has	  led	  to	  a	  mixed	  methodology,	  
composed	  of	  grounded/critical	  theory,	  reflexive	  interpretation,	  and	  a	  	  
pragmatic	  worldview.	  
My	  research	  design,	  with	  a	  mixed-­‐methods	  approach,	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  
pragmatic	  paradigm	  (Creswell:	  5).	  According	  to	  Creswell,	  a	  pragmatic	  framework	  for	  a	  
research	  design	  is	  one	  concerned	  with	  actions,	  situations,	  and	  consequences	  rather	  
than	  preceding	  conditions:	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  for	  solutions	  to	  problems,	  for	  working	  and	  
thinking	  through	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  methodology	  or	  the	  result	  of	  the	  research	  
(10).	  Creswell	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  pragmatism	  “is	  not	  committed	  to	  any	  one	  system	  of	  
philosophy	  and	  reality	  .	  .	  .	  inquirers	  draw	  liberally	  from	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  
assumptions	  when	  they	  engage	  in	  their	  research”	  (10).	  This	  liberty	  in	  research,	  which	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provides	  a	  freedom	  in	  choosing	  methods	  and	  techniques	  for	  collecting	  and	  analyzing	  
data,	  is	  present	  in	  my	  own	  sometimes-­‐haphazard	  approach	  to	  research	  and	  creation.	  
Because	  there	  can	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  to	  approach	  research,	  I	  suggest	  that	  my	  main	  
methodological	  concern	  is	  an	  investigation	  of	  a	  truth	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  project,	  the	  
truth	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  as	  it	  is	  examined	  in	  theory	  and	  practice),	  
developing	  concepts	  of	  this	  truth	  while	  toying	  with	  speculations	  of	  untruth,	  blurry	  
boundaries,	  and	  shams.	  This	  mixed	  methodology	  is	  also	  suited	  to	  the	  interdisciplinarity	  
of	  my	  project	  and	  my	  humble	  disconnection	  from	  legitimate	  disciplines	  and	  general	  
confusion	  regarding	  Cultural	  Studies,	  ‘animal	  studies’,	  art	  practice,	  and	  creative	  
research.	  Trying	  to	  find	  my	  place	  in	  academia	  has	  led	  to	  ongoing,	  existential	  problems	  
of	  truth	  and	  legitimacy.	  As	  Cleo	  Cherryholmes	  writes	  in	  Educational	  Researcher	  (1992),	  
pragmatic	  researchers	  are	  reluctant	  to	  tell	  a	  true	  story:	  “they	  would	  simply	  like	  to	  
change	  the	  subject”	  (Creswell:	  11).	  This	  reluctance	  highlights	  some	  of	  the	  critiques	  of	  
Cultural	  Studies,	  the	  main	  assessment	  being	  that	  Cultural	  Studies	  poaches	  from	  other	  
disciplines	  without	  a	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  any	  one	  particular	  method,	  worldview	  	  
or	  assumption.	  
In	  this	  project,	  my	  research	  methodology	  and	  the	  model	  for	  the	  direction	  of	  my	  
research	  design	  is	  what	  Creswell	  refers	  to	  as	  “transformative	  mixed	  methods”	  (11).	  This	  
suggests	  an	  overarching	  theoretical	  lens	  through	  which	  the	  project	  is	  investigated	  (15).	  
This	  theoretical	  lens,	  which	  I	  define,	  develop,	  and	  continue	  to	  investigate,	  is	  
posthumanism.	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Humanism,	  as	  it	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  and	  understood,	  is	  a	  philosophy	  that	  
places	  distinct	  faith	  and	  trust	  in	  our	  own	  humanity.	  A	  safe	  and	  somewhat	  reductive	  
definition	  of	  humanism	  is	  that	  it	  is	  “a	  broad	  category	  of	  ethical	  philosophies	  that	  affirm	  
the	  dignity	  and	  worth	  of	  all	  people,	  based	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  determine	  right	  from	  wrong	  
by	  appeal	  to	  universal	  human	  qualities	  -­‐	  particularly	  rationality”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  xi).	  	  This	  
affirmation	  of	  moral	  codes	  supports	  human	  interests	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  faith	  without	  
reason	  in	  the	  supernatural	  or	  the	  divine.	  It	  stands	  in	  opposition	  to	  religion	  or	  faith-­‐	  
based	  principles.	  	  
To	  date,	  an	  understanding	  of	  posthumanism	  has	  often	  been	  associated	  with	  
‘cyborgology’	  or	  ‘apocalyptia’.	  In	  this	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  the	  ‘post’	  of	  posthumanism	  
follows	  a	  progression	  and	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  the	  human	  through	  technology,	  defying	  age	  
and	  disease,	  and	  achieving	  an	  optimal	  condition	  and	  status	  for	  humans.	  Although	  an	  
element	  of	  this	  concept	  is	  threaded	  through	  Cary	  Wolfe’s	  definition	  of	  posthumanism	  in	  
What	  is	  Posthumanism?	  (2010c),	  it	  remains	  a	  developing	  and	  still	  confused	  term.	  Wolfe	  
identifies	  this	  early,	  emergent	  phase	  of	  posthumanism	  as	  crucial	  in	  constructing	  the	  
definition	  of	  posthumanism.	  According	  to	  Wolfe,	  an	  understanding	  of	  posthumanism	  
(not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  transhumanism)30	  does	  not	  necessarily	  come	  ‘after’,	  as	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  According	  to	  Wolfe,	  “posthumanism	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  transhumanism	  .	  .	  .	  transhumanism	  is	  
the	  intensification	  of	  humanism”	  (Wolfe:	  xv).	  Transhumanism	  is	  rooted	  in	  secular	  humanist	  
thinking,	  “yet	  is	  more	  radical	  in	  that	  it	  promotes	  not	  only	  traditional	  means	  of	  improving	  human	  
nature,	  such	  as	  education	  and	  cultural	  refinement,	  but	  also	  directs	  application	  of	  medicine	  and	  
technology	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	  our	  basic	  biological	  limits”	  (Bostrom	  2003:	  493).	  Instead	  of	  
seeing	  humans	  as	  developed	  and	  complete,	  Bostrom	  writes	  that	  transhumanists	  view	  human	  
nature	  as	  a	  work-­‐in-­‐progress	  and	  hope	  that	  through	  responsible	  developments	  of	  science	  and	  
technology,	  “we	  shall	  eventually	  manage	  to	  become	  posthuman,	  beings	  with	  vastly	  greater	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prefix	  ‘post’	  would	  imply.	  	  Instead,	  an	  understanding	  of	  posthumanism	  as	  Wolfe	  defines	  
it	  can	  be	  read	  analogous	  to	  Jean-­‐Francois	  Lyotard’s	  reading	  of	  postmodernism.	  In	  this	  
sense,	  posthumanism	  comes	  both	  before	  and	  after	  humanism:	  “before	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  it	  names	  the	  embodiment	  and	  embeddedness	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  not	  just	  its	  
biological	  but	  also	  its	  technological	  world,	  the	  prosthetic	  coevolution	  of	  the	  human	  
animal	  with	  the	  technicity	  of	  tools	  and	  external	  archive	  mechanisms	  (such	  as	  language	  
and	  culture)”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  xv).	  Wolfe	  means	  here	  that	  the	  human	  being,	  inextricable	  
from	  its	  own	  biology	  (before	  the	  machine	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  organic-­‐technological	  
hybrids/cyborgs)	  and	  currently	  with	  the	  proficient	  and	  inescapable	  impact	  of	  
technology,	  has	  come	  to	  function	  and	  evolve	  alongside	  the	  ongoing	  development	  of	  
language	  and	  culture.	  This	  is	  before	  humanism,	  it	  is	  the	  origin,	  it	  is	  rational	  but	  it	  is	  also	  
based	  in	  instinct	  and	  intuition	  -­‐	  it	  is	  animalistic	  and	  evolutionary.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  
humanism	  to	  be	  a	  dominant	  ontology	  in	  order	  for	  this	  version	  of	  posthumanism	  to	  
succeed	  it.	  	  	  
However,	  Wolfe	  also	  writes	  that	  posthumanism	  does	  come	  after	  humanism	  
when	  he	  suggests	  that	  though	  the	  human	  is	  embodied	  in	  its	  own	  being	  (in	  whichever	  
way	  we	  understand	  that	  being),	  it	  is	  also	  currently	  experiencing	  a	  moment	  of	  de-­‐
centering.	  	  The	  need,	  then,	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  this	  paradigm	  (embodiment	  and	  de-­‐
centering)	  and	  identify	  and	  conceptualize	  a	  new	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  human.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
capacities	  than	  present	  human	  beings	  have”	  (494). 
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comes	  after	  (humanism)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  posthumanism	  names	  a	  historical	  
moment	  in	  which	  the	  de-­‐centering	  of	  the	  human	  by	  its	  imbrication	  in	  technical,	  
medical,	  informatic,	  and	  economic	  networks	  is	  increasingly	  impossible	  to	  
ignore,	  a	  historical	  development	  that	  points	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  new	  theoretical	  
paradigms	  (but	  also	  thrusts	  them	  on	  us),	  a	  new	  mode	  of	  thought	  that	  comes	  
after	  the	  cultural	  repressions	  and	  fantasies,	  the	  philosophical	  protocols,	  and	  
evasions,	  of	  humanism	  as	  a	  historically	  specific	  phenomena	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  xv).	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  this	  posthumanism	  is	  not	  a	  disregard	  for	  the	  elements	  of	  humanism,	  nor	  
is	  it	  in	  essence	  a	  progression:	  it	  is	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  term	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  
which	  humanism	  operates.	  	  	  
Posthumanism	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  human	  is	  not	  and	  should	  not	  be	  the	  core	  
around	  which	  all	  other	  elements	  of	  our	  world	  circulate	  and	  are	  focused	  upon.	  	  And	  in	  
addition	  to	  this,	  posthumanism	  recognizes	  that	  the	  way	  we	  understand	  the	  human	  is	  
shifting.	  According	  to	  Wolfe,	  “in	  my	  sense,	  posthumanism	  isn’t	  posthuman	  at	  all	  -­‐	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  being	  ‘after’	  our	  embodiment	  has	  been	  transcended	  -­‐	  but	  is	  only	  posthumanist,	  
in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  opposes	  the	  fantasies	  of	  disembodiment	  and	  autonomy	  inherited	  
from	  humanism	  itself”	  (2010c:	  xv).	  Wolfe	  writes	  that	  in	  posthumanism	  “the	  point	  is	  not	  
to	  reject	  humanism	  -­‐	  indeed,	  there	  are	  many	  values	  and	  aspirations	  to	  admire	  in	  
humanism	  -­‐	  but	  rather	  to	  show	  how	  those	  aspirations	  are	  undercut	  by	  the	  philosophical	  
and	  ethical	  frameworks	  used	  to	  conceptualize	  them”	  (2010c:	  xvi).	  To	  use	  an	  example,	  
although	  the	  ethical	  and	  moral	  position	  of	  humanism	  would	  require	  that	  animals	  be	  
treated	  with	  respect	  and	  equality,	  it	  is	  the	  very	  amplification	  of	  human-­‐centric	  
philosophical	  and	  theoretical	  frameworks	  that	  create	  normative	  subjectivity,	  leading	  to	  
discrimination	  against	  animals	  and	  also	  humans	  with	  disabilities.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  a	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sense	  of	  the	  superiority	  of	  ‘normal’	  humans	  over	  all	  others	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
humanism	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  strengthening	  of	  dichotomies,	  such	  as	  human-­‐animal,	  
which	  Donna	  Haraway	  refers	  to	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “Great	  Divides”	  (2008b:	  21).	  Haraway	  
adopted	  this	  term	  from	  Bruno	  Latour;	  it	  refers	  to	  dichotomies	  embedded	  in	  modernist	  
understandings	  of	  humanism	  and	  posthumanism	  alike:	  nature/society,	  
nonhuman/human,	  other/man	  (2008b:	  9).	  The	  humanistic	  dogma,	  which	  calls	  attention	  
to	  the	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy,	  is	  also	  related	  to	  theories	  of	  social	  Darwinism	  and	  
eugenics,	  which	  hold	  that	  some	  qualities	  of	  the	  human	  are	  superior	  (leading	  to	  the	  
negative	  ‘isms’:	  sexism,	  racism,	  ageism).	  Posthumanism	  addresses	  the	  problems	  
embedded	  in	  humanism	  by	  essentially	  attempting	  to	  eradicate	  humanistic	  dogma.	  	  	  	  
In	  When	  Species	  Meet,	  Haraway	  defies	  acknowledgement	  of	  her	  position	  as	  a	  
posthumanist	  scholar,	  although	  she	  is	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  posthumanities	  (a	  
series	  of	  texts	  published	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press).	  Her	  previous	  work,	  
Simians,	  Cyborgs	  and	  Women	  (1990c)	  is	  often	  related	  to	  the	  posthuman,	  but	  in	  the	  use	  
of	  the	  word	  that	  references	  the	  cyborg,	  a	  transcendence	  of	  the	  human	  and	  a	  movement	  
from	  one	  being	  to	  another	  while	  retaining	  humanity	  but	  not	  gender	  or	  race.	  In	  this	  text,	  
“the	  cyborg	  is	  a	  creature	  in	  a	  post-­‐gender	  world;	  it	  has	  no	  truck	  with	  bisexuality,	  pre-­‐
oedipal	  symbiosis,	  unalienated	  labour,	  or	  other	  seductions	  to	  organic	  wholeness	  
through	  a	  final	  appropriation	  of	  all	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  parts	  in	  to	  a	  higher	  unity”	  (1991c:	  
150).	  The	  cyborg	  disregards	  philosophical	  and	  psychoanalytic	  precedence	  -­‐	  it	  does	  not	  
need	  to	  pay	  homage	  to	  its	  academic	  fathers	  and	  mothers.	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In	  Haraway’s	  own	  words,	  “I	  never	  wanted	  to	  be	  posthuman,	  or	  posthumanist,	  
any	  more	  than	  I	  wanted	  to	  be	  postfeminist.	  	  For	  one	  thing,	  urgent	  work	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  
done	  in	  reference	  to	  those	  who	  must	  inhabit	  the	  troubled	  categories	  of	  woman	  and	  
human,	  properly	  pluralized,	  reformulated,	  and	  brought	  into	  constitutive	  intersection	  
with	  other	  asymmetrical	  differences”	  (2008b:	  17).	  	  And	  in	  reference	  to	  what	  she	  reads	  
as	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy,	  quoting	  Anna	  Tsing,	  “human	  nature	  is	  
an	  interspecies	  relationship”	  (2008b:	  19).	  	  For	  Haraway,	  this	  means	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
embeddedness	  of	  the	  human	  with	  the	  animal	  (nonhuman)	  species	  that	  is	  inextricable.	  
This	  interspecies	  relationship,	  or	  species	  interdependence,	  “is	  the	  name	  of	  the	  worlding	  
game	  on	  earth,	  and	  that	  game	  must	  be	  one	  of	  response	  and	  respect.	  	  That	  is	  the	  play	  of	  
companion	  species	  learning	  to	  pay	  attention.	  I	  am	  not	  posthumanist;	  I	  am	  who	  I	  
become	  with	  companion	  species,	  who	  and	  which	  make	  a	  mess	  out	  of	  categories	  in	  the	  
making	  of	  kin	  and	  kind”	  (2008b:	  19).	  For	  Haraway,	  this	  “becoming	  with”	  companion	  
species	  is	  an	  ongoing	  and	  ever-­‐present	  becoming.	  	  	  	  
Being	  in	  flux,	  what	  a	  posthumanist	  framework	  suggests	  is	  that	  in	  order	  to	  reject	  
existing	  dogmas,	  dichotomies,	  and	  influence,	  we	  must	  “realize	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  
thought	  itself	  must	  change	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  posthumanist”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  xvi).	  	  Wolfe	  
summarizes	  a	  two-­‐part	  definition	  of	  posthumanism	  -­‐	  it	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  thought,	  and	  it	  
engages	  “directly	  the	  problem	  of	  anthropocentrism	  and	  speciesism	  and	  how	  practices	  
of	  thinking	  and	  reading	  must	  change	  in	  light	  of	  their	  critique”	  (xix).	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  
emergent	  discipline	  of	  what	  has	  generally	  been	  called	  ‘animal	  studies’,	  Wolfe	  identifies	  
animal	  studies	  as	  addressing	  these	  problems	  in	  light	  of	  the	  greater	  context	  of	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posthumanism	  (2010c:	  99).	  By	  understanding	  posthumanism	  as	  a	  philosophy	  and	  as	  a	  
system	  through	  which	  to	  address	  and	  critique	  fundamental	  humanist	  paradigms,	  we	  
can	  look	  towards	  potential	  new	  methods	  of	  addressing	  this	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy.	  
	  
C	  U	  L	  T	  U	  R	  A	  L	  	  	  S	  T	  U	  D	  I	  E	  S	  	  
This	  dialogue	  is	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  project	  in	  order	  to	  
identify	  where	  this	  project	  fits	  in	  academia	  and	  what	  its	  critical	  impact	  may	  be.	  The	  goal	  
of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  adopt	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  new	  way	  of	  thinking,	  posthumanism,	  in	  
specific	  regards	  to	  the	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy:	  it	  is	  also	  an	  understanding	  of	  
‘discipline’	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  interdisciplinarity	  (which	  is	  the	  rubric	  under	  which	  I	  functioned	  
during	  the	  research	  and	  creation	  of	  my	  Master’s	  project).	  Posthumanism	  can	  help	  
identify	  a	  crisis	  within	  the	  humanities	  in	  which	  a	  schism	  has	  been	  cultivating	  between	  
“scholars	  committed	  primarily	  to	  matters	  of	  history	  and	  scholars	  committed	  primarily	  
to	  matters	  of	  theory	  (and	  the	  relation	  of	  form	  and	  meaning)”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  101).	  The	  
proliferation	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  in	  the	  humanities	  further	  amplifies	  this	  schism,	  which	  
Ellen	  Rooney	  writes	  is	  “a	  welter	  of	  competing	  (and	  even	  incompatible)	  methods,	  and	  a	  
quasi-­‐disciplinary	  form	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  defend,	  intellectually	  or	  politically”	  
(Wolfe	  2010c:	  104;	  Rooney	  2000:	  21).	  	  Cultural	  Studies	  has	  roots	  in	  literary	  criticism,	  
which	  engages	  in	  similar	  discussions	  of	  artistic	  value	  and	  judgment	  as	  art	  history	  does.	  	  
The	  inability	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  (though	  varying	  forms	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  from	  North	  
America,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  Australia	  have	  adopted	  their	  own	  strategies	  in	  order	  
to	  thrive)	  to	  self-­‐define	  and	  self-­‐defend	  leads	  to	  ambivalence	  and	  “inclusive	  vagueness”	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(Wolfe	  2010c:	  104;	  Rajan	  2001:	  69),	  which	  has	  facilitated	  Cultural	  Studies	  to	  take	  on	  
new	  academic	  territory.	  Many	  disciplines	  are	  adopting	  Cultural	  Studies’	  strategies	  of	  
trans-­‐	  or	  interdisciplinarity	  as	  part	  of	  a	  redefinition	  of	  theory	  and	  practice,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  
deliberate	  vagueness	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  reviving	  these	  disciplines.	  
For	  example,	  in	  the	  text	  The	  New	  Art	  History:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  (2001),	  Jonathan	  
Harris	  dedicates	  his	  text	  to	  the	  development	  of	  various	  theories	  within	  the	  field	  of	  art	  
history	  (such	  as	  Marxist,	  feminist,	  and	  identity	  politics),	  discussing	  radical	  art	  history	  as	  
the	  most	  recent	  phase.	  However,	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  text,	  Harris	  negotiates	  the	  
current	  form	  of	  art	  history	  to	  be	  in	  fact	  Cultural	  Studies:	  “both	  shared	  a	  similar	  casual	  
connection	  to	  the	  political	  radicalism	  of	  the	  1960’s,	  though	  both	  had	  earlier	  roots	  as	  
well.	  Both	  have	  opened	  up	  the	  study	  of	  art	  and	  culture	  broadly	  to	  inquiries	  rooted	  in	  
questions	  about	  contemporary	  society	  and	  the	  ordering	  of	  power	  and	  identities	  within	  
it”	  (2001:	  287-­‐288).	  	  
However,	  the	  strongest	  criticism	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  is	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  
historicism’s	  “text-­‐as-­‐paraphrase”	  -­‐	  observing	  that	  the	  “teleology	  of	  the	  new	  Cultural	  
Studies,	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  ‘pluralism’,	  is	  of	  absolute	  transparency	  based	  on	  total	  
communicability”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  105).	  Because	  Cultural	  Studies	  (going	  beyond	  a	  
reductive	  understanding	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  as	  the	  study	  of	  culture)	  functions	  between	  
acknowledged	  disciplines,	  it	  adopts	  through	  practice	  the	  language,	  methodologies,	  and	  
theory	  lifted	  from	  other	  disciplines,	  creating	  a	  compilation	  of	  study	  that	  can	  either	  
contribute	  to	  these	  various	  disciplines	  or	  remain	  without	  any	  impact.	  Wolfe	  writes	  that	  
“Cultural	  Studies	  thus	  involves	  a	  repurposing	  of	  reading	  and	  thinking;	  it	  is	  a	  ‘pragmatic	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use	  of	  the	  humanities	  within	  a	  modular	  structure	  that	  appears	  to	  promote	  dissidence’	  
by	  its	  pluralism	  of	  content	  and	  identities”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  105).	  	  According	  to	  Richard	  
Johnson	  in	  What	  is	  Cultural	  Studies	  Anyway?,	  Cultural	  Studies	  that	  emphasize	  critical	  
theory	  simultaneously	  strive	  to	  “become	  more	  ‘popular’	  rather	  than	  academic”	  (1986-­‐
87:	  40).	  Therefore,	  that	  a	  heterogeneous	  global	  audience	  for	  Cultural	  Studies	  is	  taken	  
for	  granted	  is	  “an	  oxymoron	  that	  conceals	  a	  deep	  contradiction	  in	  claiming	  the	  
synchronicity	  of	  the	  unique	  and	  the	  universal,	  and	  the	  global	  reach	  of	  Western	  notions	  
of	  ‘heterogeneity’”	  (W0lfe	  2010c:	  105).	  	  	  	  	  
Critics	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  identify	  a	  crucial	  role	  of	  theoretical	  reflection	  in	  
addressing	  the	  “intellectual	  miasma	  that	  is	  Cultural	  Studies	  -­‐	  not	  because	  theory	  is	  a	  
specialized	  obsession	  but	  precisely	  because	  it	  isn’t”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  105).	  A	  lack	  of	  
theoretical	  reflection	  can	  be	  found	  in	  earlier	  forms	  of	  art	  history,	  in	  which	  “thematic	  (or	  
aesthetic)	  analysis	  has	  become	  the	  sole	  mode	  of	  ‘formal’	  analysis”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  106;	  
Rooney	  2000:	  28).	  In	  Harris’	  words,	  theory	  in	  art	  history	  is	  a	  “necessary	  part	  of	  any	  
serious	  and	  critical	  project.	  Theory	  was	  (and	  is)	  needed	  in	  this	  sense	  both	  to	  allow	  
understanding	  of	  existing	  traditions	  of	  thought	  and	  disciplinary	  practice	  -­‐	  and	  to	  allow	  
us	  to	  invent	  and	  mobilize	  forms	  of	  agreement	  and	  procedures	  of	  description,	  analysis,	  
and	  evaluation	  required	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  alternatives	  to	  the	  dominant	  practices”	  
(Harris	  2001:	  27-­‐28).	  Harris	  quotes	  Terry	  Eagleton	  from	  Literary	  Theory:	  An	  Introduction	  
(1983),	  	  
some	  students	  and	  critics	  also	  protest	  that	  literary	  theory	  gets	  in	  between	  the	  
reader	  and	  the	  work.	  The	  simple	  response	  to	  this	  is	  that	  without	  some	  kind	  of	  
theory,	  however	  unreflective	  and	  implicit,	  we	  would	  not	  know	  what	  a	  ‘literary’	  
or	  artistic	  work	  was	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  or	  how	  we	  were	  to	  read	  it.	  	  Hostility	  to	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theory	  usually	  means	  an	  opposition	  to	  other	  people’s	  theories	  and	  oblivion	  of	  
one’s	  own	  (2000:	  vii-­‐viii).	  	  	  
	  
The	  implications	  of	  theory	  as	  methodology	  and	  the	  support	  of	  theory	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  
literary	  studies,	  art	  history,	  and	  Cultural	  Studies	  suggest	  the	  interdisciplinarity	  of	  what	  
Wolfe	  positions	  as	  “animal	  studies.”	  According	  to	  Wolfe,	  	  
we	  should	  not	  try	  to	  imagine	  some	  super	  inter-­‐discipline	  called	  ‘animal	  studies’	  
but	  recognize	  that	  it	  is	  only	  in	  and	  through	  our	  disciplinary	  specificity	  that	  we	  
have	  something	  specific	  and	  irreplaceable	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  ‘question	  of	  the	  
animal’	  that	  has	  recently	  captured	  the	  attention	  of	  so	  many	  different	  
disciplines:	  not	  something	  accurate	  to	  contribute	  but	  something	  specific	  
(2010c:	  115).	  	  
	  
What	  posthumanism	  supports,	  then,	  is	  “not	  interdisciplinarity	  but	  multidisciplinarity	  or	  
perhaps	  transdisciplinarity	  -­‐	  but	  a	  transdisciplinarity	  that	  accepts	  the	  task	  of	  making	  
itself	  transparent	  by	  thematizing	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  own	  speech”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  115).	  
However,	  despite	  this	  task,	  Wolfe	  relates	  the	  impossibility	  of	  this,	  to	  understand	  
“transdisciplinarity	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  distributed	  reflexivity	  necessitated,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  (by	  
definition)	  no	  discourse,	  no	  discipline,	  can	  make	  transparent	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  own	  
observations.	  In	  this	  sense,	  transdisciplinarity	  means	  a	  distributed	  network	  of	  first	  and	  
second	  order	  observers	  (disciplines)	  that,	  precisely	  by	  ‘doing	  what	  they	  do’	  call	  in	  to	  
question	  -­‐	  and	  are	  called	  into	  question	  by	  -­‐	  other	  disciplinary	  formations”	  (Wolfe	  2010c:	  
116).	  Not	  to	  confuse	  this	  with	  the	  way	  that	  Cultural	  Studies	  functions	  in	  this	  dialogue,	  
transdisciplinarity	  seeks,	  as	  a	  goal,	  to	  question	  the	  way	  in	  which	  disciplines	  approach	  
practice	  and	  seek	  to	  make	  the	  process	  transparent:	  this	  is	  self-­‐reflexivity	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
disciplinarity.	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  ‘Interdisciplinarity’,	  an	  evasive	  yet	  indiscrete	  term	  in	  academia,	  lacks	  definition	  
and	  therefore	  is	  used	  without	  conviction,	  despite	  its	  status	  as	  emergent	  and	  
progressive.	  To	  be	  ‘inter’	  is	  to	  be	  between,	  within,	  or	  among	  several	  disciplines.	  
Therefore,	  if	  I	  can	  define	  posthumanism	  as	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  is	  still	  in	  a	  
phase	  of	  self-­‐definition,	  I	  position	  this	  paper	  in	  an	  ontology	  that	  is	  forming	  and	  
therefore	  fluid	  and	  organic,	  and	  certainly	  cross	  disciplinary.	  If	  this	  paper	  is	  a	  
posthumanist	  text,	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  art	  history,	  art	  theory,	  or	  art	  criticism.	  However,	  
the	  central	  dialogue	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  address	  art	  practice,	  which	  is	  therefore	  the	  other,	  
or	  the	  ‘inter’	  discipline.	  	  Is	  what	  results	  from	  this	  ‘inter’	  a	  paper	  of	  Cultural	  Studies?	  
Advocating	  only	  the	  title	  of	  ‘artist’	  and	  eluding	  any	  other	  self-­‐definition,	  I	  struggle	  to	  
position	  my	  project	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  an	  art	  project,	  with	  a	  supporting	  and	  
investigative	  critical	  text.	  In	  this,	  because	  I	  fail	  to	  subscribe	  to	  any	  one	  discipline,	  or	  
even	  to	  ’inter’,	  am	  I	  contributing	  to	  a	  field	  that	  eludes	  categorization	  and	  lacks	  critical	  
impact?	  	  However,	  if	  I	  aim	  to	  disregard	  the	  term	  ‘interdisciplinary’	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  
‘transdisciplinary’,	  I	  can	  instead	  function	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  self-­‐reflexivity	  and	  self-­‐
reference,	  which	  Wolfe	  claims	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  posthumanism.	  What	  I	  aim	  to	  do	  in	  this	  
paper	  is	  to	  adopt	  posthumanism	  as	  the	  philosophy,	  the	  terms	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  my	  
understanding,	  and	  apply	  these	  to	  my	  performative	  art	  practice.	  This	  eludes	  
interdisciplinarity.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  acknowledges	  the	  
problems	  in	  order	  to	  strive	  forward,	  so	  does	  my	  thesis	  project.	  This	  project	  is	  a	  critical	  
reflection	  not	  only	  on	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  art	  practice,	  but	  also	  the	  definition	  
of	  the	  languages	  and	  methodologies	  of	  interdisciplinarity.	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   Two	  key	  and	  formative	  events	  from	  my	  recent	  past	  have	  influenced	  me	  during	  
the	  development	  of	  my	  thesis	  project.	  The	  first	  event	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  my	  cat	  Sushi	  
in	  2006,	  now	  5	  years	  ago.	  From	  the	  very	  start	  of	  our	  relationship,	  Sushi	  was	  very	  loving	  
and	  loyal.	  Literally	  unavoidable,	  she	  was	  always	  in	  the	  room.	  She	  constantly	  surprised	  
me	  with	  her	  eccentricities.	  She	  has	  led	  me	  to	  think	  through	  and	  expand	  upon	  concepts	  
of	  anthropomorphization	  in	  my	  art	  practice,	  in	  which	  I	  have	  projected	  my	  feelings	  and	  
responses	  through	  animal	  imagery.	  Themes	  of	  anthropomorphization	  have	  been	  strong	  
in	  my	  art	  projects	  since	  Sushi’s	  adoption,	  including	  Cat	  and	  Bird	  (2008),	  Continuing	  
Conversations	  between	  Cat	  and	  Bird	  (2008),	  Where	  To	  Go	  From	  Here	  (2009),	  Hyena	  One	  
and	  Two	  (2008-­‐09),	  and	  more.	  Observing	  Sushi	  at	  the	  window	  while	  a	  flock	  of	  birds	  
milled	  and	  messed	  around	  in	  my	  backyard	  originally	  inspired	  these	  projects.	  I	  would	  
envision	  a	  conversation	  happening	  between	  Sushi	  and	  the	  birds,	  a	  negotiation,	  an	  
agreement.	  In	  many	  ways,	  Sushi	  is	  my	  muse.	  	  	  
	  I	  approached	  this	  thesis	  project	  while	  developing	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  as	  an	  
ideology	  and	  methodology	  (and	  it	  is	  certainly	  also	  my	  ongoing	  approach	  to	  life).	  The	  
origin	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  goes	  back	  to	  2005,	  before	  I	  adopted	  Sushi.	  At	  that	  time,	  I	  
was	  in	  the	  final	  year	  of	  my	  undergraduate	  degree	  at	  Queen’s	  University,	  Kingston.	  I	  
lived	  in	  a	  house	  with	  Darryl	  Bank,	  John	  Murnaghan,	  and	  Bitsy	  Knox	  -­‐	  a	  motley	  crew	  of	  
unassuming	  and	  brilliant	  artists.	  	  When	  I	  moved	  into	  this	  four-­‐person	  home,	  I	  replaced	  
Graeme	  Langdon,	  a	  beautiful,	  brooding,	  and	  tortured	  man	  writing	  his	  fourth-­‐year	  film	  
thesis	  on	  vampires	  and	  Robocop.	  Graeme	  came	  up	  with	  the	  term	  “posimodernism”	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when	  he	  was	  feeling	  particularly	  hopeless,	  talking	  to	  Darryl	  about	  girls	  and	  buying	  them	  
flowers.	  Darryl	  adopted	  the	  term	  and	  adapted	  it	  in	  collaboration	  with	  several	  friends.	  
What	  resulted	  from	  the	  collaboration	  was	  posimodernism,	  which	  formed	  the	  emotional	  
framework	  for	  a	  series	  of	  dance	  parties	  called	  Japanada.	  Since	  then,	  and	  in	  
collaboration	  with	  Darryl,	  I’ve	  come	  to	  associate	  the	  term	  as	  an	  overarching	  
methodology.	  In	  actuality,	  posimodernism	  is	  not	  a	  correct	  term.	  	  If	  you	  search	  
"posimodernism"	  in	  Google	  it	  comes	  up	  in	  some	  unfortunate	  academic	  writing,	  likely	  a	  
misspelling	  of	  postmodernism,	  or	  perhaps	  somehow	  relating	  to	  positivism.	  	  	  
Darryl’s	  definition	  of	  posimodernism:	  	  	  
The	  prefix	  ‘posi’	  isn't	  a	  proper	  prefix,	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  inventedness	  of	  the	  
word,	  it	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  ‘posi’	  (short	  for	  "positive"	  strain	  of	  U.S.	  hardcore	  
that	  probably	  started	  in	  the	  late	  80s	  with	  Youth	  of	  Today	  and	  some	  of	  the	  other	  
early	  Revelation	  Records	  bands).	  I	  always	  thought	  this	  specific	  subgenre	  was	  
particularly	  inane	  -­‐	  it	  combined	  an	  extremely	  narrow,	  conservative	  
aesthetic/musical	  framework	  with	  brain-­‐dead,	  earnest	  lyrics.	  It's	  all	  about	  ‘the	  
scene’,	  ‘looking	  out	  for	  each	  other’,	  'staying	  true’,	  etc.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  
resemblance	  to	  high	  school	  sports,	  at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  
normativity.	  So	  for	  me,	  ‘posimodernism’	  was	  a	  way	  of	  cryptically	  referencing	  
‘posi’	  hardcore	  while	  ignoring	  all	  the	  parts	  of	  it	  that	  are	  stupid.	  Then	  it	  folds	  
back	  into	  the	  dryness	  and	  dullness	  of	  simplistic	  and	  reductive	  theories	  of	  how	  
culture	  works,	  for	  example,	  postmodernism.	  You	  combine	  the	  warmth	  of	  the	  
saccharine,	  the	  earnest,	  the	  cliché,	  with	  the	  coldness	  of	  theory.	  Being	  at	  
university,	  pretty	  immature	  and	  ignorant,	  but	  excited	  about	  learning,	  plus	  
stressed	  out	  and	  anxious,	  I	  felt	  like	  this	  combination	  was	  something	  that	  could	  
help	  me	  out	  and	  get	  me	  through	  things	  (Darryl	  Bank,	  e-­‐mail	  message	  to	  author,	  
November	  21,	  2009).31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  In	  my	  own	  reductive	  and	  over-­‐simplified	  language,	  what	  posimodernism	  means	  to	  me	  is	  a	  
dialogue	  that	  resembles	  this:	  	  	  
Me:	  “We’re	  fucked.”	  	  	  
You:	  "Yes.	  	  We’re	  totally	  fucked."	  	  	  
Me:	  "But:	  let’s	  enjoy	  this	  moment	  for	  the	  moment.	  	  Let’s	  let	  this	  moment	  pass."	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Posimodernism	  is	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  way	  we’ve	  really	  fucked	  our	  own	  shit	  up:	  
environmentally,	  psychologically,	  sociologically,	  in	  every	  conceivable	  way.	  But	  
posimodern	  is	  also	  a	  brief	  moment	  of	  self-­‐forgiveness.	  It	  is	  a	  fleeting	  split-­‐second	  when,	  
even	  though	  we	  are	  angry	  and	  hurt	  and	  upset,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  do	  this	  one	  thing,	  put	  
something	  positive	  into	  the	  world,	  for	  now.	  It	  is	  contradictory	  and	  paradoxical.	  Being	  a	  
posimodernist	  means	  that	  sometimes	  you	  are	  frustrated	  and	  you	  don’t	  understand	  why	  
everything	  has	  to	  be	  a	  struggle;	  it	  is	  knowing	  that	  everything	  is	  going	  to	  be	  ok.	  
Posimodernism	  is	  complicated,	  it	  isn’t	  a	  solution;	  it	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  you	  and	  I	  
can	  ever	  even	  begin	  to	  fathom	  over	  three	  beers	  talking	  about	  feelings,	  or	  six	  beers	  
talking	  about	  ideas.	  It	  is	  hopeless	  enthusiasm.	  It	  is	  about	  self-­‐definition	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  
about	  earnestly	  believing	  in	  goodness,	  even	  momentarily.	  It	  is	  Bruce	  Springsteen’s	  Born	  
in	  the	  U.S.A.	  (1984)	  and	  Dolly	  Parton’s	  Jolene	  (1974).	  It	  is	  hard	  work	  and	  motivation	  and	  
conviction.	  To	  be	  posimodernist	  is	  for	  me	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  my	  cat	  should	  not	  be	  my	  
cat,	  and	  that	  I	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  domesticating	  animals	  by	  limiting	  
their	  lives	  and	  abilities;	  it	  is	  loving	  her	  with	  all	  of	  my	  capacity	  and	  forgiving	  myself.	  It	  is	  
recognizing	  that	  we	  are	  not	  all	  that	  bad,	  not	  all	  the	  time.	  It	  is	  awareness	  and	  it	  is	  
complication	  and	  it	  is	  a	  brief	  repair	  for	  the	  irreparable	  through	  optimism	  and	  laughing	  
out	  loud.	  	  	  
Posimodernism	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  almost	  any	  area	  of	  your	  life	  that	  you	  want.	  	  	  
As	  Darryl	  Bank	  puts	  it:	  	  	  
...	  Your	  personal	  life,	  academic/theoretical	  issues,	  art	  making,	  global	  conflict,	  
etc.	  In	  a	  broader	  sense,	  I	  also	  think	  it's	  a	  good	  way	  of	  negotiating	  one	  of	  the	  big	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fallacies	  of	  post-­‐secondary	  ‘art	  education’.	  I'll	  quote	  from	  Sally	  McKay	  here,	  in	  a	  
comment	  she	  left	  on	  my	  friend	  Gabby's	  blog:32	  	  
	  
I’m	  big	  on	  research	  and	  education	  and	  rigorous	  thinking	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  
larger	  cultural	  discourse,	  and	  all	  the	  good	  things	  that	  come	  from	  getting	  educated	  
about	  your	  art	  practice.	  But	  nobody	  in	  his	  or	  her	  right	  mind	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  
best	  way	  to	  be	  an	  artist	  is	  to	  read	  a	  bunch	  of	  theory	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  your	  work	  (or,	  
worse,	  vice	  versa).	  Yet,	  that's	  what	  an	  MFA	  degree	  demands.	  Only,	  since	  the	  Profs	  
and	  students	  are	  mostly	  in	  their	  right	  minds,	  the	  demand	  is	  sort	  of	  tacit	  and	  
oblique	  and	  strained.	  Students	  are	  left	  reading	  and	  making	  and	  not	  really	  knowing	  
what	  is	  expected	  of	  them	  in	  bringing	  the	  two	  together,	  and	  faculty	  are	  hoping	  that	  
the	  students	  will	  somehow	  rise	  above	  the	  murk	  and	  find	  their	  own	  path	  that	  
surprises	  and	  delights	  without	  being	  a)	  overly	  pedantic	  or	  b)	  ignorant.	  Add	  to	  that	  
the	  inevitable	  infantilization	  that	  comes	  with	  submitting	  your	  art	  practice	  to	  a	  
grading	  scheme	  and	  owie!	  It’s	  a	  mess.	  Now	  translate	  that	  into	  a	  PhD.	  A	  PhD	  that	  
is	  increasingly	  necessary	  if	  you	  want	  to	  support	  your	  art	  career	  with	  teaching.	  Arg	  
(Darryl	  Bank,	  e-­‐mail	  message	  to	  author,	  November	  21,	  2009).	  
	  
To	  be	  posimodern	  is	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  flawed	  system	  yet	  to	  be	  indebted	  to	  it,	  to	  be	  
enthusiastic	  about	  art	  and	  life	  yet	  to	  always	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  need	  to	  validate	  or	  justify.	  	  
That	  is	  posimodernism.	  	  It	  is	  always	  a	  struggle;	  it	  is	  by	  choice.	  	  But	  it	  is	  because	  there	  is	  
no	  other	  way.	  	  
	   In	  a	  recent	  conversation	  with	  my	  friend,	  former	  undergrad	  advisor,	  and	  
haphazard	  mentor,	  Craig	  Leonard,	  I	  spoke	  about	  posimodernism	  with	  enthusiasm	  
(after	  several	  drinks,	  my	  enthusiasm	  soaked	  in	  gin).	  Succinctly,	  Craig	  asked:	  “Why	  are	  
you	  paying	  homage	  to	  modernism?	  Why	  are	  you	  claiming	  this	  genealogy	  of	  
modernism?”	  Distressed	  at	  being	  challenged	  on	  the	  term	  rather	  than	  the	  concept,	  I	  
thought	  about	  this	  for	  a	  long	  time	  (what	  felt	  like	  several	  minutes,	  at	  least).	  I	  said	  that	  it	  
does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  called	  posimodernism.	  I	  replied	  that	  it	  could	  be	  called	  anything,	  
that	  the	  awareness	  was	  the	  key	  point,	  not	  the	  term.	  Since	  then,	  I	  have	  considered	  other	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terms	  and	  have	  settled	  on	  posi-­‐postmodernism.	  I	  believe	  that	  capturing	  the	  spirit	  of	  po-­‐
mo	  in	  this	  term	  is	  essential:	  schizophrenic	  already,	  the	  additional	  prefix	  of	  ‘posi’	  
references	  the	  original	  spirit	  of	  posimodernism.	  
	   Settling	  on	  the	  term	  posi-­‐postmodernism,	  I	  have	  kept	  in	  mind	  Existentialism	  as	  
a	  key	  referent	  while	  noting	  shifts	  in	  conceptual	  art	  practice,	  such	  as	  Romantic	  
Conceptualism.	  Romantic	  Conceptualism	  sprouted	  from	  conceptual	  art,	  which	  is	  known	  
as	  cold,	  hard,	  intellectual.	  Romantic	  Conceptualists,	  such	  as	  Sophie	  Calle,	  have	  
reintroduced	  the	  element	  of	  emotion	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  self/artist	  back	  into	  the	  
work,	  resulting	  in	  more	  auto-­‐fictive	  art	  practices	  that	  express	  human	  emotion	  like	  
desire,	  a	  sense	  of	  humour,	  despair.	  Existentialism	  has	  been	  a	  long-­‐standing	  influence	  
on	  me,	  and	  certainly	  I	  would	  consider	  my	  art	  practice,	  which	  is	  commonly	  focused	  on	  
the	  conditions	  of	  being	  human	  and	  engaging	  in	  relationships,	  to	  be	  an	  existential	  
practice.	  However,	  the	  additional	  component	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  is	  the	  sensorial,	  
the	  phenomenal,	  the	  moment,	  the	  feeling.	  Posi-­‐postmodernism	  is	  process	  and	  product,	  
relationships	  and	  results,	  practice,	  theory,	  romance,	  enthusiasm,	  community,	  
breakups,	  heartbreak,	  laughing,	  sleeping,	  interacting,	  engaging,	  fucking	  up,	  
acknowledging.	  
	   Posi-­‐postmodernism	  and	  my	  concept	  of	  “coming	  apart”	  are	  complementary	  
strategies	  for	  understanding	  the	  human	  world.	  Posi-­‐postmodernism	  is	  an	  ideology,	  and	  
“coming	  apart”	  is	  the	  appreciation	  of	  language.	  It	  is	  considering	  the	  terminology	  
applied	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  loneliness	  paired	  with	  hopefulness.	  “Coming	  apart”	  is	  a	  term	  for	  
understanding	  “being”	  human.	  To	  be	  lonely	  in	  the	  world	  does	  not	  require	  being	  isolated	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or	  in	  despair.	  In	  a	  posi-­‐postmodernist	  light,	  what	  this	  means	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  
exciting	  possibilities,	  connections,	  and	  relationships	  that	  may	  occur	  in	  any	  given	  human	  
world,	  and	  the	  further	  myriad	  possibilities	  for	  interference	  and	  crossover	  with	  the	  
animal	  worlds.	  “Coming	  apart”	  is	  a	  moment	  of	  hopefulness,	  because	  in	  this	  moment	  we	  
understand	  that	  while	  our	  “being”	  exists	  in	  our	  own	  specific	  worlds,	  we	  also	  share	  
concern	  for	  this	  world.	  This	  is	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  and	  optimism	  and	  language	  and	  
solution,	  maybe.	  It	  can	  mean	  failure,	  some.	  It	  is	  the	  connection	  of	  human	  and	  animal	  in	  
light	  of	  new	  possibilities.	  	  
Keeping	  this	  influence	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  in	  mind,	  the	  second	  event	  that	  
had	  a	  great	  effect	  on	  the	  development	  of	  my	  Master’s	  thesis	  is	  the	  residency	  I	  attended	  
at	  the	  Banff	  Centre	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  2010.	  	  As	  a	  resident	  of	  Beyond	  Former	  Heaven:	  
The	  Institute	  of	  Surrealist	  Ethnography,	  I	  was	  one	  of	  18	  artists,	  critics,	  and	  curators	  
experimenting	  with	  dream	  analysis,	  hypnosis,	  astral	  projection,	  and	  other	  esoteric	  
activities.	  These	  activities,	  done	  as	  a	  group	  while	  having	  the	  potential	  to	  have	  a	  deep	  
personal	  impact	  on	  individual	  participants,	  has	  led	  me	  to	  consider	  this	  experience	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  current	  focus	  of	  my	  speculative	  thesis	  project.	  In	  these	  experiences,	  it	  is	  
not	  a	  question	  of	  faith:	  you	  do	  not	  have	  to	  “believe”	  in	  the	  results	  of	  tarot	  card	  readings	  
or	  the	  possibility	  of	  astral	  projection	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  something	  valuable	  from	  the	  
experience.	  It	  is	  more	  about	  seeking	  self-­‐knowledge,	  of	  giving	  yourself	  over	  to	  the	  
unknown,	  the	  variable,	  and	  trusting	  your	  own	  intuition.	  It	  is	  also	  about	  building	  
relationships	  and	  experimenting	  with	  social	  performance	  and	  structure.	  These	  
experiences	  require	  you	  to	  trust	  your	  collaborators	  and	  construct	  lasting	  relationships	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through	  the	  cultivation	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  self-­‐knowledge.	  Inspired	  by	  my	  
experience	  in	  Banff,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  influence	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism,	  I	  
founded	  the	  GROUP	  THERAPY	  collaborative	  art	  project	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  learning	  
more	  about	  the	  individual	  self	  in	  a	  group	  setting,	  of	  constructing	  a	  circumstance	  in	  
which	  self-­‐knowledge	  could	  be	  gained	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  transformative	  
personal	  or	  collective	  experience	  could	  occur.	  GROUP	  THERAPY	  is	  a	  series	  of	  events	  
and	  projects	  that	  incorporate	  ideas	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism	  (enthusiasm,	  working	  for	  
the	  group	  or	  working	  for	  the	  weekend,	  strong	  platonic	  loves)	  with	  the	  esoteric:	  
meditation,	  palmistry,	  card	  readings,	  and	  hypnosis.	  	  
Tarot	  card	  reading	  has	  always	  been	  an	  interest	  for	  me,	  as	  a	  neat	  party	  trick,	  a	  
formative	  moment,	  a	  truth,	  a	  speculation,	  a	  sham.	  My	  time	  spent	  in	  Banff	  was	  
exceptionally	  emotional.	  I	  was	  heartbroken	  after	  an	  intense	  relationship	  leading	  to	  a	  
dramatic	  breakup,	  and	  separated	  from	  my	  cat,	  my	  close	  friends,	  and	  my	  family.	  I	  have	  
had	  my	  tarot	  cards	  read	  consistently	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  and	  a	  particular	  reading	  in	  
Banff	  was	  the	  most	  depressingly	  insightful,	  yet	  compelling,	  reading.	  Was	  it	  because	  I	  
was	  feeling	  particularly	  emotionally	  sensitive,	  or	  did	  my	  heightened	  sense	  of	  emotion	  
bring	  those	  cards	  out	  in	  formation?	  Returning	  to	  Toronto	  from	  Banff	  and	  still	  seeking	  
healing,	  I	  began	  to	  read	  my	  own	  cards	  every	  morning,	  grasping	  at	  any	  notion	  of	  sense,	  
repair,	  or	  hope.	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Fig	  9.	  Tarot,	  2010	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I	  also	  went	  to	  see	  a	  psychic	  in	  October	  2010	  who	  read	  my	  cards	  for	  me.	  
Overwhelmingly	  positive,	  the	  psychic	  told	  me	  that	  my	  future	  held	  everything	  I	  could	  
want:	  love,	  success,	  and	  money.	  To	  me,	  this	  felt	  like	  a	  clichéd	  reading.	  However,	  one	  
thing	  of	  note	  that	  the	  psychic	  told	  me	  was	  that	  I	  give	  too	  much	  of	  myself	  away	  (in	  truth,	  
in	  time,	  in	  affection).	  This	  struck	  a	  particular	  chord	  with	  me:	  how	  can	  I	  understand	  
giving	  a	  part	  of	  myself	  away	  if	  I	  cannot	  understand	  who	  I	  am?	  Who	  am	  I	  when	  I	  am	  with	  
Sushi?	  How	  does	  that	  differ	  from	  when	  I	  am	  with	  another	  human?	  I	  generally	  feel	  that	  I	  
do	  not	  give	  enough	  of	  myself.	  If	  I	  shift	  my	  physical	  and	  emotional	  makeup	  every	  time	  I	  
interact	  with	  Sushi,	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  read	  our	  cards	  together,	  “becoming	  with”	  
one	  another?	  If	  I	  read	  my	  own	  cards,	  or	  if	  I	  read	  the	  cards	  for	  Sushi,	  does	  this	  differ	  from	  
a	  reading	  based	  on	  Sushi	  and	  me	  together,	  species-­‐less,	  subject-­‐less,	  hum-­‐animal?	  The	  
performance	  Tarot	  reflects	  this	  inquiry.	  I	  sought	  knowledge,	  asking	  the	  cards:	  who	  are	  
we	  when	  we	  “become	  with”	  one	  another?	  And	  how	  can	  a	  reading	  reflect	  both	  Sushi	  and	  
me,	  reading	  the	  spread	  together?	  Can	  we	  read	  our	  cards	  as	  two	  beings	  yet	  “being	  
with”?	  During	  the	  performance,	  I	  shuffled	  the	  card	  with	  intention	  and	  asked	  Sushi	  to	  
touch	  the	  deck,	  which	  she	  did.	  This	  is	  regular	  tarot	  practice.	  	  
In	  the	  Tarot	  performance,	  Sushi	  and	  I	  used	  the	  Celtic	  cross	  spread,	  revealing	  
mostly	  inverted	  cards.	  In	  tarot,	  an	  inverted	  (upside	  down)	  card	  can	  mean	  the	  negative	  
version	  of	  the	  positive,	  upright	  card,	  or	  it	  can	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  as	  the	  positive,	  
only	  more	  subdued.	  Given	  that	  this	  reading	  was	  for	  Sushi	  and	  me,	  and	  what	  we	  become	  
when	  we	  “become	  with”	  one	  another,	  the	  results	  were	  fairly	  ominous,	  negative	  and	  
very	  subdued.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  reading	  reflected	  some	  confusion	  of	  the	  signifier:	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the	  subject,	  human	  or	  animal,	  or	  both.	  Regardless,	  what	  Sushi	  and	  I	  may	  expect	  in	  our	  
future	  together	  are	  some	  obstacles:	  dishonesty,	  and	  potentially	  some	  loss,	  despite	  
having	  some	  positive	  alliances	  and	  financial	  return	  in	  our	  near	  future.	  Of	  significance	  in	  
this	  reading	  is	  the	  seventh	  card,	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  right	  hand	  line	  of	  cards:	  the	  
Hanged	  Man,	  in	  reverse.	  The	  position	  of	  this	  card	  in	  the	  Celtic	  cross	  spread	  signifies	  the	  
subject,	  whom	  the	  reading	  is	  directed	  towards.	  This	  card	  in	  the	  positive	  refers	  to	  
wisdom,	  intuition,	  and	  sacrifice,	  yet	  the	  inversion	  is	  selfishness,	  the	  crowd,	  and	  the	  
body	  politic.	  	  Possibly,	  this	  again	  may	  refer	  to	  a	  confusion	  regarding	  who	  is	  the	  subject	  
in	  the	  reading,	  being	  hum-­‐animal,	  Sushi	  and	  me.	  	  The	  remaining	  cards	  point	  to	  
deception,	  snakes	  in	  the	  grass.	  The	  final	  card,	  which	  is	  what	  will	  come,	  was	  the	  Lovers	  
inverted.	  This	  signifies	  failure.	  I	  suspect	  that	  this	  may	  be	  a	  true	  reflection	  of	  what	  is	  to	  
come	  in	  the	  upcoming	  months.	  I	  will	  be	  leaving	  Sushi	  for	  three	  months	  and	  have	  not	  
told	  her	  yet.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  reading	  reflects	  my	  deception	  in	  not	  telling,	  and	  her	  
suspicion	  of	  me.	  This	  upcoming	  distance	  is	  certain	  to	  strain	  our	  relationship	  and	  result	  
in	  some	  inevitable	  negativity.	  
	  
Fig.	  10.	  Detail	  of	  Celtic	  cross	  spread,	  from	  Tarot,	  2010	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My	  adoption	  of	  Sushi	  and	  the	  time	  I	  spent	  in	  Banff,	  two	  significant	  experiences,	  
have	  been	  further	  supplemented	  by	  the	  way	  that	  I	  came	  to	  learn	  about	  performance	  
art.	  When	  I	  was	  in	  high	  school,	  the	  teaching	  of	  contemporary	  art	  history	  was	  limited:	  
the	  most	  contemporary	  things	  I	  came	  across	  were	  early	  iterations	  of	  modernist	  art.	  
When	  I	  came	  to	  a	  BFA	  program	  that	  had	  a	  strong	  contemporary	  art	  theory	  component,	  
I	  began	  to	  realize	  what	  kinds	  of	  possibilities	  were	  available	  to	  me	  as	  an	  artist.	  I	  began	  at	  
university	  as	  a	  painter	  and	  quickly	  realized	  that	  I	  couldn’t	  be	  contained	  on	  a	  canvas;	  I	  
wanted	  to	  make	  books	  and	  sound	  and	  video,	  and	  to	  perform.	  I	  wanted	  to	  create	  
relationships	  with	  people	  around	  my	  art	  practice.	  I	  wanted	  to	  collaborate	  with	  the	  
people	  near	  me	  and	  with	  people	  I	  have	  never	  met	  before.	  I	  also	  learned,	  for	  the	  first	  
time,	  about	  performance	  art.	  When	  I	  first	  heard	  about	  Joseph	  Beuys,	  I	  became	  a	  new	  
convert,	  exhaustingly	  enthusiastic	  about	  him	  and	  performance	  art	  in	  general.	  For	  me,	  
learning	  about	  Beuys	  was	  the	  moment:	  the	  pivotal	  second	  in	  which	  my	  approach	  to	  art	  
making	  shifted.	  	  It	  wasn’t	  only	  about	  understanding	  art	  in	  the	  everyday;	  it	  was	  more	  
than	  that.	  I	  understood	  the	  practice	  of	  Beuys,	  from	  social	  sculptures	  to	  his	  self-­‐
mythology,	  to	  encapsulate	  everything	  that	  art	  could	  be,	  the	  infinite	  possibilities	  of	  art.	  
Art	  could	  be	  (and	  is,	  always	  is)	  political.	  Art	  can	  strive	  to	  address	  the	  confused	  and	  
complicated	  situation	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in.	  Art	  can	  acknowledge	  the	  damage,	  the	  
problems.	  Art	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  make	  a	  monumental	  gesture	  to	  repair	  the	  damage,	  but	  it	  
can	  be	  subtle,	  sweet,	  clever,	  quiet.	  Art	  propels	  us	  forward.	  Art	  is	  posi-­‐postmodernist.	  
As	  I	  was	  learning	  about	  Beuys,	  I	  also	  became	  familiar	  with	  performance:	  body	  
art,	  feminist,	  radical,	  political;	  emphasizing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  body	  in	  performance	  as	  the	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integral	  element	  in	  discipline;	  endurance,	  pain.	  Performance	  art	  has	  a	  short	  but	  very	  
fast-­‐paced	  and	  diverse	  history,	  and	  coming	  to	  learn	  about	  Fluxus	  and	  Yoko	  Ono	  as	  well	  
as	  artists	  like	  Chris	  Burden	  and	  Marina	  Abramovic	  completely	  changed	  my	  perspective	  
and	  my	  approach	  to	  art.	  Genres	  of	  performance	  art	  have	  shifted	  since	  some	  of	  the	  first	  
contemporary	  performers	  and	  even	  since	  I	  first	  learned	  about	  these	  artists,	  but	  my	  
discovery	  of	  these	  artists	  and	  events	  has	  had	  a	  lasting	  effect	  on	  my	  practice.	  Learning	  
about	  Shoot	  (1971)	  by	  Chris	  Burden	  or	  Rhythm	  O	  (1974)	  by	  Marina	  Abramovic	  only	  
through	  photographs	  and	  sometimes	  differing	  or	  conflicting	  “first-­‐hand”	  accounts	  
created	  a	  seductive,	  romantic	  mystery	  around	  the	  event	  itself.	  In	  my	  research	  of	  Joseph	  
Beuys,	  I	  once	  came	  across	  the	  title,	  date,	  and	  place	  of	  a	  performance	  piece	  called	  We	  
Can’t	  Do	  It	  Without	  Roses,	  which	  at	  the	  time	  I	  only	  took	  mental	  note	  of.	  I	  do	  not	  
remember	  what	  the	  performance	  was	  and	  I	  never	  found	  that	  information	  again.	  I	  
convinced	  myself	  it	  was	  a	  real	  performance	  by	  Beuys,	  and	  created	  three	  of	  my	  own	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  piece	  based	  on	  the	  title.33	  	  The	  mythology	  of	  performance	  learned	  
through	  a	  haze	  of	  text	  and	  black	  and	  white	  photographs,	  combined	  with	  the	  reverence	  
that	  performance	  art	  is	  given	  by	  the	  audience,	  elevated	  the	  status	  of	  this	  art	  of	  the	  ‘70s	  
in	  my	  mind.	  Before	  YouTube	  made	  fuzzy	  video	  documentation	  available,	  before	  video	  
art	  (and	  performance	  video)	  exploded,	  performance	  artists	  were	  mythological.	  And	  the	  
artists	  whose	  practices	  are	  captured	  only	  through	  unreliable	  documentation	  continue	  
to	  celebrate	  this	  mythology.	  Some	  artists,	  like	  Beuys,	  had	  emphasized	  and	  fictionalized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  We	  Can’t	  Do	  it	  Without	  Roses	  I,	  2006;	  Sinners	  or	  We	  are	  All	  Bad	  People	  (Please	  Help	  Yourself):	  
We	  Can’t	  Do	  it	  Without	  Roses	  II,	  2006;	  Sinners	  or	  We	  are	  All	  Bad	  People:	  We	  Can’t	  Do	  it	  Without	  
Roses	  III,	  2007.	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his	  own	  mythology	  by	  circulating	  memories	  and	  personal	  accounts	  of	  his	  origins	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  an	  autobiography.	  Other	  artists,	  like	  Ana	  Mendieta,	  died	  young,	  and	  by	  that	  
unfortunate	  circumstance,	  her	  life	  and	  performances	  became	  mythologized.	  	  
	  
Fig.	  11.	  Chris	  Burden,	  Shoot,	  1971	  
	  
Taking	  example	  from	  these	  phenomena	  -­‐	  both	  my	  learning	  about	  performance	  
through	  still	  photography	  and	  the	  mythologization	  of	  performance	  artists	  -­‐	  has	  
influenced	  my	  thesis	  project	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room.	  By	  documenting	  my	  performance	  
events	  through	  still	  photography,	  I	  keep	  the	  mystery	  alive.	  I	  create	  an	  event	  that	  only	  
exists	  through	  documentation	  and	  my	  first-­‐hand	  account.	  The	  only	  two	  reliable	  sources	  
are	  Sushi	  and	  me,	  with	  the	  photographs	  representing	  the	  implied	  truth	  of	  the	  event.	  
The	  viewer	  does	  not	  see	  the	  event	  in	  full,	  but	  rather	  a	  silent	  moment,	  with	  no	  beginning	  
or	  end.	  	  	  
T	  H	  R	  E	  E	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  map	  out	  current	  scholarship	  and	  performative	  art	  practice	  involving	  
human-­‐animal	  relationships	  with	  a	  consideration	  towards	  communication	  and	  the	  lack	  
of	  common	  language	  between	  species.	  	  This	  section	  includes	  an	  ongoing	  investigation	  
of	  my	  performances	  with	  Sushi	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  that	  we	  perform	  in	  
a	  theoretical	  and	  artistic	  context.	  This	  section	  will	  position	  speculation	  as	  a	  conceptual	  
trope	  to	  examine	  intuition	  and	  instinct.	  
The	  emergent	  field	  of	  animal	  studies	  in	  the	  humanities	  and	  social	  sciences	  is	  a	  
complicated	  and	  often	  contradictory	  method	  of	  understanding	  animals.	  Study	  in	  this	  
field	  is	  inextricably	  bound	  to	  a	  study	  of	  understanding	  what	  it	  can	  mean	  to	  be	  human.	  	  
Philosophical	  and	  artistic	  interpretations	  of	  the	  animal	  consistently	  seek	  to	  distinguish	  
the	  difference	  between	  animals	  and	  humans.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  look	  at	  representations	  of	  
the	  animal	  in	  contemporary	  art	  and	  theory,	  focusing	  in	  particular	  on	  examples	  of	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Distinctions	  between	  animals	  and	  humans	  confuse	  and	  complicate,	  and	  can	  
also	  engender	  a	  fascination	  with	  the	  animal.	  The	  impact	  of	  British	  naturalist	  Charles	  
Darwin’s	  unprecedented	  report	  The	  Origin	  of	  Species	  (1859b)	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  animals	  and	  humans	  was	  a	  result	  of	  Darwin’s	  theory	  of	  shared	  ancestry	  
between	  animals	  and	  humans.	  Rather	  than	  the	  dominantly	  utilitarian	  or	  colonial	  
relationship	  to	  the	  animal	  in	  modernity,	  the	  introduction	  of	  common	  genetics	  
influenced	  studies	  of	  animal	  cognition	  and	  language	  as	  well	  as	  philosophical	  texts	  
regarding	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  animal	  in	  post-­‐modernity.	  Challenging	  the	  dominant	  
belief	  that	  humans	  are	  superior	  to	  animals,	  the	  possibility	  that	  animals	  came	  from	  the	  
same	  origins	  was	  made	  even	  more	  disturbing	  by	  the	  possibility	  that	  animals	  could	  even	  
be	  contained	  within	  what	  we	  understand	  as	  psychological	  subjectivity	  (Mangum	  2002:	  
43).	  What	  Darwin	  suggested	  in	  The	  Expression	  of	  Emotions	  in	  Man	  and	  Animals	  (1872a)	  is	  
that	  humans	  and	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  lower	  animals	  (dogs,	  cats,	  horses)	  have	  an	  
innate	  set	  of	  codes,	  expressions,	  and	  reactions	  that	  are	  a	  combination	  of	  involuntary	  
and	  voluntary.	  Darwin	  suggests	  that	  animals	  and	  humans	  alike	  are	  influenced	  by	  
consciousness	  and	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  “the	  mysterious	  power	  of	  will.”	  This	  position,	  
that	  animals	  are	  to	  some	  degree	  conscious,	  aware,	  and	  capable	  of	  action	  and	  reaction	  
led	  to	  a	  total	  reconsideration	  of	  how	  humans	  understand	  animals.	  Nigel	  Thrift	  writes	  
that	  in	  suggesting	  that	  “other	  animals	  have	  emotions,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  expressions	  
produced	  by	  animals	  resemble	  our	  own”	  (2008b:	  181),	  Darwin	  opened	  up	  the	  possibility	  
of	  transference	  of	  affect	  across	  species.	  Thrift	  writes	  that	  Darwin’s	  claim	  that	  “there	  is	  a	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strong	  line	  of	  emotional	  descent	  running	  from	  animals	  to	  humans”	  (2008b:	  181)	  is	  also	  
linked	  to	  how	  animals	  and	  humans	  understand	  one	  other	  -­‐	  how	  species	  react	  and	  are	  
called	  into	  action	  in	  their	  interconnected	  lives	  with	  one	  another.	  
In	  equal	  part,	  we	  continue	  to	  develop	  the	  distinctions	  and	  differences	  between	  
humans	  and	  animals.	  Thrift	  notes	  that	  awareness	  of	  these	  distinctions	  “make	  a	  startling	  
difference	  to	  the	  human	  Umwelten,	  to	  the	  worlds	  that	  human	  beings	  assume	  exist.	  The	  
reason	  that	  these	  distinctively	  human	  differences	  are	  so	  important	  is	  because	  it	  
becomes	  possible	  to	  learn	  not	  just	  from	  the	  other34	  but	  through	  the	  other”	  (2008b:	  157).	  
This	  learning	  involves	  pooling	  our	  animal	  resources	  (through	  “being	  with”,	  “becoming	  
with”)	  in	  order	  to	  amplify	  and	  project	  our	  species	  relationships	  forward.	  
Relationships	  between	  species	  are	  strengthened	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  each	  other.	  
Integral	  to	  the	  development	  and	  strength	  of	  humanity	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  animals,	  
because	  “the	  absence	  of	  animal	  being	  weakens	  the	  humanity	  of	  the	  human	  world”	  
(Lippit	  2000:	  17).	  	  In	  Electric	  Animal,	  Akira	  Mizuta	  Lippit	  describes	  a	  separation	  of	  
humanity	  away	  from	  the	  animal,	  explaining	  humans	  and	  animals	  as	  distinct	  and	  
different	  from	  one	  another.	  Lippit	  writes	  that	  as	  humans	  began	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  
heightened	  awareness	  of	  themselves,	  they	  began	  “to	  recognize	  the	  animal	  as	  a	  foreign	  
being	  .	  .	  .	  In	  turn,	  the	  animal	  came	  to	  inhabit	  a	  new	  topology	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  humanity	  
was	  left	  to	  mourn	  the	  loss	  of	  its	  former	  self.	  The	  mourning	  is	  for	  the	  self	  -­‐	  a	  self	  that	  has	  
become	  de-­‐humanized	  in	  the	  very	  process	  of	  humanity’s	  becoming-­‐human”	  (18).	  This	  
suggests	  not	  only	  a	  loss,	  or	  a	  lack,	  of	  the	  animal	  in	  the	  human	  world,	  but	  also	  a	  trauma	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  animal	  other.	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that	  is	  felt	  by	  both	  humans	  and	  animals	  alike,	  a	  trauma	  that	  must	  be	  mourned	  and	  
repaired.35	  This	  is	  also	  recognizing	  that	  our	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds	  are	  distinct,	  with	  
interference	  and	  intervention	  across	  worlds.	  
Heidegger	  wrote	  in	  The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art	  (1935;	  1993)	  that	  the	  animal	  
does	  not	  have	  a	  native	  animal	  world,	  but	  rather	  exists	  in	  a	  dynamic	  system	  alongside	  
other	  natural	  life,	  which	  can	  be	  read	  analogous	  to	  the	  rhizome.	  Heidegger	  writes,	  “plant	  
and	  animal	  likewise	  have	  no	  world;	  but	  they	  belong	  to	  the	  covert	  throng	  of	  a	  
surrounding	  into	  which	  they	  are	  linked”	  (45).	  This	  lack	  of	  a	  native	  world	  also	  creates	  a	  
distance	  from	  the	  human	  world	  (Lippit	  2000:	  56).	  Heidegger	  says	  that	  in	  this	  way,	  
animals	  are	  impoverished	  in	  the	  human	  world	  (a	  world	  which	  has	  been	  established	  by	  
language).	  Lippit	  writes	  that	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  language	  and	  world	  are	  inseparable	  
(2000:	  57):	  “where	  there	  is	  no	  language,	  as	  in	  the	  being	  of	  stone,	  plant,	  and	  animal,	  
there	  is	  also	  no	  openness36”	  (1935b:	  73).	  As	  Lippit	  notes,	  this	  reductive	  notion	  of	  the	  
animal	  is	  problematic	  when	  considering	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  animal	  (2000:	  57).	  In	  this	  
rudimentary	  reading	  of	  Heidegger,	  the	  animal	  becomes	  a	  less	  dominant	  being,	  which	  
reasserts	  anthropocentric	  preconceptions	  of	  the	  animal’s	  subservience	  to	  humans.	  
Lippit	  discusses	  Derrida	  in	  a	  negotiation	  of	  this	  reductive	  notion;	  Derrida	  writes,	  “the	  
animal	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  world,	  to	  be	  sure.	  But	  this	  lack	  is	  not	  to	  be	  evaluated	  as	  a	  
quantitative	  relation	  to	  the	  entities	  of	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  animal	  has	  a	  lesser	  
relationship,	  a	  more	  limited	  access	  to	  entities,	  it	  has	  an	  other	  relationship”	  (1989b:	  49).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  We	  see	  an	  attempt	  at	  this	  repair	  in	  I	  Like	  America…	  by	  Joseph	  Beuys,	  although	  as	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  reading	  of	  that	  performance,	  the	  man	  (the	  hare)	  seeks	  healing	  from	  the	  animal	  (the	  coyote).	  	  
36	  Or,	  no	  world.	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Heidegger’s	  concept	  of	  the	  animal	  as	  poor	  in	  the	  human	  world,	  like	  Derrida’s	  
suggestion	  of	  animal	  presence	  in	  other	  relationships,	  presents	  a	  residual	  understanding	  
of	  the	  animal	  as	  somehow	  victimized	  or	  impoverished	  in	  contemporary	  theory,	  art	  
practice,	  and	  everyday	  life.	  	  
This	  negotiated	  reading	  of	  the	  animal	  world	  creates	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  
humans	  and	  animals.	  If	  animals	  are	  not	  fully	  a	  part	  of	  our	  human	  world,	  how	  can	  we	  
ever	  understand	  them?	  In	  general	  practice	  and	  in	  our	  pet	  relationships,	  because	  there	  is	  
a	  void	  between	  us,	  we	  read	  intention	  (and	  all	  other	  emotions	  and	  actions)	  through	  what	  
we	  assume	  we	  know	  about	  the	  animal.	  Despite	  this	  and	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  rely	  on	  
this	  presumption,	  the	  animal	  can	  surprise	  us	  by	  acting	  wildly.	  The	  animal	  is	  the	  constant	  
variable:	  spontaneous,	  mysterious,	  wild.	  Animals	  will	  always	  express	  a	  degree	  of	  
wildness	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  catch	  us	  off	  guard.	  	  In	  the	  zoo,	  our	  expectations	  of	  animals	  
(that	  have	  lived	  in	  confinement)	  to	  act	  wild	  are	  often	  disappointed.	  Yet	  in	  the	  home,	  we	  
are	  displeased	  with	  our	  pets	  if	  they	  go	  beyond	  our	  everyday	  assumption	  of	  trained	  
animal	  behavior:	  simple	  actions	  such	  as	  barking,	  expressions	  of	  sexuality	  or	  gender,	  
peeing	  in	  locations	  that	  are	  off-­‐limits,	  biting,	  scratching,	  hissing,	  licking,	  throwing	  up.	  
This	  animal	  behavior	  is	  wild	  because	  it	  is	  uncomfortable	  and	  unpleasant	  to	  our	  human	  
sensibility.	  Examples	  of	  expressions	  of	  animality	  in	  the	  media	  are	  sensational	  stories	  
often	  involving	  death	  or	  critical	  injury37,	  and	  yet	  a	  popular	  reaction	  to	  such	  stories	  is:	  “it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  For	  example,	  in	  2003	  one	  half	  of	  the	  entertainment	  duo	  Siegfried	  and	  Roy	  was	  attacked	  (and	  
survived	  critical	  injury)	  by	  Montecore,	  a	  tiger	  from	  their	  act.	  Roy	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  lions	  
and	  tigers	  of	  the	  act,	  claiming	  that	  he	  “didn’t	  so	  much	  train	  the	  animals	  as	  bond	  with	  them	  
through	  a	  technique	  he	  called	  ‘affection	  conditioning’,	  raising	  tiger	  cubs	  from	  birth	  and	  sleeping	  
with	  them	  until	  they	  were	  a	  year	  old.	  ‘When	  an	  animal	  gives	  you	  its	  trust,’	  Roy	  had	  said,	  ‘you	  feel	  
like	  you	  have	  been	  given	  the	  most	  beautiful	  gift	  in	  the	  world.’”	  The	  accounts	  of	  the	  attack	  vary:	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was	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  time.”	  	  Although	  we	  want	  the	  animal	  to	  suit	  our	  concept	  of	  
animality,	  a	  part	  of	  that	  idea	  is	  the	  unknown,	  the	  variable,	  and	  the	  wild.	  	  The	  animal	  
cannot	  be	  contained	  in	  a	  conceptual	  manner.	  Though	  literal	  containment	  is	  general	  
practice,	  animals	  continue	  to	  express	  their	  animality,	  simultaneously	  conforming	  to	  our	  
idea	  of	  wildness	  and	  defying	  our	  expectations.	  
Because	  we	  expect	  a	  degree	  of	  animality	  in	  animals,	  and	  although	  we	  project	  a	  
degree	  of	  humanity	  onto	  them	  (by	  way	  of	  anthropomorphization),	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  bear	  
witness	  to	  animals	  transcending	  our	  expectations	  of	  their	  animality?	  	  I	  speculate	  that	  
through	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  animal-­‐centric	  YouTube	  videos	  and	  animal	  Internet	  
celebrity38,	  we	  witness	  animals	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  counter	  to	  our	  expectations.	  
When	  we	  see	  an	  example	  of	  an	  animal	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  exceeds	  our	  expectations	  of	  
a	  concept	  of	  what	  an	  animal	  is	  -­‐	  often	  a	  projection	  of	  our	  anthropomorphization	  -­‐	  we	  
consider	  that	  this	  animal	  is	  exceptional,	  able	  to	  express	  more	  human	  qualities	  than	  
another	  animals	  of	  the	  same	  category.	  This	  is	  disrupted,	  however,	  when	  we	  see	  this	  
same	  animal	  subverting	  our	  expectations	  of	  species,	  acting	  like	  an	  animal,	  and	  meeting	  
or	  disappointing	  our	  expectations	  of	  animals.39	  Ingrained	  in	  our	  expectations	  of	  animal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
some	  say	  Montecore	  was	  deliberately	  distracted	  from	  his	  routine	  by	  animal	  rights	  activists	  in	  the	  
audience.	  Siegfried	  has	  claimed	  that	  Roy	  had	  fallen	  ill	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  blood	  pressure	  pills	  
and	  Montecore	  realized	  something	  was	  wrong	  and	  was	  trying	  to	  protect	  Roy.	  However,	  animal	  
behaviorists	  have	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  Montecore	  was	  on	  his	  way	  to	  delivering	  a	  
killing	  bite,	  much	  as	  a	  tiger	  in	  the	  wild	  would	  bring	  down	  an	  antelope	  (Nash:	  2004).	  	  	  
38	  For	  example,	  Stains	  the	  Dog,	  who	  won	  Hot	  Slut	  of	  the	  Year,	  2009,	  on	  the	  popular	  gossip	  site	  D-­‐
Listed,	  http://www.dlisted.com/node/30375?page=1	  
39	  Again,	  countless	  examples	  on	  the	  Internet	  prevail	  in	  regards	  to	  cats	  exceeding	  or	  
disappointing	  our	  expectations.	  Nora	  the	  Piano	  Cat	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  musical	  cat,	  playing	  on	  the	  
piano	  several	  times	  a	  day	  (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0zgQAp7EYw);	  Sebastian	  the	  
Singing	  Cat	  sings	  (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljmjmvMTWyY&feature=related);	  Talking	  
Cat	  talks	  (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tRWRSfcDuQ);	  all	  of	  these	  vides	  show	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and	  human	  species	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  awareness.	  If	  animals	  are	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  human	  
world,	  this	  suggests	  that	  they	  are	  oblivious	  or	  uncaring	  of	  humanity,	  that	  they	  are	  
unaware.	  Instead,	  animals	  would	  have	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  themselves,	  
disconnected	  from	  how	  we	  conceptualize	  them	  in	  theory	  and	  in	  our	  literal	  lives.	  
Built	  into	  an	  understanding	  of	  animality	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  our	  human	  
ability	  to	  self-­‐conceptualize.	  We	  pride	  ourselves	  on	  our	  agency	  to	  self-­‐conceptualize,	  
self-­‐analyze,	  and	  find	  an	  expression	  of	  ourselves;	  we	  do	  not	  know	  if	  animals	  can	  do	  this.	  
Despite	  scientific	  evidence	  of	  animal	  cognition,	  on	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  Lippit	  suggests	  
“the	  animal	  cannot	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  its	  crimes	  because	  it	  is	  unaware	  of	  its	  
actions”	  (2000:	  50).	  These	  crimes,	  however,	  would	  not	  register	  in	  the	  human	  world	  if	  
animals	  were	  unaware	  of	  human	  laws	  and	  criminal	  conventions.	  Building	  upon	  this	  
concept	  of	  unawareness,	  I	  suggest	  that	  on	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  the	  animal	  transcends	  
human	  intentionality.	  In	  our	  human	  world,	  expectations	  and	  assumptions	  are	  irrelevant	  
to	  the	  unaware	  and	  oblivious	  animal.	  In	  Lippit’s	  discussion	  of	  this	  concept	  according	  to	  
Jean-­‐François	  Lyotard,	  this	  animal	  precedes	  the	  human	  subject:	  “the	  strange	  ontology	  
of	  animal	  being	  disrupts	  humanity’s	  notions	  of	  consciousness,	  thrust	  from	  the	  
traditional	  loci	  of	  its	  subjectivity.	  Contact	  with	  animals	  turns	  human	  beings	  into	  others,	  
effecting	  a	  metamorphosis”	  (2000:	  51).	  This	  follows	  Heidegger’s,	  and	  then	  Jean-­‐Luc	  
Nancy’s	  notion	  of	  “being	  with,”	  in	  that	  “being	  cannot	  be	  anything	  but	  being-­‐with-­‐one-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
extraordinary	  efforts	  at	  animal	  communication	  or	  mimesis.	  In	  opposition	  to	  this,	  there	  are	  
countless	  videos	  of	  Stupid	  Cats	  (Doing	  Stupid	  Things)	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  counter	  to	  our	  
understanding	  of	  logical	  behavior,	  even	  for	  cats,	  such	  as	  running	  into	  walls,	  falling	  off	  counters,	  
or	  jumping	  into	  tubs	  full	  of	  water	  (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZV6Bsym9wmU).	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another”	  (Nancy	  2000:	  3).	  This	  “being	  with,”	  and	  the	  resulting	  metamorphosis,	  like	  
Haraway’s	  “becoming	  with,”	  instigates	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  ontological	  construction	  of	  the	  
human	  and	  animal	  subject.	  In	  examples	  in	  literature	  and	  film,	  animals	  are	  capable	  of	  
transcending	  or	  developing	  and	  exhibiting	  an	  understanding	  of	  themselves.40	  
Expressions	  of	  becoming,	  metamorphosis,	  and	  transformation	  in	  literature	  indicate	  an	  
animal	  that	  is	  acutely	  self-­‐aware	  and	  capable	  of	  complex	  emotions	  such	  as	  fear	  or	  
regret,	  transcending	  animality	  and	  suggesting	  an	  implicit	  humanity.41	  	  
A	  key	  example	  of	  this	  transcendence	  is	  the	  children’s	  film	  The	  Last	  Unicorn	  
(Jules	  Bass	  and	  Arthur	  Rankin	  Jr.,	  1982).	  In	  this	  animated	  film,	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  
last	  unicorn	  on	  earth	  sets	  out	  to	  discover	  what	  happened	  to	  all	  the	  other	  unicorns.	  The	  
unicorn	  lives	  an	  ideal	  life,	  protecting	  her	  fellow	  creatures	  in	  the	  woods	  by	  virtue	  of	  her	  
very	  presence,	  yet	  she	  was	  still	  lonely.	  During	  her	  search	  for	  the	  other	  unicorns	  and	  in	  a	  
moment	  of	  danger,	  a	  wizard	  transforms	  the	  unicorn	  into	  a	  woman	  in	  order	  to	  save	  her	  
life.	  This	  transformation	  leads	  to	  a	  slow	  degradation	  of	  the	  unicorn’s	  memory	  (not	  only	  
of	  being	  an	  animal,	  but	  also	  of	  being	  a	  supernatural	  creature).	  The	  unicorn-­‐woman,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  King	  Kong	  (1933;	  remake	  dir.	  Peter	  Jackson	  2005)	  portrays	  a	  dangerous,	  yet	  expressive	  and	  
emotional	  animal	  that	  seems	  to	  transcend	  (to	  a	  degree)	  his	  animality	  in	  his	  affection	  for	  the	  
female	  protagonist.	  
41	  This	  is	  also	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  no	  emotions	  that	  are	  limited	  to	  humans,	  and	  no	  animal	  
emotions	  limited	  to	  animals,	  but	  instead	  there	  is	  dialogue	  between	  these	  concepts	  of	  emotion.	  
In	  film	  and	  literature,	  we	  can	  also	  see	  examples	  of	  creatures	  who	  are	  in	  some	  form	  not	  animal,	  
but	  not	  human.	  These	  beings	  are	  capable	  of	  deeply	  complex	  emotion	  and	  affection	  for	  humanity	  
despite	  being	  rejected.	  Frankenstein	  (Mary	  Shelley,	  1818)	  is	  an	  essential	  example	  of	  humanity	  in	  
a	  creature	  that	  is	  decidedly	  not	  human.	  	  Quasimodo	  in	  The	  Hunchback	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  (Victor	  
Hugo,	  1831),	  similarly	  rejected	  by	  humans,	  struggles	  and	  shifts	  between	  expressions	  of	  love	  and	  
humanity	  and	  deep	  aggression,	  or	  animality.	  Of	  course	  this	  humanity-­‐animality	  discourse	  is	  not	  
limited	  to	  humans	  or	  animals,	  and	  recalls	  a	  complicated	  dialogue	  of	  how	  we	  can	  categorize	  
humans,	  non-­‐humans,	  monsters,	  and	  animals.	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despite	  initial	  repulsion	  at	  being	  a	  human,	  eventually	  allows	  the	  transformation	  to	  take	  
over:	  she	  becomes-­‐human.	  At	  the	  fullest	  expression	  of	  her	  humanity	  -­‐	  in	  this	  case,	  
signified	  by	  her	  falling	  in	  love	  with	  a	  man	  -­‐	  she	  loses	  the	  concept	  of	  her	  animality:	  she	  
knows	  regret,	  which	  a	  unicorn	  would	  never	  feel.	  When	  she	  is	  transformed	  back	  into	  a	  
unicorn,	  she	  retains	  this	  awareness,	  this	  regret.	  Though	  the	  unicorn	  lost	  herself	  when	  
she	  became	  human,	  and	  transcended	  her	  animality,	  when	  she	  is	  transformed	  back	  into	  
an	  animal	  she	  retains	  a	  certain	  humanity.	  This	  perhaps,	  too,	  can	  be	  an	  example	  of	  the	  
transcendence	  of	  the	  barriers	  of	  our	  species,	  resulting	  in	  human-­‐animal.	  This	  is	  only	  one	  
of	  countless	  examples	  of	  the	  blurry	  categorizations	  of	  human,	  animal,	  or	  human-­‐animal	  
in	  film.	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To	  speak	  of	  animality	  and	  becoming-­‐animal	  from	  a	  theoretical	  viewpoint,	  I	  
refer	  to	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari’s	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus	  (1987).	  	  Deleuze	  and	  
Guattari	  have	  discussed	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  animal	  world	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  
rhizome,	  which	  is	  a	  system	  of	  dynamic	  elements	  connecting	  and	  disconnecting	  through	  
time.	  In	  the	  terms	  that	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  use,	  becoming-­‐animal	  is	  a	  movement	  from	  
the	  major	  (the	  constant)	  to	  the	  minor	  (the	  variable).	  	  This	  can	  mean	  the	  differences	  
between	  the	  dog	  -­‐	  the	  pack	  animal,	  undistinguishable	  from	  another	  dog	  -­‐	  to	  Dog,	  the	  
specific,	  individual	  subject.	  	  Becoming	  is	  a	  deterritorialization	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  no	  
longer	  stable	  but	  moves	  to	  a	  nomadic	  existence,	  in	  flight	  rather	  than	  settled	  or	  at	  peace	  
with	  oneself	  and	  others.	  British	  visual	  theorist	  Steve	  Baker	  writes	  that	  becoming	  is	  a	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kind	  of	  “un-­‐humaning	  the	  human,	  and	  this	  is	  something	  which	  the	  animal	  proposes	  to	  
the	  human	  by	  indicating	  ways-­‐out	  or	  means	  of	  escape	  that	  the	  human	  would	  never	  
have	  thought	  of	  by	  himself”	  (2000:	  103).	  Becoming,	  as	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  write,	  is	  
not	  a	  resemblance,	  an	  imitation,	  or	  an	  identification	  (2009:	  237).	  	  Becoming	  is	  not	  an	  
evolution	  or	  transformation;	  becoming	  is	  involuntary	  (238),	  similar	  to	  the	  reflexive	  
“becoming-­‐with.”	  
Baker	  discusses	  becoming-­‐animal	  in	  the	  short	  text	  The	  Salon	  of	  Becoming-­‐
Animal,	  co-­‐written	  with	  British	  artist	  Edwina	  Ashton	  (2007).	  	  Baker,	  an	  art	  historian	  who	  
specializes	  in	  animal	  representation	  in	  contemporary	  art,	  writes	  that	  the	  “aim	  of	  the	  
arts	  is	  to	  ‘unleash’	  becomings”	  (2007:	  170).	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  write	  that	  becoming	  
“requires	  all	  the	  resources	  of	  art,	  and	  art	  of	  the	  highest	  kind.	  	  The	  kind	  of	  art	  through	  
which	  you	  become	  animal”	  (2009:	  272).	  	  Baker	  discusses	  that	  this	  becoming,	  and	  that	  
which	  one	  becomes,	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  “as	  a	  process	  or	  method	  that	  ‘replaces	  
subjectivity’	  .	  .	  .	  more	  than	  just	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  poststructuralist	  theme	  of	  de-­‐
centering	  the	  subject	  but	  a	  full-­‐blown	  doing	  away	  with	  the	  subject”	  (2000:	  103).	  Baker	  
identifies	  a	  core	  theme	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  analysis	  of	  becoming-­‐animal:	  “the	  
contrasting	  of	  interpretation	  and	  meaning	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  experimentation	  on	  
the	  other	  (with	  a	  high	  value	  seeming	  to	  be	  accorded	  to	  artistic	  experimentation)”	  (2000:	  
104).	  Paradoxical,	  this	  reading	  connects	  to	  my	  own	  methodology	  (and	  that	  of	  Marcus	  
Coates,	  whom	  I	  discuss	  specifically	  in	  the	  context	  of	  becoming-­‐animal	  shortly)	  by	  
emphasizing	  experimentation	  and	  differences	  in	  meaning	  and	  intention.	  Furthermore,	  
Baker	  indicates	  the	  “role	  of	  artistic	  production	  and	  artistic	  discipline	  in	  the	  creative	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transformation	  of	  experience:	  it	  is	  through	  a	  style	  that	  one	  becomes	  animal”	  (2000:	  
104),	  meaning	  that	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  artist,	  the	  animal,	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  
subjectivity	  during	  the	  act	  of	  becoming	  are	  inextricably	  bound	  up	  with	  each	  other	  when	  
considering	  what	  is	  unconventionally	  human.	  Though	  becoming-­‐animal	  is	  generally	  an	  
abstract	  concept,	  difficult	  to	  connect	  to	  practice	  and	  artistic	  research,	  Baker	  suggests	  
that	  the	  high	  level	  of	  creativity	  that	  occurs	  when	  thinking	  through	  becoming	  affects	  
both	  the	  artist	  and	  the	  animal.	  It	  is	  relevant	  to	  note	  that	  the	  application	  of	  this	  theory	  to	  
artistic	  practice	  amplifies	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  species	  (although	  
in	  a	  true	  becoming,	  one	  would	  completely	  lose	  identification	  of	  species,	  human	  or	  
animal).	  
This	  concept	  of	  becoming-­‐animal	  leads	  into	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  rhizome	  and	  
the	  possibility	  of	  movement	  between	  (animal	  and	  human)	  worlds.	  The	  rhizome	  can	  be	  
associated	  with	  psychic	  travel	  or	  astral	  projection	  -­‐	  the	  ability	  to	  move	  as	  a	  psychic	  
through	  distinct	  planes	  of	  being.	  	  It	  consists	  of	  interlocking	  and	  interacting	  systems	  
existing	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  rhizomes,	  and	  movement	  within	  the	  rhizome	  is	  
horizontal	  and	  trans-­‐species.	  As	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  write,	  the	  rhizome	  “is	  composed	  
not	  of	  units,	  but	  of	  dimensions,	  or	  rather	  directions	  in	  motion”	  (1987:	  9).	  Lippit	  connects	  
this	  rhizome	  to	  the	  facilitation	  of	  animal	  entry	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  (which	  is	  
distinct	  from	  the	  human	  or	  animal	  world)	  (2000:	  128).	  This	  movement	  to	  the	  
phenomenal	  world,	  a	  world	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  humans	  and	  animals,	  creates	  the	  potential	  
to	  unblock	  communication	  between	  humans	  and	  animals	  (Lippit,	  128).	  This	  is	  
important	  because	  we	  can	  consider	  a	  lack	  of	  common	  language	  between	  animals	  and	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humans	  to	  create	  the	  greatest	  divide	  between	  our	  species.	  Because	  both	  animals	  and	  
humans	  can	  travel	  to	  and	  from	  the	  phenomenal	  world,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  -­‐	  
theoretically	  -­‐	  for	  any	  human	  to	  communicate	  with	  animals	  (and	  vice	  versa).	  The	  
dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  rhizome	  creates	  temporary	  connections,	  which	  are	  constantly	  
shifting	  or	  eventually	  being	  dismantled;	  the	  rhizome	  creates	  the	  possibility	  of	  
becoming-­‐animal	  by	  providing	  exposure	  from	  one	  world	  to	  another.	  Where	  it	  has	  been	  
connected	  to	  becoming-­‐animal,	  this	  rhizomatic	  theory	  can	  be	  exemplified	  in	  text	  and	  
literature.	  I	  believe	  that	  artists	  such	  as	  Joseph	  Beuys	  are	  able	  to	  emulate	  and	  develop	  
these	  theories	  through	  conceptualization	  and	  imaginative	  travel.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
consider	  expanding	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  rhizome	  beyond	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
concept	  in	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  interconnections	  across	  species	  and	  to	  begin	  
to	  dismantle	  the	  species	  divide.	  
Some	  artists,	  for	  example	  Beuys,	  have	  illustrated	  an	  attempt	  at	  dismantling	  this	  
species	  divide	  by	  reaching	  out	  across	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds	  into	  the	  phenomenal	  
world.	  It	  is	  unclear	  in	  reading	  Beuys’s	  intention	  or	  use	  of	  terminology	  when	  he	  discussed	  
I	  like	  America…	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  becoming,	  although	  in	  
my	  understanding	  of	  the	  performance,	  I	  read	  a	  dual	  becoming:	  becoming-­‐animal	  and	  
becoming-­‐shaman,	  with	  the	  additional	  possibility	  of	  Little	  John’s	  becoming-­‐artist.	  Like	  
rhizomatic	  travel,	  there	  exists	  in	  contemporary	  performance	  art	  the	  possibility	  of	  
representing	  travel	  from	  one	  world	  to	  another,	  amplified	  through	  a	  performance	  of	  
becoming.	  Marcus	  Coates,	  a	  British	  performance	  artist,	  illustrates	  possibilities	  of	  
becoming	  and	  what	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  phenomenal	  travel	  in	  his	  artworks	  Journey	  to	  the	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Lower	  World	  (2004)	  and	  The	  Plover’s	  Wing	  (2008).	  Like	  Beuys,	  Coates’s	  works	  attempt	  
to	  heal	  or	  find	  solutions	  to	  problems,	  and	  they	  appropriate	  shamanic	  ritual	  and	  culture.	  
In	  a	  traditional	  sense,	  shamans	  were	  valued	  in	  the	  community	  for	  their	  ability	  to	  
communicate	  with	  other	  species	  in	  the	  spirit/lower/animal	  world.	  In	  this	  same	  way,	  
Coates	  takes	  on	  great	  responsibility	  in	  both	  of	  these	  performances.	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Much	  of	  Coates’s	  artwork	  has	  to	  do	  with	  wildlife;	  he	  is	  an	  active	  ornithologist.	  
Coates	  is	  also	  a	  trained	  contemporary	  shaman.42	  He	  attended	  a	  weekend	  workshop	  in	  
Notting	  Hill,	  London,	  where	  he	  learned	  how	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  spirit	  world,	  to	  
look	  for	  answers	  and	  act	  as	  a	  mediator	  between	  the	  human	  world	  and	  the	  spirit	  world.	  
After	  completing	  the	  course,	  which	  encouraged	  participants	  to	  access	  a	  ‘non-­‐ordinary’	  
psychic	  dimension	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  chanting,	  ‘ethnic’	  drumming	  and	  dream-­‐catchers	  
(Frieze:	  2007),	  Coates	  was	  inducted	  into	  the	  ancient	  techniques	  of	  shamanism.	  Coates	  
has	  explained	  the	  process	  of	  phenomenal	  travel	  as	  essentially	  being	  a	  form	  of	  
imaginative	  visualization.	  Coates	  learned	  from	  a	  contemporary	  abstracted	  form	  of	  
shamanism	  that	  relies	  on	  animals	  as	  ‘guides’,	  encouraging	  practitioners	  to	  project	  
personal	  spirit	  worlds	  in	  relative	  terms	  that	  are	  familiar	  to	  them:	  to	  construct	  an	  idea	  of	  
a	  phenomenal	  world	  that	  is	  comfortable	  for	  the	  artist/shaman/traveler	  (Frieze:	  2007).	  
Coates’s	  particular	  adaptation	  of	  shamanism	  is	  that	  of	  seeking	  out	  an	  animal	  spirit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Coates	  is	  a	  living,	  practicing,	  contemporary	  shaman.	  He	  offers	  little	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  
cultural	  appropriation	  of	  the	  term	  and	  instead	  often	  represents	  himself	  meekly,	  but	  with	  earnest	  
ability.	  Like	  Beuys,	  Coates	  has	  often	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “sham-­‐man”.	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guide	  who	  will	  provide	  answers	  to	  a	  specific	  query,	  which	  Coates	  will	  then	  in	  turn	  deliver	  
to	  the	  human	  world.	  In	  Journey	  to	  the	  Lower	  World	  he	  performs	  for	  residents	  of	  a	  soon-­‐
to-­‐be	  demolished	  building	  in	  Liverpool,	  while	  The	  Plover’s	  Wing	  is	  a	  performance	  for	  the	  
mayor	  of	  Holon	  in	  Israel.	  Coates	  acted	  as	  a	  consultant,	  and	  through	  his	  shamanic	  
perception,	  he	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  youth	  violence	  in	  Holon.	  Journey	  to	  the	  
Lower	  World	  and	  The	  Plover’s	  Wing	  are	  both	  examples	  of	  Coates’s	  cultivated	  	  
shamanic	  performances.	  
The	  artwork	  Journey	  to	  the	  Lower	  World	  is	  a	  video	  documenting	  shamanic	  
performance.	  The	  performance	  took	  place	  in	  Rosa’s	  flat,	  one	  of	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  
building.	  Coates	  began	  the	  performance	  by	  drawing	  the	  green	  curtains	  in	  a	  room	  with	  a	  
giggling,	  giddy,	  skeptical,	  and	  chatty	  audience	  of	  about	  ten	  people,	  mostly	  elderly	  
women,	  sitting	  on	  folding	  chairs	  in	  a	  cramped	  cluster.	  Coates	  wrote	  the	  question,	  ”Do	  
we	  have	  a	  Protector	  for	  this	  site?	  What	  is	  it?“	  on	  a	  whiteboard,	  vacuumed	  the	  ‘stage’	  on	  
which	  he	  performed,	  tied	  his	  keys	  to	  his	  shoelaces,	  and	  began.	  During	  these	  
preparatory	  actions,	  the	  talkative	  audience	  referred	  to	  what	  would	  happen	  next	  as	  a	  
séance	  (which	  Coates	  corrected	  -­‐	  they	  would	  not	  be	  talking	  to	  the	  dead),	  while	  they	  
made	  some	  observations,	  discussed	  what	  Coates	  was	  doing,	  and	  laughed.	  The	  mood	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  performance	  was	  casual	  and	  strangely	  nervous,	  even	  anticipatory.	  
A	  series	  of	  actions	  then	  unfolded:	  Coates	  drank	  from	  a	  mug	  and	  spat	  it	  out	  on	  
the	  carpet,	  deliberately.	  Walking	  into	  another	  room,	  Coates	  turned	  on	  a	  stereo	  of	  
‘ethnic’	  drumming	  and	  dressed	  himself	  in	  an	  elaborate	  stag	  pelt,	  the	  head	  and	  antlers	  
on	  his	  head	  like	  a	  helmet,	  the	  front	  paws	  attached	  to	  his	  hands	  with	  Velcro	  bands,	  and	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the	  body	  of	  the	  pelt	  worn	  with	  suspenders	  over	  his	  brown	  pants	  and	  white	  shirt.	  The	  
performance	  video	  is	  edited	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  suggests	  multiple	  camera	  angles	  (and	  
therefore,	  people	  working	  these	  cameras)	  in	  the	  room.	  The	  perspective	  shifts	  between	  
one	  camera	  that	  focuses	  on	  Coates,	  one	  camera	  in	  the	  side	  room,	  and	  a	  camera	  that	  
pans	  across	  and	  zooms	  in	  on	  the	  audience	  members.	  When	  discussing	  this	  piece	  as	  a	  
performance,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  audience,	  being	  filmed,	  is	  therefore	  
conscious	  of	  these	  cameras	  and	  performing	  as	  well.	  Viewing	  the	  performance	  video	  and	  
not	  having	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  housing	  community,	  I	  am	  displaced	  from	  the	  intent	  of	  this	  
performance,	  and	  therefore	  can	  only	  read	  the	  performance	  and	  the	  suggestion	  of	  
atmosphere	  through	  the	  screen.	  
	  
Fig.	  12.	  Marcus	  Coates,	  Journey	  to	  the	  Lower	  World,	  2004	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In	  Rosa’s	  flat,	  the	  mood	  shifted	  when	  Coates	  came	  into	  the	  room	  wearing	  the	  
stag	  outfit.	  The	  audience	  became	  silent,	  with	  some	  soft	  nervous	  laughs	  disrupting	  the	  
atmosphere.	  Coates	  sat	  in	  the	  chair,	  closed	  his	  eyes,	  focused;	  and	  after	  some	  time	  got	  
up	  in	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  trance,	  slowly	  walked	  across	  the	  stage,	  and	  began	  to	  
squawk,	  squeak,	  twitter,	  bark	  -­‐	  making	  what	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  non-­‐specific	  animal	  
noises.	  The	  sobering	  effect	  of	  the	  drums	  and	  Coates’	  unrecognizable	  yet	  primal	  
language	  appeared	  to	  make	  the	  audience	  nervous.	  Coates	  became	  something	  not	  
human:	  eyes	  closed,	  oblivious	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  audience,	  making	  animal	  noises	  -­‐	  
suddenly	  he	  was	  wild,	  the	  variable,	  the	  unknown.	  This	  was	  deterritorialization,	  
unsettled,	  in	  flight.	  Coates	  was	  becoming-­‐animal,	  becoming-­‐shaman.	  After	  some	  time	  
moving	  around	  the	  stage	  like	  this,	  he	  sat,	  the	  drums	  stopped,	  and	  Coates	  continued	  to	  
communicate	  in	  animal	  sounds.	  At	  times,	  the	  only	  sound	  was	  his	  heavy	  breathing.	  The	  
audience	  waited	  intensely	  for	  something	  to	  happen.	  Coates	  came	  out	  of	  his	  trance,	  
opened	  his	  eyes,	  took	  a	  gulp	  of	  water	  (then	  spat	  it	  out),	  and	  removed	  the	  stag	  costume.	  
Coming	  out	  of	  the	  act	  of	  becoming,	  the	  removal	  of	  subjectivity	  appears	  nearly	  
simplistic	  in	  Coates’s	  version	  of	  becoming.	  The	  changes	  that	  take	  place	  are	  mostly	  
interior:	  Coates’s	  performance	  and	  its	  inherent	  ambiguity	  is	  speculative,	  suggestive	  and	  
non-­‐specific.	  Coates	  the	  shaman	  completes	  his	  performance.	  
Conversation	  between	  Coates	  the	  man/artist	  and	  the	  audience	  began:	  Coates	  
described	  his	  journey.	  In	  his	  description,	  he	  started	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  building,	  moved	  
down	  through	  the	  elevator,	  got	  out	  at	  the	  ground	  floor,	  kept	  going	  down.	  Coates	  the	  
shaman	  came	  to	  a	  series	  of	  caves,	  a	  pool	  of	  water,	  a	  dense	  forest.	  Coates	  described	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meeting	  some	  birds	  whom	  he	  attempted	  to	  talk	  to,	  but	  these	  animals	  were	  not	  
interested	  in	  engaging	  in	  conversation.43	  He	  saw	  a	  stag	  in	  the	  distance.	  Tired,	  Coates	  
settled	  and	  waited	  for	  an	  animal	  to	  come	  to	  him	  rather	  than	  continue	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  
them.	  Eventually,	  a	  small	  hawk	  flew	  near	  and	  came	  to	  rest.	  Coates	  began	  to	  ask	  the	  
bird	  questions.	  Coates	  described	  that	  the	  bird	  extended	  one	  wing,	  and	  he	  saw	  all	  the	  
primary	  feathers	  moving	  independently	  in	  different	  directions,	  so	  that	  the	  bird	  could	  
not	  fly.	  Coates	  said	  the	  bird	  began	  to	  shrink,	  get	  smaller	  and	  smaller,	  and	  then	  extend	  
lengthwise	  until	  it	  eventually	  slid	  away	  like	  a	  snake.	  At	  this	  point,	  Coates	  recalled	  that	  
the	  drums	  stopped	  beating,	  and	  so	  he	  returned,	  through	  the	  series	  of	  caves,	  up	  the	  
elevator,	  back	  to	  Rosa’s	  flat.	  
	  
Fig	  .13.	  Marcus	  Coates,	  Journey	  to	  the	  Lower	  World,	  2004	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Interestingly,	  in	  Coates’s	  description	  of	  meeting	  these	  animals,	  he	  refers	  to	  the	  animals	  as	  “it,”	  
“that,”	  and	  “which”	  instead	  of	  “he,”	  “she,”	  “whom,”	  etc.	  	  Animals	  are	  not	  objects;	  animals	  are	  
subjects.	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Coates	  described	  the	  bird’s	  feathers	  that	  moved	  in	  different	  directions	  and	  
identified	  this	  as	  the	  audience’s	  community.	  Coates,	  speculating,	  suggested	  that	  what	  
they	  needed	  to	  do	  was	  work	  together,	  stick	  together:	  that	  the	  feathers	  represented	  
each	  of	  them.	  Coates	  brought	  the	  message	  back	  from	  the	  lower	  world	  that	  the	  
protector	  for	  the	  site	  is	  not	  some	  outside	  mystical	  animal	  or	  force:	  it	  is	  the	  group,	  the	  
community.	  The	  ambiguity	  and	  non-­‐specificity	  of	  this	  response	  recalls	  a	  tarot	  card	  
reading	  or	  a	  horoscope	  -­‐	  each	  reading	  contains	  elements	  that	  are	  significant	  based	  
upon	  the	  open,	  interpretative,	  and	  general	  nature	  of	  speculative	  readings.	  An	  audience	  
member	  responded	  to	  Coates	  by	  saying	  that	  for	  years	  as	  a	  community	  they	  had	  been	  
striving	  to	  do	  this,	  to	  stick	  together,	  but	  have	  essentially	  and	  consistently	  failed	  to	  do	  
so:	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  group	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  or	  participate	  in	  the	  community.	  
Coates	  suggested	  that	  they	  continue	  to	  try,	  keep	  trying.	  	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  performance,	  the	  audience	  is	  serious,	  receptive,	  even	  
reverent.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  sham	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  sobriety	  of	  
the	  performer.	  Though	  acting	  foolish,	  Coates	  offers	  real	  (obvious)	  advice	  for	  this	  
community	  of	  (dis)believers.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  futility	  alongside	  a	  confirmation	  of	  
what	  the	  audience	  had	  been	  thinking	  all	  along,	  what	  they	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  do	  for	  
their	  community.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  performance	  is	  anti-­‐climatic,	  countering	  the	  intense,	  
strange,	  unearthly44	  performance.	  Coates	  thanked	  the	  audience;	  the	  audience	  clapped.	  
There	  was	  very	  little	  discussion	  following	  the	  performance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Or,	  other-­‐earthly,	  meaning	  of	  an	  earth	  that	  is	  unknown,	  other,	  or	  not	  familiar.	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Journey	  to	  the	  Lower	  World	  represents	  a	  trusting	  yet	  incredulous	  audience	  
bearing	  witness	  to	  shamanic	  ritual,	  becoming-­‐animal	  and	  becoming-­‐shaman.	  	  Acting	  as	  
the	  mediator	  between	  the	  lower	  animal	  world	  and	  the	  human	  world,	  Coates	  is	  
convincing,	  sometimes	  moving,	  sometimes	  silly	  and	  absurd.	  As	  a	  consultant	  in	  the	  
lower	  word,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  some	  animal	  will	  eventually	  respond	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
Coates	  feels	  is	  revelatory	  and	  significant.	  Moving	  past	  the	  obvious	  absurdity	  that	  
Coates	  emulates	  in	  these	  performances	  and	  the	  sometimes	  uncomfortable	  (and	  
regretful)	  audience,	  Coates’	  work	  is	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  question:	  is	  Coates	  
representing	  intuitive	  communication	  with	  the	  lower	  world?	  Coates’	  work	  comes	  close	  
to	  dishonouring	  both	  his	  audience	  and	  the	  sober	  tradition	  of	  shamanism.	  In	  the	  style	  of	  
documentation	  in	  Coates’	  performance	  videos,	  an	  authority	  is	  placed	  upon	  the	  
performer	  that	  may	  not	  be	  appropriate	  or	  warranted.	  The	  video	  documentation	  is	  
polished,	  edited	  to	  pan	  over	  the	  audience’s	  faces	  and	  zoom	  to	  Coates’	  sweaty	  and	  
enthusiastic	  animal	  calls.	  Though	  Coates	  claims	  to	  be	  able	  to	  access	  knowledge	  by	  
travelling	  through	  a	  hole	  in	  the	  ground,	  towards	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  earth,	  he	  may	  also	  be	  
making	  a	  mockery	  of	  his	  audience,	  shamanistic	  tradition,	  and,	  of	  course,	  himself.	  
Despite	  this,	  my	  reading	  of	  Coates’	  work	  is	  that	  he	  is	  earnest,	  and	  his	  ultimate	  
goal	  appears	  to	  be	  positivity;	  this	  is	  aligned	  with	  my	  own	  concepts	  of	  posi-­‐
postmodernism	  and	  my	  experimentation	  with	  communication.	  The	  performances	  are	  
clearly	  performances	  in	  the	  format	  that	  they	  are	  staged	  and	  documented,	  and	  yet	  
Coates	  functions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  non-­‐offensive,	  thought	  provoking,	  and	  positive.	  This	  is	  
clear	  in	  witnessing	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  audience’s	  attitude	  to	  Coates	  in	  Journey	  to	  the	  Lower	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World	  from	  nervous	  confusion	  to	  reverence,	  regard,	  and	  gratitude.	  Though	  Coates	  
eludes	  making	  big	  statements	  or	  providing	  big	  solutions,	  he	  is	  able	  to	  offer	  some	  
insight,	  which,	  though	  minor,	  is	  essential	  and	  cathartic	  for	  the	  audience.	  	  Even	  though	  
Coates	  does	  not	  engage	  with	  live	  animals	  in	  his	  performances,	  his	  interpretations	  of	  his	  
journey	  and	  the	  images	  that	  he	  creates	  for	  the	  audience	  are	  rich,	  descriptive,	  and	  
imaginative.	  On	  a	  spectral	  level,	  Coates	  is	  identifying	  his	  place	  in	  the	  human-­‐animal	  
worlds	  as	  a	  mediator,	  a	  traveler,	  a	  shaman.	  The	  ability	  to	  cross	  over	  barriers	  of	  world	  
and	  language,	  though	  rare,	  is	  in	  some	  cases	  essential	  to	  breaking	  down	  the	  	  
species	  divide.	  
This	  species	  divide	  is	  enforced	  and	  intensified	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  shared	  language,	  
which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  detail	  below.	  Language	  is	  the	  tool	  that	  humans	  have	  used	  to	  
develop	  their	  own	  primacy	  over	  animals,	  usually	  considering	  animals	  as	  void	  of	  culture	  
or	  ability	  (despite	  evidence	  of	  highly	  sophisticated	  communication	  among	  animal	  
species,	  such	  as	  the	  pack	  social	  behavior	  of	  wolves	  or	  tool	  use	  in	  birds).	  Albert	  Liu	  writes	  
“language	  is	  the	  enabling	  force	  that	  allowed	  humankind	  to	  separate	  itself	  from	  other	  
beings,	  to	  master	  them”	  (2002:	  152).	  This	  division,	  the	  lack	  of	  verbal	  communication	  
between	  humans	  and	  animals,	  draws	  an	  idea	  of	  humanity	  away	  from	  the	  animal	  while	  
asserting	  human-­‐assumed	  dominance.45	  If	  animals	  had	  human	  speech,	  I	  would	  suggest	  
that	  while	  a	  distinction	  between	  animal	  and	  human	  would	  remain,	  we	  would	  treat	  
animals	  more	  as	  humans,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  status	  of	  these	  talking	  animals	  would	  be	  
elevated.	  This	  is	  acknowledging,	  of	  course,	  that	  humans	  continue	  to	  oppress,	  dominate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  This	  –	  the	  implied	  lack	  of	  humanity	  in	  animals	  –	  is	  particularly	  important	  when	  we	  consider	  
what	  the	  terms	  human	  and	  animal	  mean	  along	  a	  spectrum	  of	  subjectivity.	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and	  dehumanize	  one	  another	  in	  our	  deeply	  complicated	  human-­‐human	  relationships,	  
and	  animals	  are	  already	  in	  a	  dangerously	  low	  position	  in	  humanity’s	  hierarchy	  of	  
importance.	  As	  Marc	  Bekoff	  writes	  in	  The	  Animal	  Manifesto	  (2010),	  caring	  for	  animals	  
does	  not	  require	  a	  negotiation.	  One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  choose	  to	  be	  compassionate	  
either	  towards	  animals	  or	  towards	  other	  humans.	  He	  writes,	  “many	  people	  around	  the	  
world	  who	  work	  for	  animals	  also	  work	  selflessly	  for	  people.	  Caring	  for	  animals	  doesn’t	  
mean	  caring	  less	  for	  humans:	  compassion	  begets	  compassion.	  When	  we	  learn	  to	  be	  
compassionate	  to	  all	  animals,	  that	  includes	  humanity.	  Compassion	  easily	  crosses	  
species	  lines”	  (21).	  	  Therefore,	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  find	  our	  companion	  animals	  
speaking	  coherently	  and	  expressively,	  we	  would	  be	  faced	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  stage	  
a	  negotiation	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  our	  humanity.	  If	  we	  measure	  our	  own	  humanity	  
against	  what	  we	  are	  not	  (animals),	  and	  if	  animals	  act	  more	  and	  more	  like	  how	  we	  
understand	  humans	  to	  act,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  not	  to	  see	  the	  species	  divide	  blur	  or	  
disappear	  entirely.	  This	  also	  works	  in	  the	  other	  direction,	  from	  humans	  to	  animals.	  
Within	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  humanity,	  there	  are	  varying	  degrees	  of	  expressions	  
of	  wildness	  (we	  see	  this	  in	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  violent	  criminals,	  who	  are	  described	  
as	  “animals,”	  and	  in	  discussions	  of	  using	  violent	  criminals	  in	  scientific	  experiments	  that	  
are	  currently	  done	  on	  animals).46	  Even	  among	  humans,	  there	  exists	  a	  spectrum	  	  
of	  animality.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  This	  is	  a	  complicated	  and	  vast	  topic	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  text.	  It	  is	  valid	  to	  note	  that	  
animals,	  by	  human	  standards,	  engage	  in	  criminal	  behavior,	  such	  as	  theft,	  rape,	  infanticide	  and	  
murder	  for	  sport.	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This	  human-­‐animal	  dichotomy	  is	  a	  partial	  explanation	  for	  humanity’s	  
fascination	  with	  and	  desire	  for	  animals,	  and	  the	  spectrum	  of	  animality	  complicates	  this	  
dichotomy.	  To	  recall	  Haraway’s	  words,	  “we	  have	  never	  been	  human”	  (2008b).	  We,	  as	  
humans,	  are	  as	  animal	  as	  the	  animal;	  the	  animal	  is	  as	  human	  as	  we	  are.	  	  However,	  from	  
a	  humanist	  and	  philosophical	  perspective,	  the	  need	  to	  know	  and	  understand	  animals	  
comes	  from	  a	  need	  to	  know	  and	  understand	  ourselves.	  We	  understand	  ourselves	  based	  
on	  how	  we	  interact	  with	  others,	  regardless	  of	  species.	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  see	  animals	  as	  a	  
way	  to	  self-­‐define,	  self-­‐acknowledge,	  and	  self-­‐reference.	  Because	  we	  (more	  
specifically,	  artists)	  are	  always	  searching	  to	  know	  more	  about	  ourselves,	  it	  becomes	  
necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  desire	  to	  have	  animals	  constantly	  near	  us.	  In	  a	  historical	  
sense,	  this	  fascination	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  desire	  for	  domination:	  to	  control	  that	  which	  we	  
fear,	  the	  unknown	  and	  the	  wild.	  A	  more	  contemporary	  notion	  of	  animal	  presence	  
addresses	  a	  desire	  for	  obedience	  and	  unconditional	  love.	  In	  a	  contemporary	  sense,	  and	  
to	  reference	  French	  post-­‐structuralist	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  as	  the	  animal	  looks	  upon	  us,	  we	  
are	  reflected	  in	  the	  animal	  gaze.	  In	  this,	  we	  recognize	  ourselves	  as	  we	  look	  upon	  	  
the	  animal.	  
This	  recognition	  of	  the	  self	  is	  a	  specific	  condition	  of	  human	  narcissism.	  As	  
Rosalind	  Krauss	  writes,	  in	  a	  psychological	  situation,	  drawing	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  
external	  subject	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  animal-­‐other)	  and	  investing	  it	  in	  the	  self	  is	  narcissism	  
(1976:	  57).	  This	  is	  transference	  of	  interest,	  using	  the	  animal	  as	  a	  mirror	  for	  reflection	  
rather	  than	  a	  subject,	  and	  could	  explain	  to	  some	  degree	  why	  humans	  are	  drawn	  to	  have	  
animals	  infiltrate	  their	  lives.	  Lippit	  describes	  Sigmund	  Freud’s	  psychoanalytic	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breakdown	  of	  the	  animal,	  extracted	  from	  the	  text	  Mourning	  and	  Melancholia,	  where	  
Freud	  identifies	  the	  human	  and	  animal-­‐other	  rupture.	  According	  to	  Freud,	  this	  is	  the	  
origin	  of	  anthropocentrism	  and	  hostility	  toward	  animals	  as	  well	  as	  the	  identification	  of	  
the	  animal-­‐other.	  Lippit	  writes	  that	  the	  animal,	  in	  Freud’s	  anthropological	  version,	  is	  
the	  preformed	  ego	  in	  an	  infantile	  state	  (2000:	  17).	  Once	  the	  infant	  ego	  recognizes	  
crucial	  distinctions	  between	  the	  self	  and	  other,	  the	  other	  forms	  a	  residual	  self.	  
According	  to	  Freud,	  this	  self	  only	  emerges	  through	  eliminating	  what	  is	  other.	  	  With	  this	  
elimination,	  the	  self	  mourns	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  other.	  The	  animal	  in	  Freud’s	  analysis	  locates	  
the	  philosophical	  and	  psychological	  origin	  of	  animal	  sacrifice,	  affirming	  humanity’s	  
primal	  identification	  with	  animals	  and	  a	  need	  to	  overcome	  this	  identification	  (Lippit	  
2000:	  17).	  By	  removing	  an	  understanding	  of	  animals	  from	  how	  we	  understand	  
ourselves,	  we	  disrupt	  the	  balance	  between	  humans	  and	  animals.	  However,	  as	  seen	  
through	  the	  writings	  of	  Thrift	  above,	  this	  disruption	  in	  balance	  results	  in	  a	  development	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  our	  own	  humanity,	  which	  is	  a	  productive	  and	  progressive	  moment.	  	  	  
Derrida	  discuss	  this	  identification	  of	  humanity	  in	  The	  Animal	  that	  Therefore	  I	  am	  
(2008a).	  Of	  primary	  interest	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  contemporary	  art	  and	  animality	  is	  that	  
of	  the	  animal	  gaze.	  Derrida’s	  description	  of	  the	  animal	  gaze	  is	  inextricably	  associated	  
with	  human	  self-­‐identification.	  Derrida	  writes	  that	  the	  desire	  to	  know	  the	  unknown,	  
inherently	  connected	  to	  fear	  of	  the	  unknown,	  is	  a	  product	  of	  humanity	  in	  our	  current,	  
post-­‐modern	  era	  of	  self-­‐reflexivity.	  This	  being	  said,	  animal	  representation	  and	  the	  
animal	  gaze	  become	  tools	  of	  self-­‐reflexivity,	  tools	  used	  to	  identify	  and	  clarify	  the	  
unknowns	  (which	  may	  include	  self-­‐doubt,	  as	  Derrida	  continues	  to	  explain)	  (2008a:	  18).	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The	  animal	  gaze	  can	  have	  a	  powerful	  influence	  on	  humans:	  when	  the	  animal	  gaze	  is	  
met,	  the	  focus	  on	  animals	  is	  inverted	  back	  to	  the	  human.	  When	  we	  look	  upon	  the	  
animal,	  we	  are	  caught	  in	  its	  gaze,	  creating	  self-­‐awareness.	  In	  Derrida’s	  case,	  the	  animal	  
gaze	  comes	  from	  his	  pet	  cat	  staring	  at	  him	  when	  he	  is	  naked,	  causing	  him	  to	  be	  aware	  
of	  his	  nakedness.	  This	  awareness	  instigates	  a	  total	  questioning	  of	  the	  self	  and	  a	  need	  to	  
identify	  the	  basic	  experience	  of	  shame	  while	  simultaneously	  (for	  Derrida)	  needing	  to	  
explain	  this	  shame	  away.	  Derrida	  identifies	  the	  power	  and	  influence	  the	  animal	  seems	  
to	  have	  upon	  him,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  speech	  from	  the	  animal	  further	  empowers	  this	  gaze:	  	  
As	  with	  every	  bottomless	  gaze,	  as	  with	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  other,	  the	  gaze	  called	  
‘animal’	  offers	  to	  my	  sight	  the	  abyssal	  limits	  of	  the	  human:	  the	  inhuman	  or	  the	  
ahuman,	  the	  ends	  of	  man,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  border	  crossing	  from	  which	  
vantage	  man	  dares	  to	  announce	  himself	  to	  himself,	  thereby	  calling	  himself	  by	  
the	  name	  that	  he	  believes	  he	  gives	  himself	  (2008a:	  12).	  	  
	  
Unsettled,	  Derrida	  writes	  of	  “the	  cat’s	  eyes	  looking	  at	  me	  as	  it	  were	  from	  head	  to	  toe,	  
just	  to	  see,	  not	  hesitating	  to	  concentrate	  its	  vision”	  (373).	  Derrida	  identifies	  the	  need	  for	  
humans	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  animal’s	  ability	  not	  only	  to	  look,	  but	  also	  to	  see	  and	  to	  
address	  (383).	  This	  famous	  anecdote	  of	  Derrida’s	  nudity	  and	  his	  small	  female	  cat	  is	  
repeated	  throughout	  his	  text.	  Haraway	  delivers	  a	  concise	  critique	  of	  Derrida’s	  anecdote	  
in	  When	  Species	  Meet	  (2008b);	  rather	  than	  considering	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  gaze,	  Haraway	  
considers	  the	  animal,	  Derrida’s	  cat.	  This	  cat	  is	  a	  literal	  cat,	  existing	  in	  the	  world,	  yet	  
Haraway’s	  critique	  is	  that	  Derrida	  never	  considers	  what	  the	  animal	  herself	  is	  thinking	  
and	  the	  animal’s	  reaction	  to	  Derrida	  (2008b:	  22).	  Haraway	  is	  one	  of	  the	  only	  theorists	  
who	  considers	  the	  animal	  herself	  and	  acknowledges	  the	  animal’s	  autonomy.	  In	  so	  
doing,	  Haraway	  successfully	  demystifies	  the	  animal	  gaze,	  discussing	  the	  agency	  of	  the	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animal	  in	  a	  more	  literal	  sense	  as	  a	  companion,	  and	  reduces	  notions	  of	  
anthropocentrism	  as	  a	  timeless	  conception	  of	  humanity.	  	  
	  
F	  O	  L	  L	  O	  W	  I	  N	  G	  	  
This	  powerful,	  mysterious	  animal	  gaze,	  which	  I	  have	  examined	  in	  my	  
Observation	  series,	  is	  also	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  Following	  series.	  Following	  is	  another	  
experiment	  based	  on	  Boal’s	  games;	  in	  this	  performance,	  Sushi	  follows	  me	  around	  the	  
room.	  It	  is	  simple,	  silent,	  and,	  at	  times,	  unsuccessful.	  My	  goal	  for	  this	  piece	  was	  to	  
identify	  and	  represent	  the	  strong	  connections	  between	  Sushi	  and	  me:	  we	  literally	  follow	  
each	  other	  around	  my	  home.	  At	  times	  during	  these	  performances,	  Sushi	  and	  I	  would	  
stop	  moving	  and	  look	  at	  one	  another.	  The	  connection	  inspired	  by	  her	  looking,	  
addressing	  me,	  facilitated	  the	  performance.	  It	  is	  a	  performance	  that	  potentially	  could	  
have	  no	  ending,	  as	  our	  interest	  in	  one	  another	  is	  unfailing;	  at	  times	  I	  could	  not	  judge	  
who	  was	  following	  whom.	  This	  confusion	  and	  disregard	  for	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  
performance	  truly	  is	  an	  example	  of	  “becoming	  with.”	  Though	  not	  touching,	  only	  
looking,	  Sushi	  and	  I	  were	  able	  to	  follow,	  follow	  through,	  “become	  with”	  just	  by	  “being	  
with”	  one	  another.	  
The	  Following	  series	  illustrated	  our	  strong,	  intuitive	  connection	  through	  
movement,	  through	  looking,	  and	  through	  sensorial	  and	  atmospheric	  communication.	  
In	  the	  original	  game	  by	  Boal,	  one	  of	  the	  humans	  is	  blindfolded.	  This	  person	  moves	  
through	  the	  group,	  responding	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  presence.	  Though	  neither	  Sushi	  nor	  I	  
were	  blindfolded,	  there	  was	  at	  times	  a	  lack	  of	  visual	  connection	  and	  instead	  what	  was	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happening	  was	  what	  I	  would	  call	  a	  more	  sensorial	  and	  phenomenal	  transmission	  
between	  Sushi	  and	  me.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  sense	  where	  Sushi	  was	  in	  the	  room	  even	  when	  I	  
could	  not	  see	  her.	  
	  
Fig.	  14.	  Following,	  2011	  
	  
Our	  literal	  connection,	  sensed	  through	  presence,	  and	  these	  literal	  animals	  in	  
the	  room	  -­‐	  Sushi	  and	  me	  -­‐	  become	  disconnected	  and	  removed	  from	  the	  culture	  of	  
victimization	  of	  animals,	  reductive	  notions	  of	  animals	  in	  theory	  (according	  to	  
Heidegger,	  to	  lack),	  and	  a	  general	  dismissal	  of	  animals	  as	  inconsequential.	  To	  me,	  Sushi	  
is	  of	  the	  highest	  consequence:	  she	  is	  my	  companion	  and	  partner.	  However,	  it	  is	  easy	  for	  
me	  to	  dismiss	  other	  animals,	  even	  other	  cats,	  unless	  we	  have	  spent	  some	  time	  together	  
and	  can	  begin	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  potential	  bond.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
relationships	  that	  are	  formed	  between	  humans	  and	  animals,	  though	  common,	  are	  
specific	  to	  each	  situation.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  have	  this	  deep	  bond	  with	  Sushi,	  I	  do	  
not	  experience	  this	  with	  all	  animals.	  Admittedly,	  I	  have	  become	  normalized	  into	  a	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culture	  desensitized	  to	  road	  kill,	  mousetraps,	  and	  fly	  swatters.	  Sushi	  once	  caught	  a	  
mouse	  in	  my	  apartment;	  I	  encouraged	  her.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  15.	  Following,	  2011	  
	  
	  
A	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  E	  S	  
Haraway	  considers	  the	  literal	  animal	  -­‐	  Sushi,	  Derrida’s	  cat,	  the	  mouse	  -­‐	  to	  turn	  
the	  lens	  to	  very	  real	  conditions	  in	  human-­‐animal	  relationships.	  Current	  popular	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  animals	  and	  humans	  tends	  towards	  
acknowledged	  tensions47	  -­‐	  a	  mutual	  caution	  -­‐	  referencing	  a	  historical	  overload	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  There	  are	  countless	  ways	  to	  frame	  tensions	  between	  humans	  and	  animals.	  Theoretically,	  we	  
note	  the	  differences	  between	  humans	  and	  animals,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  shared	  language,	  which	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violence	  and	  manipulation	  of	  animals	  by	  humans.	  Animals	  continue	  to	  be	  exploited	  for	  
entertainment,	  objectified,	  turned	  to	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  humour,	  bred	  specifically	  for	  
their	  body	  parts	  and	  meats,	  mistreated,	  left	  to	  go	  extinct,	  hunted	  for	  sport	  -­‐	  the	  list	  is	  
endless	  and	  the	  results	  are	  disappointingly	  the	  same:	  the	  animal	  is	  a	  victim.	  It	  is	  difficult	  
to	  discuss	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  without	  acknowledging	  this	  history.	  	  
This	  victimization	  of	  animals	  is	  not	  only	  an	  indication	  of	  historical,	  and	  
unfortunately	  contemporary,	  treatment	  of	  the	  animal,	  but	  also	  of	  an	  ingrained	  cultural	  
memory	  that	  creates	  a	  literal	  separation	  and	  avoidance	  of	  animals	  (when	  they	  are	  not	  
our	  healthy	  companion	  animals),	  particularly	  animals	  we	  perceive	  as	  pests.	  This	  also	  
suggests	  a	  hierarchy	  among	  humans	  and	  animals.	  In	  this	  hierarchy,	  humans	  are	  the	  
most	  dominant;	  following	  that	  are	  companion	  and	  utilitarian	  animals;	  and	  further	  down	  
the	  line,	  there	  are	  what	  we	  understand	  as	  less	  sentient	  and	  pestilent	  animals.	  We	  would	  
rather	  not	  kill	  a	  mouse	  in	  our	  kitchen,	  but	  if	  we	  do	  have	  to	  kill	  it,	  hopefully	  it	  will	  go	  
quietly	  and	  without	  making	  a	  mess.	  A	  dismissive	  and	  passive	  relationship	  towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
results	  in	  misunderstanding	  or	  manipulation.	  There	  are	  also	  academics	  and	  activists	  like	  Peter	  
Singer,	  whose	  texts	  Animal	  Liberation	  (1975a)	  and	  In	  Defense	  of	  Animals	  (2006b)	  are	  renowned	  
for	  measuring	  the	  ethical	  worth	  of	  human	  and	  animal	  life.	  Singer	  writes	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  In	  
Defense	  of	  Animals	  that	  what	  he	  aims	  to	  do	  in	  his	  activism	  is	  to	  “make	  the	  limited	  and	  defensible	  
claim	  that	  where	  animals	  and	  humans	  have	  similar	  interests,	  those	  interests	  are	  to	  be	  counted	  
equally.	  We	  must	  not	  disregard	  or	  discount	  the	  interests	  of	  another	  being,	  merely	  because	  that	  
being	  is	  not	  human”	  (7).	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  distressing	  examples	  of	  animal	  life	  in	  factory	  
farms,	  and	  capitalism	  pushes	  toward	  reducing	  the	  animal	  to	  a	  non-­‐sentient	  being,	  despite	  
concrete	  evidence	  that	  the	  only	  benefit	  to	  factory	  farms	  (despite	  environmental	  concerns,	  the	  
risks	  posed	  to	  human	  health	  and	  well-­‐being,	  and	  the	  huge	  drain	  on	  farmable	  land)	  is	  the	  
resultant	  low-­‐budget	  foods	  (Jonathan	  Safran	  Foer,	  2009;	  Michael	  Pollan,	  2008).	  These	  are	  only	  a	  
few	  examples	  of	  the	  tensions	  existing	  between	  humans	  and	  animals,	  specifically	  referring	  to	  
human-­‐assumed	  dominance.	  There	  are	  also	  many	  examples	  of	  animal	  violence	  against	  humans,	  
equally	  distressing,	  such	  as	  the	  documentary	  Grizzly	  Man	  (Werner	  Herzog,	  2005).	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animal	  pests	  is	  most	  common:	  these	  animals	  are	  regarded	  as	  a	  nuisance,	  with	  humans	  
paying	  little	  attention	  to	  or	  regard	  for	  the	  animal.	  	  	  
Baker	  leads	  the	  discourse	  of	  “animal	  as	  victim”	  (which	  steers	  into	  a	  
conversation	  about	  violence	  and	  animal	  bodies)	  into	  contemporary	  art.	  In	  the	  text	  
Killing	  Animals,	  Baker	  acknowledges,	  “dead	  animal	  bodies	  (or	  even	  images	  of	  dead	  
animal	  bodies)	  carry	  a	  considerable	  symbolic	  weight”	  (2006:	  78).	  A	  dead	  animal	  body	  is	  
a	  politically	  and	  ethically	  charged	  object	  in	  art	  -­‐	  much	  more	  than	  inert	  material	  (78).	  In	  
considering	  the	  intention	  and	  use	  of	  animal	  bodies,	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  
overarching	  historical	  thread	  of	  human	  oppression	  towards	  animals	  and	  ask	  ourselves:	  
what	  is	  to	  be	  done?	  How	  can	  we	  address/acknowledge/rectify	  this	  	  
damaged	  relationship?	  
Shaun	  Gladwell’s	  performative	  video	  Apologies	  (2007-­‐09)	  investigates	  this	  tense	  
relationship	  of	  humans	  toward	  pest	  animals.	  In	  this	  specific	  case,	  the	  artist	  performs	  
with	  kangaroo	  road	  kill	  in	  the	  Australian	  outback.	  Kangaroos	  are	  iconic	  of	  Australian	  
life,	  but	  an	  increase	  in	  numbers	  has	  led	  to	  kangaroo	  harvesting:	  the	  Government	  of	  
Australia	  website	  states	  that	  every	  season,	  based	  on	  kangaroo	  population,	  licensed	  
hunters	  harvest	  kangaroos.	  Because	  of	  this	  increase	  in	  numbers	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  
limitation,	  kangaroos	  are	  often	  seen	  as	  pest	  creatures,	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  victim	  of	  
regular	  road	  kill	  incidents.	  
Gladwell	  takes	  this	  common	  scene,	  the	  corpse	  of	  a	  marsupial	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  
road,	  and	  turns	  it	  into	  a	  grave	  act	  of	  apology,	  an	  expression	  of	  guilt,	  and	  a	  reverence	  for	  
a	  life	  lost.	  Apologies	  is	  a	  somber,	  romantic	  ritual	  that	  the	  artist	  performs	  in	  penance	  for	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countless	  kangaroo	  road	  kill,	  already	  dead,	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Australian	  outback	  roads.	  
In	  the	  video,	  Gladwell	  rides	  up	  to	  the	  side	  of	  the	  road	  on	  his	  motorcycle,	  parks,	  and	  
approaches	  the	  dead	  animal.	  The	  legacy	  of	  Joseph	  Beuys	  has	  infiltrated	  this	  artwork,	  
which	  references	  the	  performance	  How	  to	  Explain	  Pictures	  to	  a	  Dead	  Hare	  (1965).	  	  In	  
that	  performance,	  Beuys	  murmured	  to	  a	  dead	  hare	  as	  he	  tenderly	  cradled	  it	  in	  his	  arms.	  
In	  Gladwell’s	  video,	  ritualized	  action	  and	  an	  apology	  to	  nature	  (the	  animal	  world)	  are	  
slowly,	  softly,	  and	  silently	  performed	  by	  the	  artist.	  Gladwell	  is	  dressed	  in	  futuristic	  
motorcycle	  gear,	  completely	  protected	  from	  head	  to	  toe	  with	  a	  covered	  helmet,	  black	  
leather	  jacket,	  gloves,	  pants,	  and	  boots.	  The	  anonymity	  of	  the	  artist	  contrasts	  with	  the	  
vast	  and	  overheated	  Australian	  landscape,	  and	  heat	  waves	  can	  be	  seen	  coming	  off	  the	  
pavement.	  The	  video,	  filmed	  slowly	  and	  simply,	  with	  one	  shot	  for	  each	  kangaroo	  and	  a	  
stable	  camera,	  is	  framed	  by	  a	  bright	  blue	  sky,	  red	  earthy	  tones,	  and	  the	  suggestion	  of	  
extreme	  heat.	  As	  Gladwell	  rides	  up	  and	  gets	  off	  his	  motorcycle,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  form	  
the	  composition	  of	  the	  scene.	  Gladwell	  walks	  over	  to	  the	  dead	  animal	  and	  tenderly	  
moves	  flies	  away	  from	  the	  body,	  softly	  and	  slowly	  picking	  up	  the	  animal,	  cradling	  it	  like	  
a	  small	  child.	  The	  length	  of	  the	  kangaroo’s	  legs	  sometimes	  escapes	  the	  artist,	  and	  the	  
long	  paws	  hang	  down	  as	  Gladwell	  walks	  across	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  camera	  in	  a	  	  
silent	  lullaby.	  
Gladwell’s	  video	  and	  the	  intimacy	  between	  the	  artist	  and	  the	  dead	  animal	  
provide	  insight	  into	  a	  deeply	  private	  experience:	  death.	  Though	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  
moment	  of	  the	  death	  of	  the	  animal	  escape	  the	  audience,	  the	  suggestion,	  the	  swarming	  
flies,	  and	  the	  sometimes-­‐open	  wounds	  refer	  to	  this	  violence.	  Gladwell	  aptly	  captures	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the	  ongoing	  problem	  of	  road	  kill	  (certainly	  not	  limited	  to	  Australia)	  in	  a	  respectful,	  
apologetic	  manner.	  The	  image	  of	  road	  kill	  suggests	  a	  dismissal	  and	  disregard	  for	  dead	  
animal	  bodies.	  The	  assertion	  of	  dominance	  by	  human	  and	  machine	  as	  the	  kangaroo’s	  
enemy	  is	  unnatural,	  consistent	  with	  an	  un-­‐symbiotic	  and	  destructive	  relationship	  that	  
has	  developed	  with	  wild	  or	  pest	  animals.	  These	  animals	  that	  are	  not	  companion	  animals	  
are	  therefore	  lower	  in	  the	  human-­‐constructed	  hierarchy	  of	  animals.	  And	  for	  these	  
reasons,	  Gladwell	  performs	  an	  apology.	  The	  video	  suggests	  the	  apology	  is	  not	  just	  as	  a	  
motorist	  on	  the	  road	  who	  likely	  could	  have	  contributed	  to	  this	  tragedy,	  but	  from	  the	  
artist	  toward	  all	  animals	  who	  have	  been	  killed	  through	  human	  contact.	  There	  is	  a	  Pietà-­‐
like	  moment,	  a	  somber	  and	  silent	  mourning,	  in	  the	  way	  the	  artist	  tenderly	  picks	  up	  and	  
cradles	  these	  dead	  animals.	  The	  complete	  silence	  of	  the	  video	  contributes	  to	  the	  
somber	  nature	  of	  the	  work.	  Pointing	  to	  an	  international	  problem	  of	  human-­‐animal	  
interactions	  that	  result	  in	  unintended	  violence,	  Gladwell	  identifies	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  
animal	  victim	  in	  the	  human	  world.	  
Gladwell’s	  video	  can	  also	  be	  read	  as	  an	  example	  of	  “becoming	  with”:	  despite	  
the	  reality	  that	  the	  animal	  is	  dead,	  we	  read	  a	  deep	  emotional	  connection	  formed	  
between	  the	  artist	  and	  the	  animal.	  In	  death,	  the	  animal	  cannot	  reciprocate	  this	  
emotional	  connection.	  However,	  in	  Gladwell’s	  gesture	  of	  tenderness,	  reaching	  out	  
towards	  this	  animal,	  the	  intended	  effect	  is	  more	  significant	  than	  merely	  picking	  up	  and	  
moving	  road	  kill.	  Gladwell,	  in	  his	  human	  presumption	  of	  responsibility,	  makes	  a	  grand	  
gesture	  of	  apology	  that	  is	  both	  sentimental	  and	  romantic,	  and	  which	  confirms	  the	  role	  
of	  animal	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  humans.	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Fig.	  16.	  Shaun	  Gladwell,	  Apologies,	  2007-­‐09	  
	  
The	  “animal	  as	  victim”	  debate	  also	  leads	  to	  an	  unavoidable	  discussion	  that	  
addresses	  ethical	  and	  political	  topics	  such	  as	  animal	  rights	  and	  speciesism.	  Peter	  
Singer,	  an	  animal	  rights	  advocate,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  academic	  proponents	  for	  the	  
ethical	  treatment	  of	  animals.	  Singer	  is	  well	  known	  for	  his	  radical	  opinions	  on	  animal	  
liberation	  and	  the	  value	  of	  living	  beings.	  In	  his	  book	  Animal	  Liberation	  (1975a),	  Singer	  
writes	  extensively	  on	  speciesism.	  Speciesism	  demands	  a	  radical,	  political	  response	  -­‐	  
identifying	  animals	  as	  victims	  and	  deserving	  of	  justice.	  In	  Singer’s	  words,	  “speciesism	  is	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the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  justifiable	  to	  give	  preference	  to	  beings	  simply	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  
they	  are	  members	  of	  the	  species	  Homo	  sapiens”	  (2006b:	  3).	  Singer’s	  point	  of	  view	  on	  
speciesism	  in	  academia	  is	  controversial	  at	  best,	  as	  he	  positions	  the	  argument	  of	  species	  
against	  boundaries	  of	  race,	  gender,	  and	  other	  markers	  of	  oppression	  and	  disadvantage	  
in	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  morally	  relevant	  understanding	  of	  equality.	  In	  the	  world	  of	  
philosophy,	  with	  some	  powerful	  exceptions	  such	  as	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Haraway,	  the	  ethical	  
treatment	  of	  animals	  is	  often	  not	  addressed	  or	  is	  under-­‐represented	  in	  the	  discourse.	  
The	  term	  “animal	  rights”	  is	  generally	  not	  used	  in	  academia	  for	  its	  connotations	  of	  
extremism.	  Despite	  this,	  there	  are	  parallels	  in	  Singer’s	  advocacy	  with	  posthumanism,	  
connecting	  a	  radical	  politicized	  conviction	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  to	  a	  grounded	  
philosophical	  understanding	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships.	  Posthumanism,	  in	  its	  
rejection	  of	  human	  supremacy,	  advocates	  human	  responsibility	  towards	  animals.	  
Regardless	  of	  humanity’s	  impression	  of	  or	  attachment	  to	  animals,	  humanity	  has	  a	  stake	  
in	  the	  animal	  dialogue.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  by	  representing	  the	  unavoidable	  connection	  
between	  humans	  and	  animals,	  and	  Wolfe	  points	  to	  the	  progressive	  stance	  that	  humans	  
must	  be	  thoughtful,	  responsible	  beings	  (2010c:	  25).	  Gladwell	  embodies	  this	  sentiment	  
in	  his	  Apologies,	  taking	  on	  the	  burden	  of	  apologizing	  to	  and	  bearing	  responsibility	  for	  
the	  animal	  victims.	  It	  is	  essential	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  animals	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  
consider	  our	  responsibilities	  to	  animals	  and	  to	  ourselves	  despite	  the	  differences	  we’ve	  
come	  to	  understand	  between	  species.	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Taking	  responsibility	  for	  one	  another	  as	  species	  points	  to	  the	  connection	  that	  
we,	  as	  humans,	  feel	  towards	  animals.	  The	  surge	  of	  philosophical	  interest	  in	  the	  animal	  
subject	  following	  Darwin’s	  discoveries	  reflected	  humanity’s	  longstanding	  fascination	  
with	  animals48,	  and	  this	  relates	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  being	  and	  
consciousness.	  Animal-­‐related	  art	  and	  scholarship	  over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years49	  can	  be	  
partially	  explained	  as	  a	  narcissist	  attempt	  to	  understand	  ourselves,	  which,	  though	  
seductive,	  can	  lead	  to	  misunderstandings	  and	  misrepresentations.	  A	  lack	  of	  shared	  
verbal	  language	  displaces	  the	  animal	  from	  our	  concept	  of	  humanity,	  emphasizing	  
difference	  -­‐	  in	  a	  human-­‐centric	  understanding,	  language	  may	  be	  the	  primary	  distinction	  
that	  creates	  a	  separation	  in	  how	  we	  can	  understand	  and	  communicate	  with	  animals.	  
However,	  in	  animals’	  lack	  of	  human	  speech	  (although	  a	  “lack”	  suggests	  that	  the	  animal	  
is	  somehow	  found	  wanting),	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  for	  alternative,	  non-­‐verbal	  
communication.	  	  	  
This	  lack	  of	  shared	  language	  mystified	  the	  animal	  and	  disrupted	  our	  ability	  to	  
conceptualize	  the	  animal’s	  humanity.	  Lippit	  proposes	  that	  the	  fascination	  with	  animals	  
seen	  in	  theorists	  and	  artists	  comes	  from	  a	  separation	  that	  is	  formed	  by	  the	  animal’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Lippit	  notes	  several	  contributing	  circumstances	  to	  this	  recent	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  animals	  in	  
theory:	  along	  with	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Darwinian	  revolution,	  he	  also	  considers	  the	  popularity	  of	  
Freudian	  psychoanalysis	  and	  advances	  in	  technological	  media	  (2000:	  2).	  
49	  Of	  note	  are	  the	  following	  texts	  and	  exhibitions,	  beginning	  in	  1990,	  that	  have	  contributed	  to	  
the	  ongoing	  development	  of	  animals	  represented	  in	  literature	  and	  art:	  Simians	  Cyborgs	  and	  
Women,	  Haraway	  (1990);	  Animal.Anima.Animus.,	  PS	  1	  MOMA	  (1999);	  The	  Open:	  Man	  and	  
Animal,	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (2003);	  Becoming	  Animal,	  MASS	  MOCCA	  (2005-­‐06);	  The	  Animal	  that	  
Therefore	  I	  am,	  Jacques	  Derrida	  (2008);	  The	  Animal	  Gaze,	  conference	  (2008,	  2011);	  Adaptation:	  
Between	  Species,	  The	  Power	  Plant	  (2010).	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inability	  to	  communicate	  through	  language	  (2000).50	  This	  is	  not	  a	  new	  theory,	  but	  one	  
made	  popular	  more	  recently	  through	  the	  writings	  of	  Lippit	  and	  Derrida.	  Immanuel	  
Kant,	  a	  German	  philosopher	  of	  the	  Enlightenment,	  postulated	  a	  moment	  in	  history	  at	  
which	  animals	  claimed	  simultaneous	  difference	  from	  and	  connection	  to	  humans.	  In	  the	  
Conjectural	  Beginning	  of	  Human	  History	  (1786),	  Kant	  identified	  the	  origin	  of	  human	  
language:	  the	  animal	  cry.51	  Lippit	  discusses	  Kant’s	  construction	  of	  the	  animal	  cry,	  which	  
is	  instinctual	  and	  mimicked	  by	  man,	  “moved	  for	  the	  urge	  for	  communication	  to	  make	  
his	  existence	  known	  to	  other	  living	  beings,	  particularly	  to	  such	  as	  utter	  sounds”	  (1786:	  
54).	  The	  human	  was	  inspired	  to	  communicate	  across	  species	  (and	  among	  his	  own	  
species),	  doing	  so	  in	  imitation	  of	  the	  animal.	  This	  is	  Kant’s	  language-­‐origin	  story:	  man,	  
in	  mimesis	  of	  the	  animal,	  was	  taught	  language	  by	  animals.	  	  
Kant’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  animal	  cry	  and	  the	  origin	  of	  human	  language	  lead	  me	  
to	  consider	  the	  distinction	  between	  how	  we	  understand	  animal	  language	  and	  human	  
language.52	  Lippit	  has	  acknowledged	  that	  animals,	  able	  to	  communicate	  among	  their	  
own	  species,	  possess	  a	  secret	  language	  (secret,	  of	  course,	  because	  to	  humans	  it	  is	  
incomprehensible).	  Lippit	  writes	  that	  animals,	  silent	  figures	  of	  nature	  lacking	  the	  
capacity	  for	  human	  speech,	  also	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  self-­‐reflect	  and	  self-­‐conceptualize.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  	  There	  are	  exceptions	  to	  human-­‐animal	  language,	  for	  example,	  animals	  in	  captivity	  that	  have	  
been	  taught	  communication	  or	  primate	  animals	  that	  use	  sign	  language	  to	  communicate.	  
Humans	  endeavor	  to	  understand	  animal-­‐animal	  language	  as	  well	  as	  make	  attempts	  to	  breach	  
the	  animal-­‐human	  language	  barriers.	  
51	  	  The	  animal	  cry	  recognizes	  the	  animal’s	  impulse	  towards	  language	  and	  communication	  though	  
can	  often	  be	  described	  –	  in	  human	  terminology	  –	  as	  unintelligible,	  primordial	  or	  instinctual	  
(Lippit:	  41).	  
52	  There	  are	  examples	  in	  literature	  and	  film	  in	  which	  human	  characters	  are	  able	  to	  communicate	  
to	  animals,	  or	  animals	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  human	  language,	  for	  example,	  Dr.	  Dolittle	  (Hugh	  
Lofting,	  1920-­‐52;	  dir.	  Betty	  Thomas,	  1998)	  Chronicles	  of	  Narnia	  (C.S.	  Lewis,	  1950-­‐56).	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The	  result	  of	  this	  inability	  is	  animals’	  lack	  of	  control	  in	  determining	  or	  regulating	  the	  
discourse	  they	  put	  forth	  (Lippit	  2000:	  21).	  Although	  this	  may	  seem	  similar	  to	  
Heidegger’s	  reductive	  notion	  of	  the	  animal	  -­‐	  that	  of	  a	  creature	  lacking	  one	  of	  
humanity’s	  essential	  abilities	  -­‐	  Lippit	  instead	  empowers	  the	  animal	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  
alternative	  communication.	  In	  Lippit’s	  analysis,	  the	  animal	  lacks	  control,	  and	  in	  place	  of	  
communicating,	  the	  animal	  transmits	  (2000:	  21).	  This	  transmission	  is	  analogous	  to	  
radio	  waves,	  or	  the	  transmission	  of	  a	  feeling.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  alternative,	  operative	  method	  of	  communication	  
across	  species	  opens	  up.	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  alternative	  method	  of	  communication	  is	  
spectral	  in	  nature.	  The	  transmitting	  animal	  does	  not	  lack	  awareness,	  but	  instead	  is	  
uncannily	  hyper-­‐aware,	  omniscient,	  and	  capable	  of	  deep	  revelation	  for	  humans	  (Lippit:	  
70).	  This	  is	  an	  animal	  that	  is	  incapable	  of	  keeping,	  or	  even	  having,	  a	  secret.	  Haraway	  
discusses	  the	  honesty	  of	  the	  animal	  in	  When	  Species	  Meet.	  Haraway	  identifies	  a	  process	  
that	  bio-­‐psychologist	  Barbara	  Smuts	  calls	  “embodied	  communication”	  (2008:	  26).	  This	  
means	  nonlinguistic	  communication	  through	  meaning,	  touch	  and	  greeting,	  which	  can	  
also	  lead	  to	  understanding	  and	  honesty	  across	  species.	  	  
	  
E	  M	  B	  O	  D	  I	  E	  D	  	  	  C	  O	  M	  M	  U	  N	  I	  C	  A	  T	  I	  O	  N	  	  
In	  my	  performances	  with	  Sushi,	  I	  have	  sensed	  an	  atmospheric	  shift,	  a	  shade	  of	  
“becoming	  with”.	  In	  the	  Embodied	  Communication	  series,	  I	  approached	  each	  
performance	  by	  simply	  lying	  down,	  allowing	  Sushi	  to	  react	  to	  me	  and	  direct	  the	  
performance.	  Without	  movement,	  sound,	  or	  touch,	  and	  without	  requesting	  Sushi	  to	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perform	  in	  any	  certain	  way,	  she	  approached	  me	  of	  her	  own	  volition	  and	  expressed	  her	  
affection.53	  In	  both	  Embodied	  Communication	  I	  and	  II,	  as	  I	  lay	  on	  my	  stomach,	  Sushi	  
came	  to	  meet	  me	  face-­‐to-­‐face.	  In	  the	  first	  of	  the	  series,	  we	  simply	  touched	  noses	  and	  
made	  eye	  contact,	  and	  she	  moved	  on	  to	  engage	  in	  other	  activities,	  lying	  near	  my	  side	  
without	  touching.	  In	  this	  performance,	  I	  felt	  we	  had	  a	  strong	  connection,	  built	  and	  
emphasized	  through	  that	  one	  nose-­‐to-­‐nose	  touch.	  In	  the	  second	  of	  the	  series,	  Sushi	  
again	  approached	  me,	  and	  as	  we	  looked	  at	  each	  other	  she	  began	  to	  lick	  my	  face.	  There	  
is	  a	  moment	  of	  affection	  that	  is	  unquestioned:	  Sushi	  is	  providing	  a	  gift	  to	  me	  and	  I	  
graciously	  accept.	  	  
This	  fleeting	  moment	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  was	  sensorial.	  In	  our	  regular,	  daily	  
lives,	  if	  Sushi	  begins	  to	  lick	  my	  hands	  or	  arm	  I	  will	  allow	  it	  but	  generally	  my	  face	  is	  off	  
limits.	  However,	  in	  this	  performance,	  I	  felt	  an	  overwhelming	  and	  powerful	  connection	  
to	  Sushi	  that	  language	  cannot	  capture:	  her	  desire	  to	  provide	  affection	  and	  care	  for	  me	  
was	  welcome.	  Cats	  generally	  lick	  humans	  to	  groom	  and	  show	  affection:	  the	  grooming	  
may	  also	  be	  a	  way	  to	  remove	  ‘human’	  scents	  like	  soap	  and	  moisturizer	  so	  that	  the	  cat	  
may	  mask	  this	  domesticated	  human	  scent	  with	  the	  animal’s	  own.	  After	  this	  has	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  the	  durational	  performance	  Infinity	  Kisses	  (1981-­‐88)	  by	  Carolee	  Schneemann	  
and	  the	  projects	  that	  she	  has	  undertaken	  with	  her	  cat	  Vesper.	  In	  this	  work,	  Schneemann	  has	  
suggested	  that	  in	  the	  action	  of	  holding	  her	  camera,	  Vesper	  would	  immediately	  kiss	  the	  artist	  on	  
the	  mouth.	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  Schneemann’s	  work	  may	  be	  considered	  pivotal	  in	  the	  dialogue	  of	  
human-­‐animal	  communication	  in	  performance	  art.	  However,	  in	  my	  research,	  which	  includes	  
having	  witnessed	  Schneemann	  present	  on	  Infinity	  Kisses	  at	  the	  Animal	  House	  exhibition	  (SAW	  
Gallery,	  Ottawa,	  2009),	  I	  feel	  as	  if	  the	  artist	  is	  deliberately	  silent	  regarding	  the	  ethical	  or	  political	  
implications	  of	  her	  practice.	  Her	  ability	  to	  deflect	  an	  ethical	  dialogue	  leads	  me	  to	  exclude	  her	  
from	  my	  investigation	  of	  human-­‐animal	  communication	  in	  performance.	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  
Carolee	  Schneemann,	  see	  Schneemann,	  Carolee.	  	  Imaging	  Her	  Erotics:	  Essays,	  Interviews,	  
Projects	  (Writing	  Art),	  MIT	  Press,	  2003	  and	  Cameron,	  Dan,	  Kristine	  Stiles	  and	  David	  Levi	  Strauss.	  
Carolee	  Schneemann:	  Up	  to	  and	  Including	  Her	  Limits,	  New	  Museum	  of	  Contemporary	  Art,	  1997.	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completed,	  the	  animal	  can	  be	  assured	  that	  the	  cat	  and	  the	  human	  are	  of	  the	  same	  
species.	  Regardless,	  I	  read	  Sushi’s	  intention	  as	  one	  of	  deep	  affection,	  and	  I	  believe	  I	  
reciprocally	  transmitted	  my	  affection.	  	  
	  
Fig.	  17.	  Embodied	  Communication	  III,	  2011	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  18.	  Embodied	  Communication	  II,	  201	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In	  the	  third	  of	  the	  Embodied	  Communication	  series,	  I	  lay	  down	  on	  my	  back	  and	  
called	  Sushi	  into	  the	  room	  without	  words.	  She	  came	  into	  the	  room,	  contemplated	  the	  
situation,	  and	  lay	  down	  on	  me,	  first	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  and	  then	  she	  shifted	  around	  to	  face	  my	  
feet.	  There	  is	  some	  replication	  here,	  of	  Sushi	  responding	  to	  the	  way	  my	  body	  has	  
formed	  and	  imitating	  that.	  This	  closeness	  captures	  our	  relationship,	  the	  inextricable	  
way	  that	  we	  are	  deeply	  connected	  and	  simple	  acts	  of	  affection	  and	  motion	  amplify	  this	  
connection.	  In	  this	  series,	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  both	  felt	  this	  connection,	  this	  “becoming	  
with”	  and	  “being	  with.”	  In	  the	  Embodied	  Communication	  series,	  I	  suggest	  we	  captured	  a	  
sense	  of	  “coming	  apart.”	  In	  my	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  I	  understand	  that	  Sushi	  and	  I	  physically	  
were	  together	  in	  the	  room,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  meeting,	  we	  experienced	  “becoming	  
with.”	  Also,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  performances	  and	  artistic	  project,	  Sushi	  and	  I	  were	  in	  this	  
series	  attempting	  to	  or	  achieving	  a	  knowing,	  “being	  with,”	  sharing	  the	  concerns	  and	  
conditions	  of	  our	  relationship.	  Yet	  we	  “came	  apart”	  in	  our	  own	  Umwelten,	  we	  existed	  in	  
the	  same	  time	  and	  space	  and	  yet	  we	  did	  not	  influence	  one	  another.	  We	  “came	  apart.”	  	  
	  
I	  N	  T	  E	  R	  N	  E	  T	  	  	  K	  I	  T	  T	  E	  H	  
In	  light	  of	  transmission	  and	  communication	  through	  alternate	  means,	  the	  
performance	  Internet	  Kitteh	  is	  a	  sensorial	  experience	  between	  Sushi	  and	  me.	  Instead	  of	  
calling	  her	  into	  the	  room	  without	  words,	  I	  used	  the	  Internet	  site	  Meowmania	  
(meowmania.jqln.org).	  Meowmania	  is	  a	  series	  of	  cat	  faces	  (which	  look	  like	  collaged	  
cutouts	  from	  magazines).	  When	  you	  click	  anywhere	  on	  the	  screen,	  a	  new	  cat	  face	  pops	  
up	  along	  with	  an	  accompanying	  meow	  sound.	  The	  clicking,	  cat	  faces,	  and	  meows	  are	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endless,	  obsessive,	  always	  hilarious.	  Sushi	  was	  immediately	  drawn	  into	  the	  room	  when	  I	  
opened	  and	  began	  to	  click	  Meowmania.	  She	  ran	  into	  the	  room	  and	  moved	  around	  my	  
computer,	  tried	  to	  find	  the	  cats	  inside,	  moved	  over	  me,	  sat	  on	  my	  lap,	  rubbed	  her	  face	  
in	  my	  face.	  She	  was	  obviously	  confused	  but	  purring	  like	  a	  maniac;	  Meowmania	  was	  one	  
of	  the	  only	  interactions	  that	  Sushi	  has	  had	  with	  other	  cats.	  I	  was	  confused	  by	  her	  
reaction	  to	  the	  webpage,	  as	  she	  would	  sometimes	  focus	  her	  attention	  on	  me,	  and	  
sometimes	  on	  my	  laptop.	  The	  resultant	  sensorial	  effect	  of	  this	  performance	  was	  
confusion,	  yet	  also	  an	  overwhelming	  feeling	  of	  euphoria.	  I	  felt	  good	  about	  Meowmania	  
because	  it	  could	  make	  me	  laugh,	  it	  was	  spontaneous	  (yet	  tirelessly	  predictable)	  and	  
Sushi,	  by	  evidence	  of	  her	  very	  loud	  purring,	  appeared	  to	  have	  a	  good	  time	  as	  well.	  
Whatever	  happened	  during	  this	  performance	  was	  communication	  and	  a	  sincere	  and	  
honest	  transmission	  of	  positivity.	  The	  feeling	  that	  is	  transmitted	  is	  earnest	  and	  
heartfelt.	  When	  both	  Sushi	  and	  I	  felt	  this	  euphoria,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  feeling	  cannot	  be	  
questioned	  and	  instead,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  posi-­‐postmodernism,	  we	  engaged	  in	  the	  
moment,	  laughed	  out	  loud,	  purred	  like	  crazy:	  we	  let	  the	  feeling	  take	  over.	  Sushi	  and	  I	  
were	  honest	  animals	  in	  the	  room.	  
	  
Fig.	  19.	  Jacqueline	  Steck,	  Meowmania,	  2010	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Fig.	  20.	  Internet	  Kitteh,	  2011	  
	  
A	  N	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  S	  U	  B	  J	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  C	  T	  I	  V	  I	  T	  Y	  
An	  example	  of	  an	  honest,	  transmitting	  animal	  can	  be	  found	  in	  philosopher	  
Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra	  (1883-­‐85;	  1961).	  In	  a	  style	  of	  writing	  which	  
combines	  fictional	  literature	  and	  theory,	  Nietzsche	  introduces	  talking	  animals	  that	  
reveal	  to	  the	  protagonist	  Zarathustra	  secrets	  of	  eternal	  return.	  These	  animals	  
specifically	  choose	  Zarathustra,	  among	  all	  other	  humans,	  to	  bear	  witness	  to	  the	  secrets	  
they	  tell.	  In	  Nietzsche’s	  text,	  these	  animals	  are	  spectral	  and	  supernatural	  beings.	  Rather	  
than	  comforting	  companions,	  completely	  in	  opposition	  to	  Haraway’s	  companion	  
species,	  these	  animals	  seek	  to	  disturb	  Zarathustra	  by	  revealing	  secrets	  that	  only	  he	  can	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know,	  causing	  Zarathustra’s	  loneliness	  and	  isolation	  to	  increase.	  In	  knowing	  the	  secrets	  
of	  the	  animals	  in	  combination	  with	  his	  human	  understanding	  and	  emotion,	  Zarathustra	  
becomes	  isolated	  in	  his	  revelation	  (Lippit	  2000:	  70).	  This	  knowing	  is	  “being	  with”:	  it	  is	  
knowing	  that	  which	  formerly	  was	  unknowable.	  This	  alternative	  method	  of	  
communication,	  which	  is	  phenomenal,	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  is	  a	  deep	  
connection	  transmitted	  across	  species.	  For	  example,	  my	  close,	  admittedly	  obsessive	  
and	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  my	  cat	  Sushi	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  these	  strong	  signals.	  I	  
believe	  that	  Sushi	  chooses	  to	  transmit	  (to	  the	  degree	  that	  she	  does),	  and	  I	  am	  making	  
conscious	  or	  subconscious	  decisions	  to	  receive	  these	  transmissions.	  Regardless	  of	  how	  
it	  is	  understood,	  it	  is	  an	  everyday	  phenomenon	  to	  note	  the	  connection	  that	  humans	  feel	  
to	  the	  animal	  species.	  
In	  Dog	  Years,	  Human	  Fears	  (2002),	  Teresa	  Mangum	  discusses	  this	  connection,	  
which	  is	  amplified	  in	  pet	  relationships.	  Mangum	  regards	  these	  domestic	  pet	  
relationships	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  euthanasia,	  and	  the	  responsibility	  that	  the	  human	  
accepts	  to	  interpret	  or	  project	  the	  animal’s	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  case	  of	  illness	  or	  critical	  
injury.	  Mangum	  writes,	  “at	  best	  they	  (pets)	  possess	  accumulated	  experience	  rather	  
than	  ‘subjectivity’”	  (45),	  denying	  the	  animal’s	  capacity	  to	  communicate	  animal	  
emotion.	  Veterinarian	  Clinton	  R.	  Sanders	  sheds	  further	  light	  on	  this	  by	  stating,	  “the	  
emotional	  intensity	  of	  the	  relationships	  that	  often	  develop	  between	  people	  and	  their	  
nonhuman	  companion	  animals	  commonly	  prompt	  human	  caretakers	  to	  be	  ambivalent	  
about,	  or	  reject	  entirely,	  the	  definition	  of	  their	  animals	  as	  mindless,	  objectified,	  
nonpersons	  .	  .	  .”	  (1995:	  197-­‐98).	  With	  this	  statement,	  Sanders	  claims	  that	  the	  human	  in	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the	  pet	  relationship,	  after	  years	  of	  the	  animal	  and	  the	  human	  having	  aged	  together,	  
experienced	  connection,	  and	  felt	  emotion	  across	  species,	  are	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  the	  
notion	  that	  the	  animal	  does	  not	  have	  autonomy	  or	  subjectivity.	  However,	  in	  these	  
instances,	  the	  pet	  owner	  will	  often	  adopt	  or	  construct	  communication	  across	  species,	  
projecting	  an	  identity	  on	  the	  animal.	  This	  strategy,	  in	  which	  pet	  owners	  construct	  
animal	  subjectivity,	  can	  be	  further	  confounded	  and	  complicated	  due	  to	  the	  animal’s	  
silence.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  shared	  speech,	  human	  pet	  owners	  have	  become	  
animal	  narrators	  -­‐	  accustomed	  to	  speaking	  for,	  and	  as,	  their	  animals	  (Mangum	  2002:	  
45).	  But	  do	  we	  love	  our	  pets	  because	  they	  cannot	  speak	  to	  us?	  Because	  we	  project	  the	  
animal’s	  subjectivity	  and	  voice,	  giving	  us	  creative	  license	  as	  authors	  over	  the	  animal’s	  
subjectivity?	  Is	  this	  because	  we	  somehow	  relate	  to	  and	  see	  our	  anthropomorphized	  
version	  of	  animal	  humanity	  in	  the	  animal	  that	  references	  our	  own	  experience?	  
Nietzsche	  sheds	  additional	  light	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  communication	  between	  
animals	  and	  humans.	  Whereas	  the	  animals	  of	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra	  have	  language,	  in	  
continuing	  the	  aforementioned	  theme	  of	  deficit,	  they	  lack	  memory.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  
animals	  in	  the	  text	  that	  have	  overcome	  this	  memory	  disorder:	  these	  are	  the	  animals	  
that	  tell	  the	  secrets.	  The	  animal	  that	  Nietzsche	  writes	  about	  is	  constantly	  forgetting	  to	  
speak.	  Lippit’s	  interpretation	  of	  this	  animal	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  text	  is	  as	  a	  being	  capable	  of	  
comprehending	  language	  but	  forgetting	  a	  response,	  inadvertently	  causing	  the	  animal	  
to	  be	  locked	  in	  a	  gaze	  (2000:	  71).	  Lacking	  memory,	  the	  animal	  also	  lacks	  history;	  
without	  memory	  or	  history,	  death	  loses	  its	  finitude	  (2000:	  39).	  If	  the	  animal	  is	  unable	  to	  
understand,	  remember,	  or	  conceptualize	  death,	  death	  has	  no	  impact.	  	  Subsequently,	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there	  is	  no	  animal	  death,	  only	  animal	  deaths.	  Lippit	  writes	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  being	  that	  
dies,	  but	  the	  moment	  (2000:	  39),	  and	  therefore,	  animals	  mourn.	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  
Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  synthesis	  of	  becoming-­‐animal;	  however,	  rather	  than	  moving	  
from	  the	  pack	  to	  the	  individual,	  the	  only	  real	  animal	  death	  as	  Lippit	  postulates	  is	  the	  
death	  of	  the	  individual,	  the	  Dog.	  The	  animal	  pack	  will	  die	  only	  when	  it	  becomes	  extinct,	  
but	  each	  individual	  animal	  death	  does	  not	  have	  an	  impact.	  (This	  is	  obviously	  an	  
objectionable	  and	  reductive	  understanding	  of	  animal	  death	  in	  light	  of	  the	  individual	  
animal,	  the	  pet,	  but	  suggests	  instead	  a	  lack	  of	  individuality	  for	  the	  collective,	  
anonymous,	  drone).	  The	  becoming	  towards	  death	  defines	  each	  moment	  of	  the	  animal;	  
for	  Lippit,	  in	  each	  moment	  the	  animal	  dies	  and	  passes	  into	  another	  moment	  (2000:	  68).	  
This	  theoretical	  animal	  survives	  our	  human	  conception	  of	  time,	  constantly	  returning	  to	  
the	  human	  world.	  
Our	  human	  need	  to	  understand	  animals	  leads	  me	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  see	  
animals	  functioning	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  introspection	  and	  self-­‐awareness.	  	  By	  using	  the	  
term	  self-­‐awareness,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  we	  make	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  our	  
relationships	  with	  animals	  and	  to	  see	  how	  we	  are	  able	  to	  love	  them,	  to	  trust	  the	  animal	  
to	  trust	  in	  us.	  Generally,	  I	  suspect	  that	  animals	  like	  me:	  I	  speculate	  that	  these	  animals	  
can	  see	  my	  goodness,	  or	  my	  desire	  to	  be	  good,	  and	  therefore	  react	  positively	  to	  me.	  If	  a	  
dog	  growls	  at	  me,	  I	  am	  afraid	  the	  dog	  knows	  something	  that	  I	  do	  not.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  dog	  
can	  see	  right	  through	  me.	  I	  believe	  that	  animals	  are	  hyper-­‐aware.	  What	  if	  the	  animal	  
can	  see	  my	  deepest	  secrets,	  those	  which	  no	  other	  human	  could	  know?	  I	  could	  not	  keep	  
a	  secret	  from	  an	  animal,	  even	  if	  I	  tried.	  Animals	  have	  an	  honesty	  that	  cannot	  be	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hidden54,	  and	  our	  relationships	  and	  connection	  to	  animals	  become	  amplified	  when	  we	  
find	  ourselves	  with	  pet.	  This	  concept	  of	  an	  honest	  animal	  in	  our	  pet	  relationships	  is	  
foiled,	  however,	  when	  we	  look	  to	  animal	  expressions	  of	  dishonesty,	  performance,	  or	  
deception	  in	  nature.55	  	  
Seeking	  to	  understand	  the	  animal	  (to	  understand	  ourselves)	  but	  also	  to	  break	  
down	  this	  assumed	  vulnerability	  leads	  us	  to	  construct	  a	  form	  of	  communication	  across	  
species.	  Some	  of	  this	  communication	  is	  based	  on	  presumption.	  By	  attributing	  human	  
qualities	  to	  the	  animal,	  we	  can	  carry	  on	  conversations	  when	  we	  catch	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  
animal’s	  engagement	  with	  our	  voice.56	  A	  well-­‐known	  painting	  entitled	  His	  Master’s	  
Voice	  (1899)	  by	  Francis	  Barraud	  embodies	  this	  speculation	  of	  engagement	  with	  voice.	  In	  
the	  painting	  (based	  on	  a	  photograph),	  a	  fox	  terrier,	  Nipper,	  sits	  and	  looks	  inquisitively	  at	  
a	  phonograph,	  which	  Barraud	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  playing	  the	  voice	  of	  Barraud’s	  
brother,	  recently	  deceased,	  and	  Nipper’s	  former	  human	  companion.	  The	  painting	  
suggests	  an	  attachment	  that	  is	  sensorial	  and	  goes	  beyond	  an	  understanding	  of	  
embodied	  affection	  between	  humans	  and	  animals	  in	  pet	  relationships.57	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  We	  could	  also	  read	  this	  as	  instinct.	  	  
55	  Deceptive	  strategies	  by	  animals	  in	  the	  wild	  include	  camouflage,	  auditory	  deception,	  hoarding,	  
and	  stealing.	  
56	  With	  the	  surge	  of	  YouTube	  and	  animal	  celebrity	  on	  the	  Internet,	  there	  are	  countless	  examples	  
of	  cats	  that	  have	  been	  anthropomorphized	  and	  presented	  as	  more	  human,	  more	  intelligent,	  
more	  capable	  of	  conversation.	  One	  of	  my	  favourite	  examples	  is	  Talking	  Cat	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XU2EtLHVoiI;	  and	  the	  autotune	  mash-­‐up	  of	  this	  video	  and	  
other	  chatty	  cat	  celebrities	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nr-­‐SZXIVvuo	  (accessed	  February	  
24,	  2011).	  
57	  Barraud	  attempted	  to	  sell	  his	  painting	  as	  a	  logo	  to	  the	  Edison	  Bell	  Company,	  the	  leading	  
manufacturer	  of	  the	  cylinder	  phonograph,	  and	  was	  denied	  based	  on	  the	  reasoning	  that	  “dogs	  
don’t	  listen	  to	  phonographs”	  (Design	  Boom,	  http://www.designboom.com/history/nipper.html,	  
accessed	  February	  9,	  2010).	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Moving	  beyond	  auditory	  sensations,	  are	  there	  other	  forms	  of	  human-­‐animal	  
interaction	  that	  suggest	  communication?	  What	  about	  intuitive	  communication,	  
emphasizing	  the	  inextricable	  bonds	  of	  our	  species	  relationships?	  In	  the	  book	  
Technologies	  of	  Intuition	  (2008),	  Jennifer	  Fisher	  suggests	  that	  intuition	  is	  central	  to	  
processes	  of	  “coming	  to	  know”	  in	  practice	  and	  experience.	  A	  delicate	  balance	  exists	  
between	  clairvoyance,	  fantasy,	  foreknowledge,	  and	  wishful	  thinking.	  	  Intuition	  is	  always	  
contradictory	  and	  paradoxical	  (11).	  In	  my	  thesis	  project,	  I	  connect	  animals	  and	  humans	  
by	  suggesting	  that	  all	  animals	  and	  humans	  alike	  are	  capable	  of	  an	  innate	  knowing.	  This	  
knowing	  transcends	  both	  human	  and	  animal	  experience	  and	  is	  brought	  about	  through	  
deep	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  through	  “being	  with.”	  It	  is	  what	  I	  feel	  when	  I	  am	  with	  
Sushi,	  a	  feeling	  that	  is	  intensified	  during	  our	  performances.	  Though	  this	  knowing	  may	  
be	  benign,	  it	  is	  present	  in	  all	  species	  and	  is	  distinct	  from	  animal	  instinct.	  This	  knowing	  
can	  be	  expressed	  as	  honesty,	  or	  as	  deliberate	  deception:	  it	  is	  paradoxical.	  It	  is	  sensorial,	  
atmospheric,	  transcendental.	  This	  knowing	  is	  read	  not	  only	  as	  a	  projection	  of	  my	  
reflection	  onto	  the	  animal,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  animal’s	  making	  conscious	  decisions	  to	  
transmit	  emotions,	  sense	  and	  affect.	  It	  is	  an	  amplification	  of	  intuition,	  emphasized	  in	  
close	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  that	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  this	  communication.	  
What	  if	  the	  growling	  dog	  knows	  something	  that	  I	  don’t	  know	  about	  myself;	  
what	  if	  my	  subconscious	  sent	  the	  dog	  that	  message?	  	  For	  several	  years,	  I	  have	  believed	  
that	  I	  can	  communicate	  with	  animals	  through	  a	  system	  that	  may	  be	  telepathic.	  I	  have	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not	  been	  able	  to	  prove	  this,	  as	  yet.58	  I	  am	  not	  a	  trained	  psychic,	  I	  don’t	  consider	  myself	  
to	  be	  a	  telepath:	  but	  I	  do	  a	  feel	  a	  strong	  connection	  between	  animals	  and	  myself,	  a	  
connection	  that	  is	  sensorial	  and	  sympathetic.	  By	  believing	  that	  I	  can	  communicate	  with	  
animals,	  can	  I?	  	  Is	  my	  conviction	  enough?	  Is	  it	  about	  having	  faith	  in	  animals	  and	  in	  
myself,	  and	  in	  our	  intuitive	  abilities?	  Speculative	  and	  often	  unbelievable,	  the	  
phenomenon	  of	  communication	  with	  animals59	  sets	  an	  unlikely	  precedent	  for	  human-­‐
animal	  relationships.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  intuitive	  communication	  is	  
available	  to	  all	  species,	  humans	  and	  animals	  alike,	  and	  posit	  that	  this	  communication	  
can	  be	  cultivated	  with	  awareness.	  	  
We	  refer	  to	  intuition	  as	  a	  human	  quality	  and	  instinct	  as	  an	  animal	  one;	  however,	  
this	  should	  not	  imply	  that	  these	  qualities	  are	  exclusive,	  determined	  by	  species.	  It	  can	  be	  
asserted	  that	  animals	  have	  intuition	  and	  that	  there	  is	  latent	  instinct	  in	  humans.	  A	  clear	  
example	  of	  human	  instinct	  is	  the	  need	  to	  procreate,	  not	  only	  for	  biological	  reasons,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Several	  years	  ago	  I	  saved	  a	  scared	  puppy.	  I	  was	  driving	  along	  a	  country	  road	  in	  the	  summer	  at	  
midday	  with	  a	  threatening	  sky	  and	  drastic	  winds	  and	  temperature	  changes:	  a	  rainstorm	  was	  on	  
its	  way.	  I	  stopped	  my	  car	  when	  I	  saw	  a	  parked	  van	  and	  two	  middle	  aged	  women	  scrambling	  
around	  the	  road,	  chasing	  after	  a	  small	  animal	  (which	  I	  eventually	  realized	  was	  a	  puppy).	  I	  opened	  
my	  door	  to	  see	  if	  I	  could	  help	  and	  the	  dog	  –	  I’m	  not	  certain	  where	  she	  was	  coming	  from	  –	  
immediately	  ran	  into	  my	  lap	  before	  I	  could	  even	  get	  out	  the	  car.	  	  It	  happened	  so	  quickly.	  I	  
snuggled	  with	  the	  puppy,	  who	  was	  obviously	  terrified	  of	  the	  approaching	  storm.	  Did	  the	  puppy	  
know	  that	  I	  had	  good	  intentions?	  Why	  did	  the	  puppy	  choose	  me	  while	  running	  away	  from	  the	  
other	  women?	  This	  experience	  has	  puzzled	  me	  for	  years.	  
59	  This	  can	  include	  psychic	  communication,	  or	  more	  analytical	  communication	  such	  as	  the	  
popular	  television	  show	  Dog	  Whisperer	  (with	  Cesar	  Millan,	  National	  Geographic	  Channel	  2004-­‐
present).	  It	  should	  be	  known,	  however,	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  Dog	  Whisperer	  relies	  on	  
dominating	  animals	  (or	  dog	  rehabilitation,	  solving	  behavioral	  problems)	  and	  asserting	  the	  
human	  as	  the	  Alpha,	  or	  the	  pack	  leader.	  This	  emasculates	  animals	  into	  submission	  rather	  than	  
nurturing	  a	  relationship	  that	  is	  based	  on	  respect	  and	  affection.	  Dogs	  often	  growl	  when	  they	  are	  
disturbed	  or	  feel	  like	  their	  territory	  is	  being	  threatened,	  and	  some	  dog	  trainers	  suggest	  that	  this	  
aggression	  will	  become	  dangerous	  if	  it	  is	  not	  checked	  by	  matched	  human	  aggression.	  Barbara	  
Smuts,	  however,	  claims	  that	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  respectful	  relationships,	  the	  human	  must	  not	  
assert	  dominance	  but	  adapt	  to	  the	  animal’s	  emotion	  and	  animality,	  giving	  the	  animal	  space,	  
respect,	  and	  affection	  when	  appropriate	  (2006).	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also	  for	  reasons	  of	  legacy	  and	  culture.	  But	  queering	  these	  instinctual	  actions	  or	  abilities	  
reflects	  a	  current	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  choose	  to	  be	  practical,	  rather	  than	  instinctual,	  
suppressing	  some	  of	  our	  more	  animalistic	  tendencies.	  Particularly	  in	  a	  North	  American,	  
capitalist	  context,	  we	  are	  impressed	  by	  the	  need	  to	  plan,	  to	  be	  comfortable,	  and	  to	  
deny	  our	  instincts.	  	  When	  we	  suspect	  we	  are	  ill	  prior	  to	  being	  diagnosed,	  we	  call	  that	  
awareness.	  Humans	  and	  animals	  can	  be	  rational	  creatures	  and	  our	  concept	  of	  animals	  is	  
one	  of	  difference,	  as	  we	  understand	  animals	  to	  be	  led	  by	  instinct.	  However,	  as	  Nigel	  
Thrift	  writes,	  what	  is	  considered	  animal	  agency	  is	  expanding	  beyond	  conventional	  
notions,	  removing	  the	  nature-­‐culture	  dichotomy,	  where,	  	  
as	  a	  consequence,	  agency	  is	  ascribed	  where	  before	  no	  agency	  was	  noticed.	  So	  
Aristotle	  included	  plants	  and	  animals	  in	  psūchê	  and	  nowadays,	  knowing	  what	  we	  
do	  now,	  their	  claim	  would	  be	  even	  more	  pressing.60	  After	  all,	  we	  live	  in	  a	  world	  
in	  which	  parrots	  have	  been	  taught	  large	  vocabularies	  and	  can	  get	  an	  obituary	  in	  
The	  Economist	  and	  in	  which	  new	  Caledonian	  crows	  routinely	  use	  all	  manner	  of	  
tools	  to	  forge	  tools,	  not	  just	  in	  laboratories	  but	  also	  in	  the	  wild.	  Indeed,	  
rationality	  is	  a	  value	  that	  is	  now	  being	  associated	  with	  animals	  as	  well	  as	  
humans	  (2008a:	  83).	  	  
	  
Thrift	  claims,	  based	  on	  the	  results	  of	  research	  on	  animal	  behavior	  and	  cognition	  over	  
the	  past	  20	  years,	  that	  animals	  are	  more	  rational	  (having	  cognitive	  and	  pre-­‐cognitive	  
capabilities)	  and	  that	  “humans	  are	  less	  rational	  than	  was	  once	  thought	  (that	  is,	  they	  
have	  less	  unique	  cognitive	  and	  pre-­‐cognitive	  capabilities	  that	  are	  able	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
sign	  of	  supremacy	  over	  animals)”	  (2008b:	  157).	  Thrift	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  our	  
understanding	  of	  instinct	  is	  no	  longer	  necessarily	  equal	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  animal:	  
“an	  animal	  can	  have	  a	  genetic	  endowment	  that	  makes	  it	  behave	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  In	  Greek,	  psūchê	  refers	  to	  a	  branch	  of	  science	  that	  studies	  the	  soul.	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it	  is	  also	  able	  to	  reflect	  on	  that	  behaviour”	  (2008b:	  157).	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
consider	  where	  the	  domesticated	  animal,	  an	  animal	  that	  is	  instinctive	  yet	  is	  a	  part	  of,	  
influenced	  by,	  and	  limited	  by	  our	  human	  lives	  can	  fit	  into	  this	  discussion	  of	  instinct	  and	  
rationality.	  This	  is	  an	  animal	  that	  has	  a	  modified	  need	  for	  instinct.	  	  This	  animal	  is	  fed	  
and	  cared	  for,	  given	  a	  place	  to	  sleep	  and	  frequent	  exercise.	  It	  does	  not	  need	  to	  hunt	  or	  
provide	  for	  its	  offspring,	  and	  without	  its	  consent,	  the	  ability	  to	  procreate	  has	  often	  been	  
removed	  or	  the	  animal	  is	  forced	  to	  breed.	  I	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  domestic	  
animals,	  with	  the	  boundaries	  put	  in	  place	  by	  domestication,	  the	  animal	  has	  exchanged	  
an	  instinctual	  notion	  for	  a	  more	  intuitive,	  sentient	  way	  of	  living.	  	  
	  
I	  N	  T	  E	  R	  S	  P	  E	  C	  I	  E	  S	  	  	  C	  O	  L	  L	  A	  B	  O	  R	  A	  T	  I	  O	  N	  	  	  
In	  art	  practice,	  sentient	  animals	  are	  becoming	  popular	  as	  collaborative	  agents,	  
and	  in	  many	  cases,	  it	  is	  the	  animal’s	  instinct	  and	  potential	  for	  wildness	  that	  create	  the	  
collaborative	  framework	  of	  the	  project	  or	  performance.	  The	  performance	  by	  Joseph	  
Beuys	  I	  Like	  America	  and	  America	  Likes	  me	  has	  retroactively	  been	  considered	  an	  
example	  of	  interspecies	  collaboration.	  Lisa	  Jevbratt	  first	  introduced	  the	  term	  
‘interspecies	  collaboration’;	  I	  use	  the	  term	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  of	  species	  
working	  together	  toward	  representing	  the	  goals	  of	  an	  artistic	  project	  within	  a	  
framework	  of	  trust	  and	  shared	  communication.	  However,	  I	  am	  skeptical	  of	  the	  degree	  
to	  which	  collaboration	  may	  occur,	  since	  many	  interactions	  and	  interpretations	  of	  
animal	  actions	  are	  framed	  by	  human	  assumption	  and	  projection.	  Collaboration	  across	  
species	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  manipulation,	  coercion,	  or	  extortion	  of	  the	  animal	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collaborator	  and	  must	  occur	  specifically	  in	  an	  art	  context.61	  By	  using	  the	  term	  
collaboration,	  we	  must	  assume	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  intention	  and	  awareness	  (0f	  the	  artistic	  
stakes)	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  animal.	  In	  my	  performances	  with	  Sushi,	  the	  best	  that	  I	  can	  do	  
is	  read	  Sushi’s	  intention	  based	  on	  our	  collective	  experience	  and	  my	  observation	  of	  her	  
eccentric	  tendencies	  and	  assume	  her	  cognitive	  and	  creative	  input.	  In	  this,	  I	  reject	  the	  
notion	  that	  Sushi	  is	  my	  collaborator:	  we	  are	  what	  we	  are	  in	  our	  performances,	  and	  we	  
are	  reacting	  to	  one	  another,	  but	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  read	  artistic	  intention	  in	  Sushi.	  As	  with	  
my	  experience	  with	  Sushi,	  Beuys	  acknowledged	  that	  in	  I	  Like	  America…,	  Little	  John	  
altered	  and	  even	  directed	  the	  performance.	  The	  animal	  in	  that	  room	  was	  the	  
contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  unknown,	  with	  the	  constant	  possibility	  of	  spontaneity.	  I	  
position	  that	  this	  is	  what	  will	  happen	  when	  we	  bring	  an	  animal	  to	  an	  art	  project,	  an	  
animal	  that	  is	  autonomous	  and	  has	  no	  prior	  training	  in	  performance	  or	  the	  
entertainment	  industry.	  It	  is	  the	  spontaneity	  and	  the	  unknown	  that	  leads	  and	  creates	  
the	  performance,	  not	  the	  animal’s	  collaborative	  nature.	  	  	  
Artist,	  scholar,	  and	  creator	  of	  the	  website	  Interspecies	  Collaboration	  Jevbratt	  
suggests	  that	  artists,	  being	  creatively	  aware,	  have	  an	  inherent	  ability	  to	  collaborate	  
with	  animals.	  As	  Jevbratt	  writes	  on	  her	  website,62	  this	  ability	  to	  read	  artistic	  intention	  in	  
animals	  is	  almost	  supernatural.	  I	  am	  deeply	  skeptical	  of	  placing	  this	  confidence	  in	  
artists.	  Although	  it	  is	  an	  admirable	  notion,	  that	  artists	  are	  able	  to	  complement	  and	  
encourage	  difference	  and	  acceptance	  across	  species,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  I	  previously	  mentioned	  Siegfried	  and	  Roy;	  their	  tigers	  and	  lions	  can	  be	  considered	  
entertainers,	  performers,	  and	  even	  part	  of	  the	  troupe	  –	  employees	  –	  but	  because	  they	  are	  
trained	  for	  the	  acts,	  they	  are	  not	  collaborators.	  
62	  See	  http://www.interspeciescollaboration.net/	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distinguishes	  this	  ability	  in	  artists	  from	  a	  human	  of	  any	  other	  occupation	  or	  interest.	  
Jevbratt	  also	  frames	  the	  artist	  as	  capable	  of	  achieving	  increased	  awareness	  and	  
breaking	  down	  communication	  barriers,	  likening	  artists	  to	  shamans	  or	  mystics.	  The	  
difference	  between	  this	  portrayal	  and	  Beuys’s	  artist-­‐shaman	  is	  that	  Beuys	  adopted	  an	  
identity	  (and	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  believed	  he	  was	  a	  shaman	  becomes	  irrelevant,	  as	  a	  
performative	  identity	  was	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  Beuys’s	  practice),	  while	  Jevbratt	  
suggests	  that	  this	  ability	  to	  break	  down	  barriers	  is	  innate	  in	  artists.	  The	  notion	  that	  the	  
artist	  has	  intrinsic	  supernatural	  or	  extraordinary	  powers	  is	  impossibly	  romantic.	  As	  I	  
mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  text,	  artists	  are	  certainly	  aware	  of	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  
live,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  they	  are	  essentially	  supernatural	  or	  mystic.	  	  
Jevbratt	  continues,	  however,	  to	  position	  a	  natural	  reflexivity	  inherent	  in	  
animals,	  which	  results	  in	  an	  animal’s	  ability	  to	  be	  an	  artistic	  creator.	  Jevbratt	  identifies	  
animals	  as	  having	  a	  creative	  impulse	  that	  is	  dynamic	  and	  deliberate.	  	  Birds	  of	  paradise,	  
for	  example,	  perform	  and	  attempt	  to	  attract	  a	  mate	  through	  vibrant	  displays	  and	  
choreographed	  movements.	  	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  creative	  expression	  in	  
animals	  who	  are	  communicative,	  such	  as	  Koko	  the	  gorilla,	  who	  has	  learned	  sign	  
language,	  or	  elephants	  in	  Thailand	  who	  have	  been	  trained	  to	  paint	  portraits	  of	  other	  
elephants.	  These	  impulses	  of	  performance,	  artistic	  expression,	  and	  emotion	  in	  animals	  
can	  allow	  collaborators	  to	  infer	  communication	  across	  species.	   It	  is	  difficult	  to	  fully	  
accept	  Jevbratt’s	  interspecies	  collaboration	  project	  without	  questioning	  the	  inherent	  
and	  elevated	  status	  she	  gives	  to	  both	  animals	  and	  humans.	  If,	  according	  to	  Jevbratt,	  
artists	  are	  humans	  that	  have	  been	  specifically	  chosen	  to	  embody	  supernatural,	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communicative	  qualities	  with	  awareness,	  as	  well	  as	  creativity	  and	  integrity,	  should	  we	  
not	  question	  her	  position	  that	  all	  animals,	  all	  non-­‐human	  species,	  have	  this	  same	  
inherent	  creativity?	  	  If	  artists	  are	  only	  one	  small	  subset	  of	  the	  human	  species,	  why	  is	  it	  
that	  all	  animals,	  in	  a	  sweeping	  generalization,	  are	  artists?	  	  I	  believe	  that	  Jevbratt	  places	  
too	  much	  faith	  in	  both	  humans	  and	  animals,	  and	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  element	  of	  
play,	  deception,	  or	  intention	  that	  can	  result	  in	  a	  performance	  work	  between	  humans	  
and	  animals.	  In	  watching	  documentation	  of	  Beuys’	  I	  like	  America…,	  despite	  the	  tension	  
and	  the	  implied	  risk,	  there	  is	  playfulness	  from	  both	  the	  human	  and	  the	  animal,	  resulting	  
in	  the	  legacy	  of	  this	  performance	  as	  being	  humorous,	  risky,	  and	  endearing.	  
	  
G	  I	  F	  T	  	  
Nina	  Katchadourian’s	  GIFT	  (1998)	  is	  a	  performative	  project	  which	  I	  believe	  
evokes	  a	  (failed)	  attempt	  at	  interspecies	  collaboration	  (in	  which	  the	  animal,	  in	  this	  case	  
actually	  an	  insect,	  refuses	  to	  collaborate).	  In	  the	  video	  documentation	  of	  a	  
performance,	  the	  artist	  intervened	  upon	  a	  spider’s	  web	  in	  a	  part	  of	  the	  artist’s	  series	  of	  
works	  entitled	  Uninvited	  Collaborations	  with	  Nature.	  This	  particular	  video	  was	  inspired	  
by	  a	  story	  from	  a	  Swedish	  nature	  book	  in	  which	  a	  spider	  wraps	  up	  his	  prey	  to	  present	  it	  
as	  a	  gift	  to	  another	  spider.	  The	  artist	  Katchadourian	  slowly	  and	  painstakingly	  spelled	  
out	  the	  word	  gift	  in	  coloured	  thread	  in	  a	  spider’s	  web,	  using	  a	  pair	  of	  tweezers	  and	  
shaking	  hands.	  The	  frame	  of	  the	  camera	  was	  locked	  onto	  the	  spider’s	  web.	  As	  the	  artist	  
finished	  the	  words,	  the	  spider,	  aggressive	  and	  territorial,	  quickly	  sought	  to	  recapture	  its	  
web.	  Rapidly	  coming	  into	  the	  framed	  scene,	  the	  spider	  removed	  the	  letters	  one	  at	  a	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time,	  flinging	  them	  away	  in	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  anger	  and	  disgust.	  These	  affected	  
emotions	  of	  the	  spider	  strongly	  contrast	  with	  the	  very	  slow	  and	  deliberate,	  and	  
obviously	  difficult	  actions	  of	  the	  artist.	  In	  this	  video,	  the	  spider	  became	  an	  unwilling	  and	  
apparently	  angry	  collaborator	  in	  Katchadourian’s	  work,	  despite	  the	  artist’s	  seemingly	  
good	  intentions.	  In	  spelling	  out	  the	  word	  gift,	  we	  assume	  that	  Katchadourian	  wanted	  to	  
gift	  the	  spider	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  One	  of	  the	  critiques	  of	  interspecies	  collaboration	  is	  that	  
what	  may	  be	  considered	  collaboration	  to	  some	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  merely	  a	  reaction	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  animal	  to	  maintain	  its	  autonomy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  intervention.63	  It	  is	  to	  be	  
expected	  that	  any	  animal,	  or	  human,	  would	  somehow	  react	  to	  an	  intervention	  in	  its	  
space,	  like	  the	  spider,	  or	  a	  complete	  disruption	  through	  displacement,	  as	  in	  Beuys’s	  
coyote,	  and	  there	  is	  little	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  the	  decision-­‐making	  and	  direction	  of	  
the	  artistic	  project	  benefits	  from	  mutual	  collaboration	  across	  species.	  	  
	  
Fig.	  21.	  GIFT,	  Nina	  Katchadourian,	  1998	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Although,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  I	  like	  America…by	  Beuys,	  Little	  John’s	  space	  was	  not	  being	  intervened	  
upon,	  but	  rather	  his	  entire	  lifestyle	  through	  displacement.	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Here	  we	  can	  question	  the	  role	  of	  the	  animal	  in	  these	  performances.	  Is	  the	  
animal	  a	  performer?	  It	  is	  by	  virtue	  of	  Katchadourian’s	  decisions	  that	  the	  spider	  
intervened	  (to	  reclaim	  its	  territory),	  but	  through	  the	  documentation,	  and	  even	  the	  very	  
artful	  and	  deliberate	  way	  that	  the	  spider	  removed	  the	  thread,	  can	  we	  now	  consider	  this	  
spider	  as	  a	  performer,	  an	  artistic	  contributor?	  In	  this	  work,	  as	  in	  Francis	  Alÿs	  The	  
Nightwatch	  (2004),	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  though	  the	  animal’s	  reactions	  
cannot	  be	  predicted,	  the	  artists’	  do	  project	  an	  intention,	  or	  a	  narrative,	  onto	  the	  
animal’s	  contribution.	  Therefore,	  there	  cannot	  be	  honest	  collaboration	  across	  species,	  
even	  if	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  animal	  as	  a	  contributor,	  as	  the	  human	  artist	  retains	  
authorship	  in	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  work.	  
	  
T	  H	  E	  	  	  	  N	  I	  G	  H	  T	  W	  A	  T	  C	  H	  
In	  The	  Nightwatch,	  the	  animal	  that	  had	  been	  displaced	  and	  was	  being	  
intervened	  upon	  was	  a	  small	  red	  fox.	  Similar	  to	  Little	  John,	  this	  fox	  was	  taken	  from	  its	  
environment	  and	  placed	  into	  a	  gallery	  setting.	  The	  fox	  appeared	  to	  be	  performing	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  this	  artwork,	  but	  in	  reality	  the	  fox	  just	  did	  what	  foxes	  will	  do:	  searched,	  
sniffed,	  tried	  to	  find	  an	  exit.	  The	  Nightwatch	  is	  a	  single-­‐channel	  video	  documenting	  the	  
fox’s	  actions	  in	  the	  gallery	  after	  hours	  on	  the	  internal	  surveillance	  system.	  In	  Alÿs’s	  
video	  work,	  the	  fox	  moved	  through	  London’s	  National	  Portrait	  Gallery,	  blended	  into	  the	  
surroundings,	  and	  conducted	  the	  video	  of	  the	  performance	  through	  the	  space	  with	  
unprecedented	  memory	  and	  skill.	  The	  fox	  appeared	  to	  move	  with	  incredible	  purpose	  
through	  the	  space,	  sometimes	  returning	  to	  retrace	  his	  steps	  or	  to	  glance	  up	  at	  some	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paintings,	  and	  followed	  a	  trail	  that	  eventually	  led	  him	  to	  rest	  on	  a	  bench.	  The	  
documentation	  creates	  a	  sense	  of	  voyeurism,	  of	  looking	  with	  curiosity	  from	  above	  at	  
the	  beings	  below.	  Although	  it	  is	  a	  simple	  concept,	  simply	  presented	  by	  the	  artist,	  The	  
Nightwatch	  contained	  limitless	  potential.	  The	  animal	  was	  completely	  unpredictable,	  
and	  any	  number	  of	  situations	  could	  have	  taken	  place.	  Instead,	  the	  fox	  responded	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  seemed	  natural	  -­‐	  in	  a	  way	  that	  I	  would	  think	  a	  fox	  would	  act	  in	  any	  confined	  
space.	  Because	  the	  fox	  is	  out	  of	  context	  in	  the	  gallery,	  it	  is	  fascinating	  to	  watch	  this	  
animal,	  to	  wonder	  if	  it	  is	  trapped	  and	  to	  be	  unsure	  of	  where	  it	  is	  going.64	  This	  animal	  
performer	  unknowingly	  contributed	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  artwork	  that	  enhanced	  barriers	  of	  
domestic-­‐wild	  and	  interior-­‐exterior	  while	  suggesting	  an	  invisibility	  of	  the	  animal	  in	  
everyday	  life.	  This	  animal,	  often	  invisible	  due	  to	  its	  silence	  or	  lack	  of	  speech,	  has	  
presence	  and	  alternate	  communication,	  holds	  our	  fascination,	  and	  inspires	  practice	  and	  
research.	  	  
The	  fox	  of	  Alÿs’s	  work	  embodies	  a	  sense	  of	  “being	  with”	  as	  I	  understand	  it	  
through	  the	  reading	  of	  Heidegger	  and	  Nancy.	  In	  this,	  we	  understand	  a	  sense	  of	  
emptiness,	  in	  considering	  how	  we	  are	  human,	  and	  The	  Nightwatch	  illustrates	  that	  
emptiness	  in	  the	  vacant	  rooms	  of	  portraits:	  human	  faces	  staring	  out	  at	  the	  fox	  and	  the	  
audience.	  Additionally,	  the	  video	  artwork	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  
human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  light	  of	  the	  unknowable,	  subjective	  human	  and	  animal	  
Umwelten:	  that	  which	  we	  can	  perceive	  but	  can	  never	  know.	  We	  can	  also	  see	  in	  this	  work	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  As	  an	  aside,	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  animal	  performance	  encapsulates	  the	  problematic	  of	  urban	  
wildlife.	  Urban	  wildlife,	  like	  raccoons,	  squirrels,	  mice,	  rats,	  and	  even	  foxes	  have	  learned	  to	  adapt	  
and	  evolve	  their	  way	  of	  living.	  In	  this,	  the	  natural	  and	  the	  wild	  become	  slowly	  domesticated	  as	  
we	  humans	  develop	  our	  own	  unnatural	  lives.	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another	  example	  of	  “coming	  apart.”	  The	  fox	  moved	  around	  in	  an	  environment	  generally	  
reserved	  for	  human	  traffic,	  human	  experience,	  human	  concerns.	  However,	  by	  being	  
present	  in	  this	  space,	  the	  fox	  shared	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  space,	  the	  environment.	  
Therefore,	  the	  fox	  is	  “being	  with,”	  while	  contained	  in	  its	  animal	  world,	  and	  “coming	  
apart”	  by	  existing	  in	  its	  own	  Umwelten	  while	  intervening	  into	  a	  space	  of	  shared	  human	  
and	  animal	  concern	  (or	  perhaps,	  being	  intervened	  upon).	  Ontologically,	  the	  fox	  can	  
understand	  the	  limitations	  of	  its	  being,	  as	  can	  the	  human	  audience.	  Alÿs’s	  profoundly	  
simplistic	  artwork,	  the	  concept	  of	  which	  is	  endearingly	  clever,	  is	  layered	  in	  an	  
understanding	  of	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds,	  and	  
connections	  -­‐	  physical	  or	  phenomenological	  -­‐	  across	  species.	  	  
	  
Fig.	  22.	  Francis	  Alÿs,	  The	  Nightwatch,	  2004
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Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  began	  as	  an	  investigation	  of	  an	  interspecies	  relationship	  
and	  continues	  as	  one.	  This	  project	  has	  captured	  only	  one	  small	  glimpse	  into	  the	  
possibilities	  of	  communication	  between	  species	  in	  a	  speculative	  consideration	  of	  
theoretical	  and	  ideological	  frameworks.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  daily	  actions	  and	  affections	  of	  
a	  human-­‐animal	  relationship	  that	  is	  ongoing:	  the	  multiple	  phases,	  stages,	  moments,	  
feelings,	  and	  ideas	  that	  are	  contained	  within	  this	  thesis	  are	  still	  under	  development.	  My	  
relationship	  to	  Sushi	  continues,	  alongside	  possibilities	  of	  “becoming	  with,”	  “being	  
with,”	  and	  “coming	  apart.”	  I	  continue	  to	  consider	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  
communication	  in	  our	  relationship	  could	  be	  amplified.	  I	  strive	  to	  further	  reflect	  and	  
meditate	  upon	  terms	  like	  species,	  posthuman,	  hum-­‐animal.	  
	   In	  the	  process	  of	  writing	  and	  performing	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room,	  I	  have	  formed	  an	  
emergent	  methodology	  and	  ideology	  in	  posi-­‐postmodernism,	  which	  is	  still	  undergoing	  
development	  and	  conceptualization.	  In	  this	  ideology,	  I	  have	  opened	  up	  the	  conditions	  
to	  consider	  a	  speculative	  and	  ambiguous	  connection	  between	  concept	  and	  process	  and	  
between	  action	  and	  research	  in	  artistic	  practice.	  I	  have	  built	  a	  bridge	  of	  possibility	  for	  
understanding	  human-­‐animal	  relationships	  in	  a	  posi-­‐postmodernist	  light.	  This	  ideology,	  
paired	  with	  the	  theoretical	  lens	  of	  posthumanism,	  reflects	  the	  interdisciplinarity	  of	  the	  
project,	  spanning	  discipline,	  definition,	  and	  production	  in	  a	  resultant	  non-­‐hierarchical	  
and	  non-­‐specific	  thesis	  project.	  	  
Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  is	  a	  thesis	  and	  artistic	  project	  that	  has	  led	  me	  to	  consider	  
the	  conditions	  under	  which	  I	  strive	  to	  understand	  my	  own	  humanity,	  and	  in	  this	  way,	  
my	  relationship	  with	  Sushi	  has	  also	  been	  placed	  under	  investigation.	  The	  original	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inspiration	  for	  the	  project	  was	  to	  discover	  and	  develop	  a	  concept	  of	  animal	  autonomy	  in	  
performance	  art;	  however,	  as	  the	  project	  developed,	  I	  shifted	  the	  focus	  toward	  the	  
human	  and	  the	  resulting	  human-­‐animal	  relationships.	  In	  our	  performances	  together,	  
Sushi	  and	  I	  have	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  differences	  inherent	  in	  our	  species	  and	  the	  
insurmountable	  barriers	  and	  the	  continuous	  optimism	  that	  these	  same	  barriers	  bring	  
into	  focus.	  “Coming	  apart,”	  which	  is	  my	  conceptual	  development	  of	  the	  contrasting,	  yet	  
complementary,	  nature	  of	  Haraway’s	  concept	  of	  “becoming	  with”	  and	  Heidegger’s	  
“being	  with,”	  acknowledges	  that	  humans	  and	  animals	  live	  in	  their	  own	  respective	  
worlds.	  However,	  in	  “coming	  apart,”	  we	  can	  perceive	  the	  differences	  of	  these	  worlds	  
without	  loneliness	  or	  anonymity.	  Instead,	  we	  continue	  just	  to	  “be.”	  We	  “come	  apart”	  
because	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  “be	  with,”	  which	  is	  to	  know,	  another	  human,	  an	  animal,	  or	  
ourselves.	  This	  acknowledgment	  can	  create	  new	  possibilities	  of	  searching,	  asking	  
questions,	  and	  hopefulness.	  
My	  research	  has	  included	  a	  dialogue	  of	  human-­‐animal	  communication	  and	  
relationships	  that	  has	  led	  me	  to	  examine	  speculation	  and	  ambiguity	  in	  light	  of	  
contemporary	  performance	  art.	  This	  dialogue	  has	  considered	  the	  ethics	  and	  politics	  of	  
evaluating	  human-­‐animal	  relationships,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theoretical	  consideration	  of	  animal	  
language,	  the	  animal	  gaze,	  and	  animal	  affect.	  Paired	  with	  the	  process	  of	  performance	  
and	  experimentation	  in	  my	  artistic	  project,	  this	  thesis	  project	  has	  therefore	  been	  
informed	  by	  theory,	  lived	  experience,	  practice-­‐led	  research,	  and	  conceptual	  notions	  of	  
our	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds.	  With	  the	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  thesis,	  by	  asking	  questions	  
about	  human	  and	  animal	  relationships,	  I	  have	  contributed	  valuable	  research	  through	  a	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process	  of	  thinking	  through	  questions	  and	  possibilities.	  This	  research	  can	  lead	  into	  
countless	  areas:	  animals	  in	  performance	  art,	  the	  ethics	  of	  animals	  in	  art	  and	  practice,	  
telepathic	  communication	  between	  human	  and	  animal	  worlds,	  domestic	  relationships,	  
death	  and	  loss,	  animal	  emotion,	  projection	  in	  artistic	  practice	  -­‐	  this	  list	  could	  be	  further	  
expanded	  upon.	  I	  note	  here	  that	  all	  of	  these	  areas	  of	  study	  are	  integral	  to	  
understanding	  how	  humans	  regard	  animals	  in	  our	  daily	  lives,	  as	  humans	  and	  animals	  
are	  vitally	  connected.	  	   	  
Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  identifies	  a	  crucial	  moment	  in	  the	  field	  of	  interdisciplinary	  -­‐	  
and	  ‘animal’	  -­‐	  studies,	  a	  moment	  of	  clarification	  and	  identification.	  This	  is	  a	  moment	  of	  
truth	  for	  the	  consideration	  of	  animals	  in	  human	  lives,	  animals	  in	  animal	  worlds,	  and	  
animal	  and	  human	  cross-­‐interference	  into	  one	  another’s	  worlds.	  What	  do	  we	  consider	  
when	  we	  consider	  the	  animal?	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  weight	  of	  ethics	  
and	  animal	  autonomy	  while	  maintaining	  that	  human	  language	  and	  projection	  forms	  the	  
conditions	  of	  our	  understanding	  -­‐	  how	  we	  connect	  with	  and	  communicate	  to	  animals.	  It	  
is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  animals	  are	  more	  often	  than	  not	  given	  a	  voice	  through	  human	  
projection,	  and	  very	  little	  is	  known	  about	  animal	  emotion.	  This	  project	  identifies	  some	  
hope	  and	  optimism:	  in	  using	  human	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘respect’	  and	  ‘trust’,	  we	  can	  
acknowledge	  the	  animal	  within	  the	  animal	  world	  without	  infringing	  upon	  what	  we	  can	  
only	  presume	  is	  the	  animal’s	  intention	  and	  well-­‐being.	  
	   Having	  completed	  this	  body	  of	  work	  and	  thesis	  I	  can	  look	  toward	  bringing	  my	  
art	  practice	  with	  Sushi	  into	  further	  experimentation:	  of	  dimensionality	  and	  material,	  of	  
concept;	  creating	  deliberate	  limitations	  but	  expanding	  beyond	  time	  and	  space.	  As	  Sushi	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and	  I	  age	  together,	  I’ve	  noted	  changes	  in	  our	  relationship.	  In	  a	  way,	  we	  have	  both	  
settled	  into	  a	  comfortable	  place	  of	  working	  with	  and	  living	  with	  one	  another	  as	  
companions,	  with	  some	  eccentricities	  and	  spontaneity.	  	  Expanding	  upon	  our	  
performances,	  Sushi	  and	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  cultivate	  possibilities	  of	  communication	  in	  
our	  daily	  relationship,	  attempting	  to	  condition	  our	  non-­‐verbal	  communication.	  Sushi	  
continues	  to	  inspire	  me	  to	  challenge	  the	  assumptions	  of	  her	  species.	  
	   Finally,	  as	  this	  project	  is	  one	  that	  captures	  a	  brief	  moment	  of	  a	  human-­‐animal	  
relationship,	  it	  is	  one	  that	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  developed	  and	  expanded	  upon.	  I	  also	  
suggest	  that	  my	  research	  and	  speculation	  in	  this	  project	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  human-­‐
animal	  relationships	  in	  considering	  what	  “coming	  apart”	  can	  mean.	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  
is	  therefore	  fleeting	  and	  sensorial	  but	  monumental,	  confident,	  and	  assertively	  
suggesting	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  barrier	  of	  our	  species	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  posthuman	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Artists	  are	  not	  real	  people.	  There's	  this	  Jerry	  Saltz	  lecture	  somewhere	  online	  where	  
he's	  talking	  about	  the	  sublime	  and	  during	  the	  lecture	  he	  makes	  an	  analogy	  about	  
how	  non-­‐artists	  are	   like	  dogs	   in	  that	  they	  deal	  directly	  with	  the	  world:	  you	  ask	  a	  
dog	  to	  come	  to	  you	  and	  it	  will.	  Whereas	  artists	  are	  like	  cats,	  y'know,	  you	  call	  for	  a	  
cat	   and	   that	   cat	   is	   not	   fucking	   coming	   to	   you;	   they'll	   take	   a	   stroll	   around	   the	  
fucking	  room,	  rub	  up	  on	  a	  bunch	  of	  shit,	  then	  rub	  your	  tiny	  ankle	  and	  be	  off.	  And	  
then	   Saltzer,	   he	   said	   artists	   are	   like	   that	   in	   that	   they	   have	   an	   indirect	   way	   of	  
dealing	  with	  the	  real	  world,	  through	  the	  making	  of	  art,	  artists	  create	  this	  system	  
of	  occupying	  the	  world	  in	  this	  indirect,	  yet	  very	  distinct	  way.	  	  
Hennessy	  Youngman,	  Art	  in	  America:	  International	  Review.	  March	  24,	  2011.	  65	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In	  my	  artistic	  practice,	  I	  investigate	  relationships	  and	  expand	  upon	  the	  
conditions	  and	  stakes	  of	  relationships.	  My	  artistic	  practice	  is	  both	  performative	  and	  
autobiographical.	  Each	  tone,	  expression,	  limitation,	  and	  suggestion	  in	  my	  art	  practice	  is	  
performative.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  queering	  the	  limitations	  of	  expectations	  for	  ourselves	  
and	  for	  each	  other.	  	  	  
My	  practice	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  any	  one	  media,	  and	  it	  challenges	  traditional	  
concepts	  of	  craft	  and	  performance	  through	  quilting,	  stop-­‐motion	  documentation,	  
drawing,	  writing,	  photography,	  and	  installation.	  	  I	  engage	  with	  research	  methodologies	  
that	  emulate	  or	  parallel	  academic	  practice	  in	  order	  to	  juxtapose	  the	  immeasurable	  and	  
ambiguous	  with	  data,	  analysis,	  and	  logic.	  In	  my	  practice,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  written	  text	  
and	  performance,	  I	  confuse	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  author	  by	  using	  statements	  such	  as	  the	  
individual	  “I,”	  the	  accusatory	  “you,”	  and	  the	  communal	  “we.”	  Weaving	  a	  pseudo-­‐fictive	  
narrative	  into	  the	  artwork,	  I	  subtly	  effect	  a	  subversion	  of	  the	  viewer’s	  assumptions.	  I	  
provoke	  compelling	  dialogue	  that	  questions	  accepted	  notions	  of	  normativity	  and	  the	  
everyday.	  I	  use	  speculation	  as	  an	  artistic	  trope.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  collaboration,	  
collective	  experience,	  collective	  memory,	  group	  dynamics,	  and	  social	  repair.	  
	   I	  am	  currently	  working	  on	  an	  ideological	  framework	  with	  genealogical	  roots	  in	  
Postmodernism	  and	  Existentialism	  and	  combining	  Romantic	  Conceptualism	  and	  
Posthumanism.	  This	  framework	  is	  called	  Posi-­‐postmodernism.	  Posi-­‐postmodernism	  
considers	  the	  current	  state	  of	  our	  emotional	  understanding	  to	  take	  into	  account	  shifting	  
approaches	  to	  social	  interactions	  and	  relationships.	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This	  appendix	  is	  a	  QuickTime	  video	  file	  of	  the	  Animals	  in	  the	  Room	  stop-­‐motion	  
video.	  The	  file	  name	  of	  this	  video	  file	  is	  “animals	  in	  the	  room.mov”.	  
	   	  	  
